

THE NEW MARKET CAMPAIGN




NEW MARKET BATTLEFIELD MILITARY MUSEUM





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MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN CABELL BRECKINRIDGE,

C. S. A.

THE NEW MARKET CAMPAIGN

MAY, 1864

BY

EDWARD RAYMOND TURNER

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BY
EDWARD RAYMOND TURNER

TO
MY AUNT

Mary Louise Turner

A WOMAN OF THE
OLD SOUTH



NEW MARKET BATTLEFIELD C. 1898 PHOTO TAKEN FROM SHIRLEY'S HILL LOOKING NORTHEAST TO MANOR'S HILL, FIRST UNION POSITION MAY 15. TOP LEFT, PEAK OF MASSANUTTEN MOUNTAIN WHERE GENERAL SIGEL'S SIGNAL CORPS WAS LOCATED. HOUSE IN LEFT FOREGROUND WAS BUILT IN 1867.

PREFACE

THE writing of this volume was made possible by the preliminary researches of Captain Henry A. Wise, Colonel George H. Smith, Lieutenant-Colonel George M. Edgar, and Mr. Benjamin A. Colonna.

The battle of New Market, though one of the smaller engagements of the Civil War, possessed certain striking features which made it such an attractive subject, that it had been described by numerous writers. Moreover the part taken by the Cadets was so brilliant and unique that tales of their exploits, from the very day of the battle, were given wide circulation. To those in a position to know, however, it was evident that no satisfactory account had been written; for notwithstanding that General Sigel, General Imboden, and others had given versions, their work was obviously semi-popular and incomplete; while everything relating to the Cadets was more or less a matter of rumor and controversy, exaggerated assertions being made by their partisans, and sweeping denials by those who opposed them.

The desirability of writing an authoritative account had occurred to a number of those who took part in the battle, but to no one more than Captain Wise, who led the much debated charge of the Cadets, and who ardently wished that the part taken by his comrades should be perpetuated and placed in the proper light. With this purpose in view he began a study of the subject, which was continued for twenty years, and which resulted in the collection of much of the material used as a basis for this study. He began by bringing together every-

thing that had hitherto been written about the battle. He then tried to get possession of such source materials as existed outside of the War Department. Finally he endeavored to have every surviving officer and Cadet write all that he knew about the Valley campaign and all that he could learn from others. For years Captain Wise carried on a voluminous correspondence, asking and answering questions, and continually seeking for new information. In all of this he was eminently successful, for men on both sides told him all that they knew, while a number of small collections were given to him by those who had previously begun them. The result was an extraordinary mass of material, of uneven value, it is true, but proportionately speaking, as voluminous and minute, perhaps, as similar material relating to any battle of the Civil War. The entire accumulation was delivered to me to be used in the composition of this book.

Meanwhile, Colonel George H. Smith, who commanded the 62d Virginia Regiment at New Market, undertook to write an account of the battle. He was the first who tried to do this in a scientific way. A legal training and a judicial temperament caused him to weigh and compare evidence in a manner not theretofore characteristic of the study of this incident. He was one of the first, moreover, to visit the battlefield, and endeavor to determine accurately the positions of the troops. The result of his investigations was a series of papers dealing with the New Market campaign. When my own work was begun, the first draft, filled as it was with inaccuracies, was sent to him for criticism. I shall never forget the moderation with which this older student took issue with me, the courtesy with which my attention was called to mistakes, and the suggestive and constructive advice which was given to me. Since

then this advice has always been at my service, and I have constantly profited by it. The opponents of Colonel Smith have reproached him with making mistakes, which he had afterward to acknowledge; but I know of almost no one else who has done pioneer work in this field, who has been able progressively to abandon errors, errors unavoidable because of the chaos of obscurity in which the subject was enveloped, for closer approximations to the truth, which he was himself helping to establish. It is one of the most pleasant tasks in writing this book to pay a tribute to this Southern gentleman.

Lieutenant-Colonel George M. Edgar, who commanded the 26th Virginia Battalion at New Market, and who directed one of the decisive movements in the battle, had begun to write a history also. The men of the 26th Battalion had been hardly dealt with. At a critical moment in the fight they had charged desperately upon the enemy and broken his line, doing much to enable their comrades to win the battle; yet for a long time it was asserted that they had remained in the rear as a reserve. Colonel Edgar desired to undo this injustice. He began to collect material and study the sources, and would undoubtedly have composed one of the ablest and most accurate histories of the battle yet written, when the present undertaking was brought to his attention. Then not only did he give the author the benefit of his knowledge and experience, but with rare generosity turned over the entire collection of materials which had been amassed by him, desiring only that justice be done to all.

Another task remained, which was undertaken by the one most fitted to do it. There was no accurate survey, and no adequate topographical map of the battlefield. In 1911 this was executed by Mr. Benjamin A. Colonna, a New Market

Cadet, whose training in the government service made him eminently qualified. When the map was completed, copies were sent to most of the commanders who had taken part in the battle, with the request that they mark the several positions of their commands, and the lines along which they had moved, and answer a series of carefully prepared questions. The invaluable data thus obtained was likewise delivered to me.

My own task has been the using of all this material, a task characterized by such difficulty as I fear will be appreciated only by those who have tried to make military history minute and detailed. The very mass of the evidence was bewildering, while a part of it was contradictory, owing to the fact that in regard to some matters eye-witnesses, indeed men who participated in the same movement, had given diametrically opposite accounts; a difficulty not lessened by the fact that as a rule numbers of writers had hastened to substantiate the rival narratives. Accordingly while this volume is intended to be approximately a final statement, I put forward the solution of some of the problems with considerable diffidence, though I fear some of them are destined not to be solved in a manner satisfactory to all authorities. I have constantly been reproached for not doing justice, and reproved for not making my account different; but I hope for the lenity of these critics in asking them to consider that from nearly every one of the commands I have statements to show that when a retreat was made, that command retreated last or did not retreat at all; that when a charge was made, that command charged first, and first broke the enemy's line; and that when cannon were taken, that command captured them. I have been conscious of no prejudice myself, and I have desired earnestly and tried arduously to tell the truth. I have good reason to believe that

the conclusions presented are correct, but if they are mistaken, I hope that the mass of evidence submitted will assist my critics in correcting them. The bibliography and the discussion of the sources there contained will show the character of the materials used and the methods employed in using them. I may say that the earlier drafts of this work were for more than two years subjected to the scrutiny of those best qualified to criticise them.

Some of the more important results of this study may be summed up as follows:

There was no such disparity of numbers in the opposing forces as has often been stated: Sigel had about 6,000 men in the battle; Breckinridge about 4,500.

The Federal army was defeated because of the slow, faltering, and clumsy strategy of its commander, and through a lack of hearty co-operation on the part of the different commands.

The Confederate triumph was owing to superb and brilliant movements of Imboden and Breckinridge, who showed themselves no unworthy successors of Stonewall Jackson, and to the resolute bravery of the veteran Confederate troops.

The decisive factors on May 15 were the storming of the Federal position on the right, the excellent handling of the Confederate artillery, the defeat of the Federal cavalry, and the desperate charges made by the Confederate center.

As regards the Cadets it may be said:

Any assertion that the Cadets won the battle of New Market, or stemmed a Confederate rout, are popular exaggerations which have tended to discredit what they actually did.

There is no doubt that they held the gap in the Confederate line, fought wondrously well, and by their example stimulated the adjoining regiments to make the decisive charge.

It remains only to make my grateful acknowledgments to all who assisted me either by contribution, criticism, or suggestion. I am under particular obligations to Lieutenant-Colonel George M. Edgar, of Paris, Kentucky; the Rev. Dr. C. W. Humphreys, of Milton, Florida; Colonel George H. Smith, of Los Angeles, California; Mr. Preston Cocke and Major Branch B. Morgan of Richmond, Virginia; and Mr. Benjamin A. Colonna of Washington, D. C. I must again mention Captain Henry A. Wise and Mr. Preston Cocke, who not only assisted and encouraged me at all times, but by their arduous labors in preparing the way, made possible the undertaking and completion of this work.

EDWARD RAYMOND TURNER.

ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN.

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
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
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SHIRLEY'S HILL

C.1898, FIRST CONFEDERATE POSITION (ABOUT NOON) MAY 15, 1864. IN RIGHT FOREGROUND IS WHERE SKIRMISHERS OF THE 30TH VIRGINIA DROVE IN THE SKIRMISHERS OF COMPANIES A & B OF THE 18TH CONNECTICUT. THE FIRST MAN KILLED IN THE BATTLE WAS CAPTAIN WILLIAM L. SPAULDING OF THE 18TH CONNECTICUT. HE WAS MORTALLY WOUNDED AND CARRIED TO THE REAR OF EWING'S BATTERY, ON MANOR'S HILL, WHERE THE NEW MARKET BATTLEFIELD MILITARY MUSEUM IS NOW LOCATED.





WAR MAP OF VIRGINIA 1864

BY BRANCH B. MORGAN, C.E.
BASED UPON THE MAP OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA 1864 IN
BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR
BY PERMISSION OF THE CENTURY COMPANY



CONFEDERATE MONUMENT-ERECTED BY THE WOMEN'S MEMORIAL SOCIETY, MAY 12, 1898, TO THE MEMORY OF ALL SOUTHERN SOLDIERS WHO FELL IN THE BATTLE OF NEW MARKET, MAY 15, 1864. LOCATED IN ST. MATTHEWS CEMETARY WHERE CAPTAIN SNOW'S MARYLAND ARTILLERY WAS POSITIONED 12:30 PM.

THE NEW MARKET CAMPAIGN

1864

CHAPTER I.

THE SITUATION IN THE VALLEY.

IT HAS been said that the battle of Gettysburg marked a turning point in the fortunes of the Confederacy not only because it foreboded the exhaustion of the South, but because the North, realizing at last the actual horror of warfare on its own soil, made renewed and gigantic efforts to bring the struggle to a close. However this may be, it is certain that during the winter of 1863 and the months following huge additions were made to the Federal forces in Virginia, and that presently under the masterly leadership of Grant and his lieutenants an onward march was begun upon the Confederates from all sides at once. And such was now the disparity of the opposing armies that the advance could thus be made, because while it was necessary that Lee, for example, should mass his thinned ranks in concentrated strength, and oppose the main body of the enemy, it was possible for Grant at the same time to advance upon his great antagonist with an overwhelming army, and yet out of the superfluity of his numbers threaten him from other points as well. At the time, perhaps, it could not be seen clearly, but it was, as we now know, the beginning of the end.

In the spring of 1864 Grant planned to overwhelm the Confederate resistance by combined strategy and simultaneous

advance. In the west, Banks was to abandon Texas and, collecting 25,000 men, make an attempt upon Mobile, while in the south, Sherman was to break up Johnston's army and destroy the Confederacy from within. The work in the east, the most difficult part, Grant reserved for himself. There Lee's army, which had so long stood at bay, was to be surrounded and attacked on every side.¹ While Grant with the main army advanced in front, plans were made to draw in upon Lee from all other directions as well, to threaten Richmond, to disturb his communications, to raid the country in his rear, and to destroy his base of supplies. Thus Butler with 33,000 men moving up the James River from Fort Monroe was to attack Richmond on the one side, while on the other Union troops were to raid the Shenandoah Valley and get possession of southwest Virginia.

It is not necessary to trace the history of this combined movement. It may be said that in carrying out the frontal attack Grant soon became locked in a death struggle with Lee in the Wilderness. On the Peninsula Butler accomplished nothing, but was immediately shut up between the James and the Appomattox as completely as if he had been in a bottle corked.² Meanwhile, however, the movements from southwest and western Virginia bade fair to destroy the Confederate rear.

At the beginning of 1864 the Federal Department of West

¹ For Grant's plan see *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (abbreviated hereafter *War Records*), serial 1, vol. XXXII, part III, 245, 246; ser. 1, vol. XXXIII, 827-829; also *Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant*, II, 129-133.

² Report of General Grant, July 22, 1865, in *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVI, part I, 18. For the entire plan see *ibid.*, 15-17. For the causes of this shameful failure see G. W. Wolfson, "Butler's Relations with Grant and the Army of the James in 1864," *South Atlantic Quarterly*, X, 377-393.

Virginia was under the command of Major-General Franz Sigel³ who, it is estimated, had altogether about 25,000 men.⁴ These were somewhat scattered, the largest bodies being a force under Crook in the Kanawha region of southwest Virginia, and a force under Sigel himself near Martinsburg, West Virginia. In addition many men were doing guard duty along the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, the all important line from Baltimore to the west.⁵

In working out his general plan, Grant intended that these forces should destroy the Valley railroads and seize Lynchburg and Staunton. Sigel says that on March 29 he received orders from Grant to dispatch within ten days 8,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry, picked men, to march to Staunton by way of Covington.⁶ In the meantime Crook was to make a raid in southwest Virginia for the purpose of destroying as much as possible of the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, and then move on to Lynchburg. As this plan was presently worked out, Crook's task was considered the more important, so that he was given 10,000 men, while Sigel, who says that he had remaining only about 7,000, was expected to engage the enemy from the north and create a diversion.⁷

³ *War Records*, ser. I, vol. XXXIII, 618, 664. See below, Appendix B, p. 117. Also *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, IV, 487.

⁴ In a report to Thomas, March 29, 1864, Sigel gives the total number as 22,397. *War Records*, ser. I, vol. XXXIII, 762-765. In another place Sigel says 24,000. "Sigel in the Shenandoah Valley in 1864," *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, IV, 487. According to a Southern writer he had more than 27,000. William Allan, in *Southern Historical Society Papers*, XI, 271.

⁵ *War Records*, ser. I, vol. XXXIII, 762-765; Allan, *place cited*; Sigel, *place cited*.

⁶ Sigel, *ibid.* Cf. *War Records*, ser. I, vol. XXXIII, 765, 874.

⁷ *War Records*, ser. I, vol. XXXIII, part I, 901, 911, 964, 1027, 1028; *ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XXXVII, part I, 368, 369; Sigel, *place cited*, 487; Allan, *Southern Historical Society Papers*, XI, 271.

The advance from the southwest need only be mentioned here. On May 2 Crook marched from the Kanawha River, and on the 9th defeated A. G. Jenkins at Cloyd's Mountain. Following the enemy he entered Dublin, and destroyed a quantity of military stores. On the 11th he defeated the Confederates at New River, and burning the bridge there, cut the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad in two, and so achieved the most important part of his task. With Averell, who had left Logan Court House on May 6 in command of two thousand men, Crook effected a junction at Union in Monroe County on May 15th. By the 19th he had finished his retreat. He had not reached Lynchburg, but he had accomplished a large part of what had been intended.⁸

While Crook and Averell were fighting in the south, Sigel was marching up the Shenandoah Valley in the course of a campaign filled with glory for his opponents, but fraught with disaster to himself; the campaign which culminated at New Market.

Sigel's movement was intended to be largely for the purpose of diverting the attention of the Confederates from Crook,⁹ his objective point being Staunton, where he could

⁸ *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 8-67, 365, 710, 728, 736, 737; Colonel J. Stoddard Johnston, MS. *The Battle of New Market*, 2; Allan, XI, 271; Holmes Conrad, *New Market Day*, 24, 25.

⁹ Sigel, *place cited*, 487, 488. Grant writing to Sherman, April 4, had said: "From the expedition from the Department of West Virginia I do not calculate on very great results, but it is the only way I can take troops from there. With the long line of railroad Sigel has to protect he can spare no troops, except to move directly to his front. In this way he must get through to inflict great damage on the enemy, or the enemy must detach from one of his armies a large force to protect it. In other words, if Sigel can't skin himself he can hold a leg whilst some one else skins." *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXII, part III, 246. On May 8, Sigel wrote to Grant: "If I receive no orders to the contrary, I will move

command the Virginia Central Railroad, now the Chesapeake and Ohio.¹⁰ On May 1 he prepared for his advance up the Valley by sending his baggage to the rear. Soon afterward he set out, moving with the slowness which characterized most of his subsequent operations, so that in two weeks he had gone no farther than the little village of New Market about fifty miles from Winchester, whence he had started. It is probable that his forces amounted in all to about 6,500 men.¹¹

At first Sigel believed that his march would be almost unopposed. At Winchester and at Cedar Creek he learned that there was no hostile force in the Shenandoah Valley except Imboden's cavalry and mounted infantry, which exaggerated reports made out to be 3,000 strong.¹² Before leaving Winchester he dispatched two forces of cavalry to guard his flanks: to the right he sent Colonel Jacob Higgins with 500 horsemen in the direction of Wardensville; to the left Colonel William H. Boyd with 300 horsemen into the Luray Valley. The first disaster came in a few days when both of these detachments met with total defeat, thus leaving his flanks exposed.¹³ On

up the Shenandoah Valley and try to come into communication and form a junction with General Crook, who is expected to be at Lewisberg on or about the 14th instant." *Ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XXXVII, part I, 407. For Sigel's correspondence with Grant, cf. *ibid.*, ser. I, vol. XXXIII, 874, 901, 911.

¹⁰ General John Echols, *Address on the Life and Character of General John C. Breckinridge*, 5.

¹¹ Sigel's army has been variously estimated to have contained from 5,000 to 15,000 men. See below, pp. 111-116.

¹² Sigel, *place cited*, 488; Sigel to Grant, May 1, 1864, in *War Records*, ser. I, vol. XXXVII, part I, 364, 365; Major Theodore F. Lang, MS. Personal Recollections of the Battle of New Market. It is probable that Imboden did not have more than 2,000 men.

¹³ Sigel, *ibid.*; Lang, *ibid.*; *War Records*, ser. I, vol. XXXVII, part I, 427, 428.

May 9 Sigel was joined by Sullivan's division at Cedar Creek, and on the 10th, after a cavalry skirmish, he occupied Woodstock. Here fell into his hands all of the enemy's telegraphic correspondence, from which he learned that Breckinridge was hastening toward him with 4,000 men to reinforce Imboden.¹⁴

On May 13 Sigel sent forward three regiments of infantry, 900 cavalry, and six guns, under Colonel Augustus Moor. The next day they encountered a portion of Imboden's army near Mount Jackson, and forcing them across the Shenandoah, got possession of the bridge, and then followed them to New

¹⁴ *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 427, 446; Sigel, *place cited*; Lang, *place cited*. The Confederates seem to have believed that Sigel was not aware that there were in his front any hostile forces save those of Imboden. Colonel J. Stoddard Johnston, General Breckinridge's Chief of Staff, says that when on the night of the 14th Breckinridge learned that Federal troops had occupied New Market, he determined to attack them early in the morning, before they should receive information of his advance. He adds that Sigel "was wholly unconscious of the presence of any force in his front, except a few cavalry which had been steadily falling back before his advance." The Battle of New Market, 5. It seems that while Sigel knew from the captured correspondence that Breckinridge was hastening against him, he did not know of the actual presence of his opponent until early on the morning of the 15th. Major Lang, of Sigel's Staff, says: "Sigel" received "information of this exploit" (the forcing of the Shenandoah at Mount Jackson) "late at night of the 14th, and at the same time also that Breckinridge was on his march down the Valley. From Sigel's headquarters at Mount Jackson, at about midnight, we learned that Colonel Moor was in close quarters with either Imboden or Breckinridge, for we could hear the report of artillery at intervals during the remainder of the night. So, at about three o'clock, the writer was ordered to take a squadron of cavalry and proceed to the front, in order to keep the commanding general informed as to the situation. When the writer reported to Colonel Moor, he found a deserter from General Imboden's command, who gave the first information as to the troops that were in front of us." *Personal Recollections*, etc. "We had driven the enemy out of the town the night before, and were not looking

Market, seven miles beyond.¹⁵ The result of this success was that the two divisions of Sigel's army, one part at Woodstock, the other at New Market, were separated by a distance of about nineteen miles.¹⁶ Herein lies one of the explanations of Sigel's failure. At no time thereafter was he able to get all of his forces united against the Confederate attack.¹⁷

for trouble, as we were in ignorance . . . of the proximity of Breckinridge's forces, as we also suppose was the case with General Sigel." MS. letter of A. J. Gilbert (123d Ohio Regiment) to B. A. Colonna, Dec. 12, 1910.

¹⁵ Report of Colonel Augustus Moor, 28th Ohio Infantry, May 21, 1864, in *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 79-81; Imboden, "The Battle of New Market," in *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, IV, 482; Sigel, *ibid.*, 488. Cf. *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 731, 733.

¹⁶ Sigel, *place cited*, 488. In a dispatch to Grant, May 13, 1864, Sigel explains his plan as follows: "My principal object in advancing up the Shenandoah Valley was to threaten Staunton, to divide the forces of Breckinridge, and to assist by those means General Crook, whose object is to destroy New River bridge. . . . My forces are insufficient for offensive operations in this country, where the enemy is continuously on my flank and rear. My intention, therefore, is not to advance farther than this place with my main force, but I have sent out strong parties in every direction. Skirmishing is going on every day. If Breckinridge should advance against us I will resist him at some convenient position. My cavalry is at Mount Jackson to-day." *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 446, 447.

¹⁷ Lang, *Personal Recollections*, etc. In describing the battle, the author says: "Soon the skirmish lines of the two armies were engaged. Then it was that Sigel made his first appearance upon the field. I enquired for his troops, and received the reply that they were coming, and in turn he received from the writer, 'yes, General, but too late.'" See also below, p. 101, where Major Lang's strictures are quoted. A. J. Gilbert (123d Ohio Regiment) says that he was "much surprised to see, about nine o'clock in the morning, the approach toward our line of the solid lines of Breckinridge's troops . . . as it was known that Sigel had his force strung out down the Valley for several miles, and only our little brigade with a section of Battery D with us, it was easy to compre-

Learning of his subordinate's success late on the night of the 14th, Sigel believed that Mount Jackson would afford an admirable position from which to confront his opponent. Very early on the morning of the 15th he ordered his remaining troops to advance, so that by ten o'clock they had reached Mount Jackson, seven miles in the rear of Moor at New Market.¹⁸ Here, he says, while he was debating whether to go farther or not, he got word from Colonel Moor and others¹⁹ that the troops at New Market were in an excellent situation, that the men were eager for a fight, and that Breckinridge was in their front. Two batteries were asked for. Hereupon Sigel resolved to fight the enemy at New Market.²⁰ Accordingly he hastened forward and arrived upon the scene about noon. Immediately, however, he realized that all of his forces could not reach New Market in time, since the battle had begun. He now changed his plan once more, and, as will be seen, ordered Moor to fall slowly back.²¹

hend what the outcome was going to be." Letter to B. A. Colonna, Dec. 12, 1910.

¹⁸ Sigel, *place cited*, 488.

¹⁹ Major Lang says: "The writer at once dispatched a courier to Sigel . . . requesting him to bring forward his entire force, and to make no delay, as we would certainly soon have a battle. At this period day was just breaking . . . the writer with his squadron took position . . . on a high point . . . from this point the maneuvers of the Confederates could be seen in the distance, south of New Market . . . every ten minutes I would send a courier to Sigel to bring his troops to the front at a double quick." *Personal Recollections*, etc.

²⁰ "Believing that a retreat would have a bad effect on our troops, and well aware of the strategical value of New Market, commanding, as it did, the road to Luray, Culpeper, and Charlottesville, as well as the road to Brock's Gap and Moorfield, I resolved to hold the enemy in check until the arrival of our main forces from Mount Jackson and then accept battle." Sigel, *place cited*, 488.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 489. The march of the Federal forces to New Market is



MAJOR-GENERAL FRANZ SIGEL,

U. S. A.

The Federal movements had thus far been characterized by uncertainty, slowness, and indecision. Already there had been partial failure. Many of the men were disheartened before the campaign was well begun, while as the critical moment drew near, it brought to the minds of the officers misgiving and foreboding of disaster.²²

In contrast with this wavering policy were the swift and decisive movements of the Confederates. The opening of the campaign found them defending lines which were extended and which might easily be broken. The country to be protected had long since been drained of its men, so that at all times during the campaign the Confederate forces were numerically inferior to their enemies. But what they lacked in numbers and equipment was supplied by their energy and the skill of their commanders. It is true that their task was an impossible one, and before long they were destined to be swept aside and defeated; but, acting along interior lines, at first they did accomplish the seemingly impossible, and for a short time held Lee's base of supplies unharmed and almost untouched.

Brigadier-General John D. Imboden, who was commanding in the Valley, says that as early as April he knew that Sigel would attempt an invasion of the Shenandoah country.²³

described by Walker, *History of the Eighteenth Regiment Connecticut Volunteers*, 212-217; Rawling, *History of the First Regiment Virginia Infantry*, 163-164; Keyes, *Military History of the 123d Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry*, 54.

²² Cf. Lincoln, *Life With the Thirty-Fourth Massachusetts Infantry*, 260 ff.

²³ Imboden, "The Battle of New Market," in *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, IV, 480. For various rumors and predictions cf. *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXIII, 1253, 1254, 1255, 1291, 1295, 1297, 1305, 1319, 1322, 1324.

Accordingly on May 2 he broke camp at Mount Crawford, Rockingham County, and advanced to meet Sigel and learn what he could. Since he had with him a force of less than 1,600 men, he summoned the reserves of Rockingham and Augusta Counties to be ready at a moment's notice, while he sent a similar order to the Cadets of the Virginia Military Institute at Lexington.²⁴

On May 5 he obtained positive information as to Sigel's superior force, and so dispatched to General Lee urgent requests that aid be sent him.²⁵ Meanwhile he actively confronted his opponent, falling back slowly and watching every movement. First he tried to compel the Federal troops to withdraw by striking the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad in their rear. To accomplish this end McNeill's Virginia Partisan Rangers made a dash around Sigel, and striking the railroad at Piedmont, West Virginia, wrought enormous damage, burning the bridge and machine-shops, and destroying locomotives and other property worth, it was said, several million dollars.²⁶ A few days later, when Sigel sent out strong bodies of cavalry to cover his flanks, Imboden by rapid and daring movements struck them separately and captured or dispersed

²⁴ Imboden, *place cited*, Imboden's force consisted of the 62d Virginia mounted infantry, Colonel George H. Smith; the 23d Virginia Cavalry, Colonel Robert White; the 18th Virginia Cavalry, Colonel George W. Imboden; Major Harry Gilmor's battalion of cavalry; part of Major Sturgis Davis's Maryland battalion of cavalry; Captain J. H. McNeill's Rangers; Captain J. H. McClanahan's battery, six guns; and Captain Bartlett's Valley District Signal Corps. *Ibid.*

²⁵ MS. Letter of Imboden to Henry A. Wise, June 6, 1895.

²⁶ See McNeill's report in *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 69; also *ibid.*, 383, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392. Cf. *Richmond Enquirer*, May 17, 1864; also "War Path" in (Richmond) *Sentinel*, May 25, 1864.

the greater part of their forces.²⁷ Thus he was able to retard the Federal advance until in a few days he learned that Breckinridge was hastening from southwestern Virginia to succor him.²⁸

Major-General John Cabell Breckinridge²⁹ received command of the Western Department of Virginia on February 25.³⁰ The jurisdiction included east Tennessee, and Virginia west of the Blue Ridge Mountains, his headquarters being at Dublin, Pulaski County, Virginia, on the East Tennessee, Virginia, and Georgia Railroad, so that he might guard the important salt-works and lead-mines nearby. The frontier which he must defend was several hundred miles long; the troops granted him for this purpose were few and insufficient. The forces at his disposal consisted of one brigade of infantry under Brigadier-General John Echols at Monroe Draught, and another under Brigadier-General Gabriel C. Wharton at the Narrows of New River, twenty-six miles from Dublin. In addition he had a force of Tennessee cavalry under General John C. Vaughan, the Kentucky cavalry of General John H. Morgan at Abingdon, General A. G. Jenkins's cavalry at the Narrows of New River, and a brigade of cavalry under Colonel W. L. Jackson at Warm Springs.³¹ Thus at the time when

²⁷ *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 71, 73, 724, 725, 726, 729, 734; Imboden, "The Battle of New Market," *place cited*, 481; Imboden to Henry A. Wise, June 6, 1895. See above, p. 5.

²⁸ For Imboden's masterly retreat see an article by "War Path" in (Richmond) *Sentinel*, May 25, 1864. Cf. Imboden, *place cited*, 481; Imboden to Henry A. Wise, June 6, 1895.

²⁹ See below, Appendix C, p. 119.

³⁰ *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXIII, 1198. He assumed command March 5. *Ibid.*, 1211. MS. Draft of a Report of the Battle of New Market written by Colonel J. Stoddard Johnston for General Breckinridge, "shortly after the battle;" cited as Breckinridge, Report.

³¹ Colonel J. Stoddard Johnston, MS. The Battle of New Market, 1.

Sigel was preparing to advance upon Staunton, Breckinridge had less than 10,000 men in his entire department, his forces consisting of two small brigades of infantry, and four small brigades of cavalry partly dismounted.³² All of these troops were widely scattered.

Breckinridge had been informed earlier that the enemy was preparing to move against him, but about May 1 he ascertained that Crook was advancing with a strong force from the Kanawha.³³ He at once endeavored so to arrange his small and dispersed forces as to frustrate this move, and engaged busily in preparations to drive Crook back; but meanwhile the danger from Sigel became still more pressing.³⁴ On May 4, Breckinridge received a dispatch from President Davis at Richmond saying that Sigel was advancing up the Shenandoah Valley, and suggesting that he might have to protect that place.³⁵ Accordingly he communicated with Lee, and on the morning of May 5 received answer that Sigel was on the march, and that his movement threatened Lee's left at the same time that Grant's entire army was advancing. Accordingly he was ordered to the defense of Staunton with all his available force to check the Valley movement as soon as possible.³⁶

³² Lieutenant-Colonel George M. Edgar, MS. Notes of Comment on the Battle of New Market; C. W. Humphreys, "Battle of New Market" in (Richmond) *Times-Dispatch*, October 8, 1905; Echols, *Address*, 6.

³³ *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 707, 709; J. S. Johnston, *The Battle of New Market*, 2.

³⁴ Cf. correspondence of Lee with Jefferson Davis, May 3, 1864, *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVI, part II, 942, 943; also vol. XXXVII, part I, 710.

³⁵ *Id.*, vol. XXXVII, part I, 712; Breckinridge, Report; Johnston, p. 2.

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On the next day, May 6, Breckinridge set out, taking Echols's Brigade, consisting of the 22d Virginia Regiment, the 26th Battalion, and the 23d Battalion; parts of Wharton's Brigade, namely the 51st Virginia Regiment and Clarke's Battalion; and Chapman's battery.³⁷ Jones and Morgan were left to protect the salt-works and lead-mines, and McCausland's Brigade and a force of cavalry remained at the Narrows of New River. Altogether the force which he could bring to Imboden's assistance was probably not more than 4,000 men.³⁸ Breckinridge himself went ahead by forced marches and reached Staunton on the evening of the 8th, his infantry arriving two days later.³⁹ Meanwhile Imboden had called out the reserves of Augusta and Rockingham Counties under Colonel John H. Harmon.⁴⁰ On the 9th the Cadets of the Virginia Military Institute were summoned. They responded on the 11th under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Scott Shipp.⁴¹ The part played by the Cadets in the ensuing campaign was of a character so romantic and unique as to make necessary some digression.

greater part of his command speedily to Staunton and meet Sigel's column—leaving as few as could be relied upon to make a show of resistance in front of the column of the Federals about to move from the Kanawha Valley towards Dublin." Letter of Lieut.-Col. George M. Edgar to Henry A. Wise, February 18, 1896.

³⁷ Edgar, Notes of Comment on the Battle of New Market.

³⁸ "I have 4,000 men en route for Jackson Depot to take cars." Breckinridge to Imboden, May 4, 1864, *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 717. Cf. *id.*, 712, 713, 718; also vol. XXXIII, 1231, 1239, 1318, 1328; Breckinridge, Report; Edgar to Henry A. Wise, February 18, 1896.

³⁹ Breckinridge, Report.

⁴⁰ *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 715, 716.

⁴¹ Report of Lieut.-Col. Scott Shipp, July 4, 1864, in *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 89; Breckinridge, Report; J. S. Johnston, *The Battle of New Market*, 3.

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⁴¹ Report of Lieut.-Col. Scott Shipp, July 4, 1864, in *War Records*, ser. I, vol. XXXVII, part I, 89; Breckinridge, Report; J. S. Johnston, *The Battle of New Market*, 3.

CHAPTER II.

THE CADETS OF THE VIRGINIA MILITARY INSTITUTE.

THE Virginia Military Institute was established by the state at Lexington in 1839. Designed as a military academy and training school, it was liberally supported by the commonwealth, and under the management of its superintendent, Brevet Major-General Francis H. Smith, a West Point graduate, it had an honorable career and became the pride of Virginia.¹

At the outbreak of the Civil War a period of greater activity began. There was much need in the Southern states for training in military matters, and the Virginia Institute being the most important establishment of its kind there, became more prominent than ever before. Its officers and cadets, however, were so eager in offering their services wherever they were needed, that soon many of them had been called away. In May, 1861, the Institute was closed for a while, since the Cadets were ordered to Richmond by the state authorities for military duty. Just before their departure they were addressed by Colonel J. T. Preston, a member of the faculty since the foundation of the Institute. In words of earnestness and pathos he bade them never forget the ideals of the school which they were leaving.² Then under the lead of Major Thomas

¹ J. S. Wise, "The West Point of the Confederacy," *Century*, XXXVII, 461 (January, 1889).

² "Cadets, called by the voice of your country and your God, you are entering upon the path of duty and of danger. The first step in the path you will soon take; when, where, and how the last will be taken by all, or any of you, God alone knows. Let this not disturb you; you are right

Jonathan Jackson they marched away to Richmond, where they rendered efficient service as drill-masters in the preparing of new recruits for the field.³

In January of the year following the need of training officers for the Confederate army was so clearly realized that the Institute was opened once more and its work begun anew. The Cadets now taught there were prepared for war not only by the rigid drill and discipline of the barracks, but by actual marching and camping in the field, since from time to time in response to danger summons they were hurried out to give aid and re-enforcement.⁴ These boys, who had been called the seed-corn of the Confederacy,⁵ came, some of them, from the highest and proudest families in the South. Many of them longed for the day when they could go forth and do a soldier's work; and one of their number has left a record of how amid the lonely hills where Lexington lies they chafed at the news of the mighty deeds wrought in the world outside, and of how they burned to march away and take part in them.⁶

now, let it be your care never to be wrong. The venerable minister of God has invoked Heaven's best blessing upon you; take this with you as your best omen and bear it with you as your most cherished possession. For the rest remember you are Virginians, and never forget, in battle, or in march . . . in success, or in trial, . . . never forget the Virginia Military Institute." Quoted by Upshur, "Address," *New Market Day*, 9.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ In May, 1862, the Cadets had marched to Jackson's aid at McDowell in the Shenandoah Valley, but did not take part in the battle. J. S. Wise, *place cited*, 462; Upshur, p. 10.

⁵ J. S. Wise, p. 461.

⁶ "As the war wore on, the stirring events following each other so rapidly and so near at hand bred a restlessness and discontent in every high-strung boy among us. Each battle seemed to infuse fresh impatience in the cadets, who would assemble at the sally-port for discussion;

Meanwhile vanished the lightsome hopes with which the contest had begun. In the west, in the south, on the James, on the Rappahannock, a terrible struggle was being waged; and though victory perched upon the banners of the Confederacy again and again, yet the mournful evidence of battle came even to Lexington, for one after another broken and wounded officers were brought there to stay until they could go back to fight, or find there a resting-place forever.⁷ Old men now living speak of the profound impression made upon them when the mighty Jackson himself was borne back to sleep in the shadow of the halls where he had taught.⁸ Then came Gettysburg and the definite turning of the tide, when the utmost that Lee could do was for a while to stay the mighty onrush of the Federal forces; the period when the Confederacy was drained dry of soldiers, when new hostile forces threatened front and flank and rear, when the need of men became desperate. Then at last came the call for the Cadets, and they answered.

Already at the beginning of 1864 in a mass meeting they had passed resolutions offering their services to General Lee; but he replied that he preferred them to remain at Lexington, since if they left, it would be necessary for him to send other

the mails were crowded with letters begging parents and guardians for permission to resign and go to the war. Good boys became bad ones to secure dismissal, and as the result of these conspiracies regular hegirlas would occur. Many a night have I paced the sentry-beat, thinking now of the last gay party that had scrambled to the top of the departing stage, commissioned for active service; now envying the careless gayety of the veterans assembled in the officers' quarters, as from time to time their joyous laughter over campaigning yarns burst from the window of some tower room; then hoping against hope, as it seemed, for the day when, like them, I would be a soldier indeed." J. S. Wise, *place cited*, 463.

⁷ J. S. Wise, pp. 462, 463.

⁸ J. S. Wise, p. 463; Upshur, p. 10.

soldiers there; but that if need arose he would call for them.⁹ Then came Sigel's advance upon Staunton, the dread that he would destroy the all-important railroads, the hurried advance of Breckinridge to oppose him, and the concentration around Staunton. On May 2 General Smith wrote to Breckinridge reporting the condition and readiness of his pupils.¹⁰ At last on the night of May 10 the summons came, and early on the morning of the 11th the Cadets marched out to battle.¹¹

The conflict at New Market was an important action, but it was not one of the great battles of the Civil War. And yet, such was the stirring and romantic character of its inci-

⁹ Upshur, p. 7.

¹⁰ *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 707, 708, 730.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 89. Cf. the vivid and somewhat imaginative description of J. S. Wise, *place cited*, 464, 465: "The last rays faded upon the neighboring peak of House Mountain. The evening gun boomed out upon the stillness. The colors of the Institute dropped lazily from their staff. Never in all her history seemed Lexington and her surroundings more gently beautiful, more calmly peaceful. Such was the sunset hour of that lovely day on which we sought our cots, almost forgetful of the troubled world elsewhere. At midnight, save in the guard-room at the sally-port, every light had disappeared. Suddenly the barracks reverberated with the throbbing of drums; we awoke and recognized the long roll. Lights were up; the stoops resounded with the rush of footsteps seeking place in the ranks; the adjutant, by lantern-light, read our orders amid breathless silence. They told us that the enemy was in the valley, that Breckinridge needed help, and that we were ordered to march for Staunton at daybreak—a battalion of infantry and a section of artillery—with three days rations. Not a sound was uttered, not a man moved from the military posture of 'parade rest.' Our beating hearts told us that our hour had come at last.

"'Parade's dismissed,' piped the adjutant. Then came a wild halloo, as company after company broke ranks. Again in fancy I see the excited rush of that gay throng, eager as greyhounds in the leash, hurrying back and forth, preparing for the start, forgetful that it would be six hours before they should march."

dents, and such was the glory attending the victors, that it has always been much written about and much discussed. Particularly is this so in connection with the work done by the Cadets of the Virginia Institute. The veteran sons of that old school have never tired of writing and talking of their deeds on the 15th of May. They have told again and again of their march, and their charge, and of the comrades who laid down their lives, until there has been amassed a literature manuscript and printed, rich in controversy, but exhaustive and minute.

Thus it is known that before daybreak of the 11th the march was begun down the pike.¹² It rained intermittently throughout the day, and when on the evening of the 12th the Corps halted near Staunton, the Cadets were foot-sore, muddy, and tired.¹³ Here they united with the Confederate forces which had been hurrying up the Valley, and made ready for the approaching struggle. Evening found them in the shadow of impending battle, for one courier after another arrived with tidings that Sigel was steadily advancing in strong force.¹⁴

¹² Captain Frank Preston, Company B of the Cadet Corps, writing a few days after the battle, thus describes the march: "We left you on Wednesday of last week, marching to Midway the first day, we slept in the rain, and the next day, in a drenching rain, we made our way through mud and water to Staunton. From Staunton we marched to near Harrisonburg, and the next day to within seven miles of this place. At midnight we were roused and started on the road to New Market." Letter written on May 19 to a member of his family, and published in the *Lexington Gazette*, May 25, 1864.

¹³ MS. letter of Louis C. Wise (C) to Henry A. Wise, April 26, 1909.

¹⁴ "Sigel is reported to have about 4,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry. This information is uncertain, and probably exaggerated." Colonel George H. Smith to Breckinridge, May 9, 1864, *War Records*, ser. I, vol. XXXVII, part I, 726. "My scouts . . . report Sigel's whole force on the move up the Valley. . . . Citizens accustomed to estimating the number of troops reported to them 10,000 infantry, but this I am satisfied is an ex-

Nevertheless that evening Breckinridge determined to move forward. On the 13th the march was continued, bringing the army to Harrisonburg. On the 14th progress was resumed down the pike along which were streaming vehicles and wagons laden with people fleeing from the enemy.¹⁵ The weather was wretched, for the rain continued to fall, at times in torrents.¹⁶ The road was slippery, and the ploughed fields were a sea of mud.¹⁷ Toward nightfall the Confederates reached Lacey's Spring. Less than ten miles beyond the Federal forces were encamped at New Market.

aggregation." Captain T. S. Davis to Breckinridge, May 10, 1864, *ibid.*, 727. "They have now twenty-eight pieces artillery . . . a very large proportion, but correct. The whole force is 6,000 men." Captain T. S. Davis to Breckinridge, May 11, 1864, *ibid.*, 729. "Their force is not over 6,000—2,000 cavalry, and twenty-eight pieces of artillery, and the rest infantry." Colonel George H. Smith to Breckinridge, May 11, 1864, *ibid.*, 730. Cf. J. S. Wise, *place cited*, 465.

¹⁵ J. S. Wise, *ibid.*

¹⁶ J. Stoddard Johnston, *The Battle of New Market*, 4. W. M. Patton (C) describing the march, says: "We marched the first day from Lexington to Midway, camping that night in the neighboring woods, the next night we camped just west of Staunton. I recall one of the worst rains that night that I ever experienced. We had few tents, and all hands got soaked. I think it then continued until the day after the battle to rain, almost continuously, and at times very hard." MS. letter to Henry A. Wise, June 10, 1895. "At twelve o'clock on the night of the 14th received orders to prepare to march immediately . . . we remained on the side of the road two or three hours in the midst of a heavy fall of rain." Report of Lieut.-Col. Scott Shipp, *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 89. The Federal soldiers suffered also. Cf. *ibid.*, 85. "Were in camp all forenoon. Raining all the time." MS. Diary of J. F. Klingaman (54th Pennsylvania Regiment, Company C), May 14, 1864.

¹⁷ MS. letter of G. T. Lee (C) to Henry A. Wise, May 15, 1909.

CHAPTER III.

THE STRUGGLE FOR POSITION.

GENERAL BRECKINRIDGE was playing a bold game. When ordered to the Valley his objective had been Staunton. This place, so important because of its magazines and hospitals, and because it was the key to the rich country from which came supplies for the army of Northern Virginia, General Lee desired him to protect.¹ Against Staunton Sigel was advancing, but Breckinridge had reached it first, and was able to concentrate his forces there on May 12 while his opponent was still some distance away. What course should he follow? Entrench himself before the town, and wait there to be attacked?² His forces numbered less than 5,000 men. The enemy outnumbered him, and this was known certainly by the Confederates.³ Yet Breckinridge determined to go forward and seek the foe.⁴ His course was justified by such brilliant success that nothing may be said in disparagement now; and yet one cannot but believe that had the Federal forces been properly managed, and had they been handled nearly so well

¹ "Staunton with its hospitals and supplies of every kind, the key to the Valley" . . . J. S. Johnston, *The Battle of New Market*, 5.

² "General Breckinridge, in the meantime, had his wagon-train supplied with commissary stores, and, while all thought he would fortify and await the approach of Sigel, he determined to advance and meet him in the open field." *Ibid.*, 3, 4.

³ *War Records*, ser. I, vol. XXXVII, part I, 726, 727, 729, 730. See below, Appendix A, p. 116, for estimates by Confederates.

⁴ He still desired to choose a position and there wait to be attacked. See below, p. 24.

as the Confederate forces were, then the attempt of Breckinridge might well have ended in crushing disaster.

On the morning of the 13th he had set out down the pike, and by nightfall had reached Mount Crawford. On the 14th he marched to Lacey's Spring, thirty-five miles from Staunton, and close to Sigel.⁵ That night he determined to take up a good position and wait to be attacked by the Federal army.⁶ And so silently in the rain and the darkness his men made ready to march once more.⁷ Before daybreak they had taken possession of Shirley's Hill a little to the south of New Market.

To the Cadets the scene was dramatic and intense, so that those who were present have never forgotten it. Members of the Corps still tell how sometime after midnight the order came to move out;⁸ how in the gloom and confusion roll was

⁵ Breckinridge, Report.

⁶ "Being convinced that the enemy was advancing in comparative confidence, I determined not to await his coming, but to march to meet him and give him battle wherever found." *Ibid.*

⁷ Breckinridge probably intended also to annoy the enemy by night attacks. General Imboden relates that on the night of the 14th he led the 62d Regiment through the orchards and fields close to the Federal camp at New Market, intending to surprise it. MS. letter to Henry A. Wise, June 6, 1895. Colonel Moor, commanding the troops in New Market on the evening of the 14th, says: "At about 8 P. M. a line of rebels approached across an open field on my right front with the evident purpose to turn the position I had occupied before sunset. I instructed Major Stephens, commanding First West Virginia Regiment, to allow the rebels to come near enough and give them a volley, which order was well executed. About two hours later my whole front was attacked and for a few minutes the firing became general. The rebels, however, had to retreat in confusion, losing 5 killed and many more wounded. No further annoyance occurred that night." *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 79, 80.

⁸ "We retired for the night in a church; but we had scarcely fallen asleep, when we were aroused to get up and go to the front; the usual

called as the men stood sleepily in ranks; how just before the march began, Captain Frank Preston at the instance of Colonel Shipp besought divine comfort and guidance; how Colonel Shipp addressed them briefly; and how a little later they went splashing through the mud down the road toward the enemy.⁹

In topography the scene of the battle of New Market has some resemblance to that which has characterized so many battle-grounds where opposing forces have met each other in rolling country. The hostile armies confronted each other from two low ridges. It was so at Agincourt and at Waterloo; it was so at Fredericksburg and at Gettysburg.

roll not being sounded as we were too near the enemy." MS. letter of Lawrence Royster (C) to Henry A. Wise, June 12, 1895. Also MS. letter of W. Kemp (C) to General James A. Goggin, March 25, 1888.

⁹ Cf. J. S. Wise, "The West Point of the Confederacy," *place cited*, 466: "But soon the silence was broken only now and then by the fall of a passing shower, or the champing of the colonel's horse upon his provender.

"I was corporal of the guard. A single sentinel stood post, while the guard and drummers lay stretched before the watch-fire in deep, refreshing sleep. It was an hour past midnight when I caught the sound of hoofs upon the pike advancing at a trot, and a moment later the call of the sentry brought me to him, where I found an aide bearing orders from the commanding general. On being aroused our commandant rubbed his eyes, muttered, 'Move forward at once,' and ordered me to rouse the camp. The rolls were rattled off; the short, crisp commands went forth, and soon the battalion debouched upon the pike, heading in the darkness and the mud for New Market.

"Before we left our camp something occurred that even now may be a solace to those whose boys died so gloriously on that day. In the gloom of the night, Captain Frank Preston, neither afraid nor ashamed to pray, sent up an appeal to God for protection to our little band. It was a humble, earnest appeal that sunk into the heart of every hearer. Few were the dry eyes, little the frivolity, in the command, when he had ceased to speak of home, of father, of mother, of country, of victory and defeat, of life, of death, of eternity. Those who, but a few hours later, heard



THE VALLEY TURNPIKE RUNNING THROUGH

NEW MARKET TOWN.

In 1864 the town of New Market consisted of two or three rows of houses built along the turnpike which runs northeast through the Shenandoah Valley. It possessed a certain strategic importance in that it lay at the intersection of the Valley turnpike and the road which runs to Luray.¹⁰ To the west of the pike is the north fork of the Shenandoah. At the river there are high bluffs from which the land slopes gradually down towards the pike; while from New Market the country rising slowly to the north and abruptly to the southwest culminates in two hills on which at one time or another the opposing armies made their stand. To the south the Confederates were posted on Shirley's Hill, to the north the Federal forces occupied Bushong's Hill and, at the close of the battle, Rude's Hill, some distance to the rear. In 1864 these hills were pastures and wheat-fields, intersected now and then by fences and stone walls. Between Shirley's Hill and Bushong's Hill in one place there was a shallow ravine. The scene which was closed by the river-bluffs on the west was shut in on the east by the Massanutten Mountain, a mile or more to the east of the pike, approach to which was rendered difficult by intervening marshes and woodlands.¹¹ Between the pike and the mountain Smith's Creek, a small stream, flows northward to empty into

him commanding 'B' company in the thickest of the fight, his already empty sleeve showing that he was no stranger to the perilous edge of battle, realized as few can, how the same voice can at one time plead reverently and tenderly and at another pipe higher than the roar of battle." Also MS. letter of W. M. Patton (C) to Henry A. Wise, June 10, 1895; MS. letter of Gideon Davenport (C) to Preston Cocke (C), Jan. 28, 1895.

¹⁰ G. E. Pond, *The Shenandoah Valley in 1864*, pp. 18, 19.

¹¹ Cf. the descriptions of Brigadier-General John D. Imboden, "The Battle of New Market," *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, IV, 481; Breckinridge, Report; Colonel George H. Smith, "More of the Battle of

the Shenandoah. On the west, then, was the river, on the east the mountain, to the north and to the south the hills seized by the hostile forces; down the middle ran the turnpike; and in the center lay the town of New Market.

During the day preceding, May 14, the Confederates under Imboden had been resisting the advance of the Federal troops; but after sharp skirmishing they had been forced to fall back before what they reported as overwhelming numbers,¹² and the van of the Federal army had crossed the river.¹³ This was while Imboden, going to meet General Breckinridge, had left Colonel George H. Smith of the 62d Virginia in command. Imboden says that the advance of the Federals had been so cautious that he did not believe that Sigel would cross the Shenandoah on the 14th. When this occurred, however, he galloped back with orders to hold the town at all hazards. He found that Colonel Smith had admirably disposed his troops. New Market was held during the day, and an artillery duel maintained with the enemy.¹⁴ On the evening of the 14th Breckinridge ordered Imboden to continue falling back,¹⁵ hoping thus to lure Sigel on to attack the Confederate

New Market," *Confederate Veteran*, XVI, 569, 570 (November, 1908); Colonel J. Stoddard Johnston, *The Battle of New Market*, 7; Captain Frank Preston, in *Lexington Gazette*, May 25, 1864.

¹² Upshur, "Address," *New Market Day*, 12, says: "Imboden . . . had gradually fallen back, having taken some prisoners, some of which were seen on their way up the Valley" . . . John S. Wise, "The West Point of the Confederacy," *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, IV, 465, says: "Now and then a haggard trooper, dispirited by long skirmishing against overwhelming force, would gloomily suggest the power and numbers of the enemy."

¹³ See above, p. 6.

¹⁴ Imboden, "The Battle of New Market," *place cited*, IV, 482.

¹⁵ Breckinridge, Report.

army in some strong position south of New Market.¹⁶ In this he failed, for by the morning of the 15th the Federal forces had occupied the town, and from thence advanced no farther, except that the skirmish line was sent a little to the south.¹⁷ That Breckinridge still desired to be attacked is shown by the fact that he ordered Imboden forward to charge the enemy and then retreat, hoping thus to lure them into a pursuit. Imboden tried it a number of times, but in vain.¹⁸ This being so, Breckinridge true to the plan which he had so far followed, took the initiative once more, and made ready for an attack on the enemy in their own position.¹⁹

¹⁶ Imboden asserts that he desired that the Confederate army be posted in a certain strong position about two miles behind New Market, and there wait to be attacked. Letter to Henry A. Wise, June 6, 1895. Cf. Upshur, "Address," *New Market Day*, 13.

¹⁷ Breckinridge, Report.

¹⁸ Letter of Imboden to Henry A. Wise, June 6, 1895. "Breckinridge took up a defensive position, choosing the best ground available; and the ground afforded a pretty good position, being flanked by wooded hills, from which an approaching column, down the hill on which the town is situated, and across the flat, would have received a deadly fire." MS. letter of Lieut.-Colonel George M. Edgar to Henry A. Wise, Feb. 18, 1896.

¹⁹ General Imboden says: "The whole country for two or three miles lay before and below, like a map, and a few words of explanation from me as to the roads, streams, etc., enabled General Breckinridge to grasp it all; and he remarked after five minutes study of the scene, 'We can attack and whip them here, and I'll do it.'" "The Battle of New Market," *place cited*, IV, 483. "Gen. B. looked the country over carefully, took out his watch, and said: . . . 'It's now eleven o'clock, and we can't wait any longer for them to attack us.'" Captain J. W. Parsons, *Confederate Veteran*, XVII, 119 (March, 1909). "He waited for Sigel to advance until about ten o'clock, when I heard him say: 'Well, I have offered him battle and he declines to advance on us, I shall advance on him.'" Letter of Lieut.-Col. George M. Edgar to Henry A. Wise, Feb. 18, 1896. "On the morning of the fight Breckinridge seemed at first to have intended standing on the defensive; as we took a position some distance

Sunday, May 15, the day of the battle, was gloomy and disagreeable. During the previous days it had rained almost without ceasing, and that morning there was a steady down-pour. The air was moist and close; everything was wet and dripping. Underfoot the roads were miry; the fields were a slough of soft mud.²⁰

The battle of New Market may be divided into three parts: first, the struggle between the Confederates and the first or advanced portion of the Federal army, for the most part an artillery duel, lasting for an hour or more just before mid-day;²¹ second, the struggle between the advancing Confederates and the larger part of the Federal army, posted in its chosen position on Bushong's Hill to the north of the town; and third, the pursuit of the Federal forces to Rude's Hill and afterwards until they had crossed the Shenandoah River.

In the arrangement and handling of his troops Breckinridge displayed dexterity and judgment. While yet upon Shirley's Hill he marched and countermarched his men in sight

back of the town, and commenced strengthening it, as well as we could, with fence-rails, etc. But while thus engaged, the order came to advance" . . . MS. letter of Colonel George H. Smith to Henry A. Wise, March 7, 1896. Also Breckinridge, Report.

²⁰ "The rains, which had fallen more or less about every day since we left Lexington, gave us a thorough drenching on the 14th, and did not hold up for us on the 15th. The roads and fields were very wet, the ploughed fields almost miry, so that to march across the fields even at slow time was hard work, and at double quick, exhausting. The sky was overcast all day, and there were several hard showers, and a heavy, damp atmosphere all day." MS. letter of B. A. Colonna (C) to Henry A. Wise, April 14, 1909. Also J. S. Wise, *place cited*, 466.

²¹ The battle began at eleven o'clock, or very shortly before. Cf. report of Major Henry Peale, 18th Connecticut Regiment, *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 81. Very probably, however, there was some artillery firing before this. See below, p. 29, note 36.

of the enemy with the purpose, it would seem, of magnifying his numbers.²² Having made his army seem more numerous than it really was, he completed the deception by arranging his troops in three lines. The first line consisted of the 51st Virginia Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Wolfe²³ and the 62d Virginia Regiment;²⁴ Colonel George H. Smith, these regiments being under the command of Brigadier-General Gabriel C. Wharton;²⁵ the second line was made up of the 22d Virginia Regiment, Colonel George Patton and the 23d Virginia Battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel Clarence Derrick;²⁶ the third and last line comprised the 26th Virginia Battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel George M. Edgar, and the Cadets of the Virginia Military Institute, Lieutenant-Colonel Scott Shipp.²⁷ The Federal commanders, already exaggerating the number of the enemy, became convinced that they were even more numer-

²² "After maneuvering the regiments and battalions in a way that suggested that he was playing the old strategic trick of countermarching his men with the view of multiplying their numbers in the eyes of the enemy." . . . Lieut.-Col. George M. Edgar, MS. Notes upon the Battle of New Market.

²³ Colonel Forsberg, commander of the 51st, was on the day of the battle sick in the hospital at Lynchburg. MS. Forsberg Memoranda.

²⁴ This regiment had been detached from General Imboden's command, to which it belonged. Its members were increased by a company of 70 Missourians under Captain Woodson. These men had just been exchanged and were on their way home, but in the hour of need joined Breckinridge. For the fearful losses of this command, see below, p. 98, note 25.

²⁵ Key, 3. The positions and movements of the commands are indicated on the map, below, p. 132, and are explained in the key accompanying, below, pp. 132, 133.

²⁶ Key, 2.

²⁷ Key, 1.

ous.²⁸ Having produced this illusion, Breckinridge changed the relative position of his troops as they advanced, so that in the second part of the battle they were spread out in one long line in echelon. Anticipating what took place afterwards, it may be remarked that the first change in the formation was made as the troops were marching down the hill: the 26th Battalion moved from the third to the second line, on the left of the 22d Regiment,²⁹ leaving the Cadets alone in the rear.³⁰ Subsequently the 26th Battalion was moved from the left of the second line to the extreme left of the first line, to the left of the 51st Regiment.³¹ The artillery, Chapman's Battery, two sections of Jackson's Battery, a section of McClanahan's Battery, and the Cadet section, under the command of Major William C. McLaughlin, was to the right near the turnpike.^{31a}

The Federal forces in their first, advanced position, in and about New Market, were commanded by Colonel Augustus Moor, and consisted of the 1st New York Cavalry, the cavalry of Colonel John E. Wynkoop, numbering about 300, and made up of detachments of the 15th New York, 20th Pennsylvania, and 22d Pennsylvania, the 34th Regiment of Massachusetts Infantry, Colonel George D. Wells, the 1st West Virginia, Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob Weddle, and the 123d Ohio Regiment,

²⁸ "The enemy in three strong lines now issued from the woods" . . . Report of Major Henry Peale, *War Records*, ser. I, vol. XXXVII, part I, 82.

²⁹ Key, 61.

³⁰ Key, 5.

³¹ Key, 71. Edgar, Notes upon the Battle of New Market.

^{31a} Key, 4. "Chapman's Battery, Jackson's, McClanahan's and a section of artillery manned by the Cadets were all on the field." MS. letter of Micajah Woods (Jackson's Battery) to his father, Mount Jackson, May 16, 1864.

Major Horace Kellogg.³² There were also two sections of Battery B, Snow's Maryland Artillery, comprising four guns.³³ These troops had been sent forward to feel the strength of the enemy.³⁴ The events of the battle were to prove that this was a mistake, for they were not strong enough to make a serious resistance to the Confederates, but nevertheless constituted a unit so important that Sigel should not have detached it from the remainder of his army.³⁵

The battle began with the firing of artillery³⁶ and the advance of the Confederate skirmishers, the 30th Virginia Battalion of Colonel Lyle Clarke, and sharp-shooters, who gradually drove in the Federal skirmishers from their advanced position to the south of New Market.³⁷ Meanwhile some of

³² *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 77. Key, 9.

³³ Report of Colonel Augustus Moor, *ibid.*, 79. Key, 8.

³⁴ *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 79.

³⁵ Pond, *The Shenandoah Valley in 1864*, p. 21.

³⁶ This firing began about 9:30 A. M., according to D. M. Armstrong, MS. letter to B. A. Colonna, February 17, 1911.

³⁷ Colonel J. Lyle Clarke of the 30th Battalion says: "On May 15th I was ordered to the front with my Battalion of sharpshooters, 30th Virginia (better known as 'Clarke's Battalion') at 9 A. M., and formed a line of skirmishers, advancing until we met the Federal skirmishers . . . continuing to 'drive them in' until they formed their first line of battle near New Market." MS. letter to Henry A. Wise, March 25, 1895. It is certain that these skirmishers were commanded, at least part of the time, by Major Peter J. Otey. MS. statement of General G. C. Wharton, in possession of Colonel Edgar. Major T. F. Lang of Sigel's Staff, who had taken an advanced position for the purpose of observing the Confederate movements, says: "I witnessed a splendid formation . . . of the Confederates. First was the advance—creeping and dodging from point to point . . . their sharp-shooters. Later a line reaching from side to side of the Valley, moving forward slowly, cautiously, with intervals of 12 to 15 feet apart, keeping their alignment as if on dress parade. This was the skirmish line. The practiced eye of the veteran soldier knew

the Confederates were engaged in throwing up a hasty breast-work of rails, brush, and earth, at right angles to the pike, so that there might be a line back of which to rally in case of need.³⁸

As the Confederate skirmishers advanced down the southern hill, the artillery³⁹ opened fire upon the Federal battery posted in the church-yard at the north end of the village.⁴⁰ Under the accurate and effective fire of the Confederate guns the Federal artillerymen were forced to withdraw up the pike. The 18th Connecticut Regiment had now come up to Moor's assistance,⁴¹ and shortly after Major-General Stahel with the

what this meant, and I did not have long to wait for the meaning. The line of battle hove in sight a little south of New Market, and a magnificent line it was too." MS. Personal Recollections of the Battle of New Market. Cf. Breckinridge, Report; letter of Lieut.-Col. Scott Shipp to A. P. Young, April 28, 1873.

³⁸ MS. letter of W. M. Patton (C) to Henry A. Wise, June 10, 1895.

³⁹ Key, 4.

⁴⁰ Key, 8. "Three Federal officers rode down the street about noon, and ordered me to the cellar, as the shells were then bursting over our old town. It was not long before the artillery came thundering down the street and turned the corner at the old church." MS. letter of Mrs. E. C. Crim of New Market to B. A. Colonna, Dec. 10, 1910. "In a picturesque little church-yard, right under the shadow of the village spire and among the white tomb stones, a six-gun battery was posted in rear of the infantry line of the enemy." "The little town, which a moment before had seemed to sleep so peacefully upon that Sabbath morn, was now wreathed in battle-smoke and swarming with troops hurrying to their positions. We had their range beautifully, and every shell, striking some obstruction, exploded in the streets." J. S. Wise, "The West Point of the Confederacy," *place cited*, 466, 467. "We could see this smoke and hear the guns of our infantry in the streets of New Market as they drove the enemy slowly retiring." MS. letter of B. A. Colonna to Henry A. Wise, April 14, 1909.

⁴¹ Report of Major Peale, 18th Connecticut Infantry, *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 81, 82.



PLATEAU IMMEDIATELY WEST OF THE LUTHERAN CEMETERY, AND NEAR THE TURNPIKE.
SHIRLEY'S HILL IS IN THE BACKGROUND.

remainder of the cavalry.⁴² There was some fighting in the streets of New Market and about the town, but shortly after noon General Sigel arrived upon the scene, and decided to form his lines upon the hill to the north of the town. Accordingly the Federal troops abandoned their first position.⁴³ Thereupon Breckinridge took possession of New Market.⁴⁴ This part of the engagement was followed by heavy artillery firing on both sides, which lasted for some time, but did comparatively little damage.⁴⁵

The second part of the battle began between one and two o'clock in the afternoon⁴⁶ with the renewed advance of the Confederates, and culminated in their assault on the strong position occupied by the Federal army upon Bushong's Hill.

⁴² Report of Colonel Augustus Moor, *ibid.*, 80.

⁴³ *Ibid.* The reports of the Federal commanders in regard to this movement and the fighting which preceded it are meager and somewhat confused. *Ibid.*, 79-83. Also MS. letter of A. J. Gilbert (123d Ohio Regiment) to B. A. Colonna, Dec. 21, 1910.

⁴⁴ Breckinridge, Report.

⁴⁵ J. S. Johnston, The Battle of New Market, 8. "The artillery duel still continued with considerable vigor, and the enemy shelled our line with great accuracy, although without the infliction of any considerable damage." Report of Major Peate, *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 82. "At this moment, say 12:30 P. M., the main body of our artillery . . . was pouring a steady fire into the enemy. They were enveloped in smoke, and made lots of noise." Letter of B. A. Colonna (C) to Henry A. Wise, April 14, 1909. J. S. Johnston, The Battle of New Market, 9; MS. letter of J. B. Baylor (C) to Henry A. Wise, June 6, 1909.

⁴⁶ This I judge from an account written by H. A. Du Pont, MS. letter to Lieut.-Col. Edgar, October 1, 1908. Edgar believes that it was about two o'clock. Critical Notes upon the Battle of New Market. Cf. also the report of Lieut.-Col. Shipp, *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 90; *ibid.*, 80.

This part of the battle was a more general engagement than the first part had been. It was marked by the daring generalship of Breckinridge, who was able to force back his opponent from a position of strength, because he hurled forward nearly every soldier he had, while the Federals were poorly massed and partly scattered. Moreover the Confederate soldiers fought with eager, desperate valor, while in Sigel's army, though some of the men were brave and steady and veteran troops, others did little more than meet the first onset.

Up to this time although the Cadet artillery had done good service in helping to silence the Federal battery in New Market,⁴⁷ the Cadet Corps had taken no part, but had been held in the rear as a reserve. It is very probable that Breckinridge did not wish to expose these youths, few of whom were more than eighteen years old, while one was only fourteen.⁴⁸ During the march the youthful appearance of the Cadets had made them the butt of ridicule on the part of the older soldiers.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ J. S. Wise, "The West Point of the Confederacy," *place cited*, 467.

⁴⁸ "The general having determined to receive the attack of the enemy, made his dispositions for battle, posting the corps in reserve. He informed me that he did not wish to put the Cadets in if he could avoid it, but that should occasion require it, he would use them very freely. He was also pleased to express his confidence in them, and I am happy to believe that his expectations were not disappointed, for when the tug of battle came they bore themselves gallantly and well." Report of Lieut.-Col. Scott Shipp, *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 89, 90. "General Breckinridge rode along in front of our line, and said he hoped that he would not have to put us into any hot places." MS. letter of P. B. Hiden (C) to Henry A. Wise, May 6, 1909. Henry H. Harrison (C) says that in 1865 General Breckinridge told him that he "had tried hard to keep them out of harm's way." *Winchester Times*, clipping. J. B. Baylor, Company D, was fourteen. MS. letter to Henry A. Wise, June 6, 1909. Also letter of General Francis H. Smith to Mrs. Susan R. Hull, in (Baltimore Evening) *News*, March 23, 1895.

⁴⁹ "The youthful character of the Cadets made Breckinridge hesitate

Now, however, when the Confederate commander marshalled his scanty numbers it was impossible for him to spare any of his forces, and the Cadets were ordered to the immediate rear of the main lines, so that as the army went forward they also came under fire. This order they had awaited eagerly, as there were few of them who did not burn to take part in the fight. When most of them were sent ahead, some who had been left on guard duty in the rear, went forward notwithstanding and so joined their comrades on the march.⁵⁰ It is said that this was the only instance of disobedience on their part at any time during the battle.

to put them into action. In fact, he had quite made up his mind to place them in charge of the baggage-train, and when several of the Cadets, learning that this was contemplated, pleaded so earnestly with him, he abandoned the idea. They said they had been called out several times and assigned to that duty, and on their return to Lexington, had been jeered with such remarks as 'Now the war is over; there comes the baggage-guard,' and gibes even more stinging. There was no resisting the fervor of their appeal to be put into action" . . . J. S. Johnston, *The Battle of New Market*, 6. "Previous to that you may recollect how our old veterans guyed you boys, calling you 'new issue,' and asking you if 'your mommies knew you were out,' etc., etc., all of which was taken in good part." MS. letter of T. C. Morton, 26th Virginia Battalion, to Henry A. Wise, Feb. 12, 1896. Also MS. letter of T. W. Preston (C) to Henry A. Wise, May 11, 1909.

⁵⁰ "Up to this time I was still corporal of the guard, in charge of the baggage-wagon, with a detail of three men. . . . We had not been relieved in the general bustle and confusion. My orders were to remain with the wagons at the bend in the pike. . . . When it became evident that a battle was imminent, a single thought took possession of me, and that was, that I would never be able to look my father in the face again if I sat on a baggage-wagon while my command was in its first, perhaps its only, engagement. . . . My oration . . . ran about this wise: 'Boys, the enemy is in our front. Our command is about to go into action. . . . I shall join the command forthwith. Anyone who chooses to remain may do so.' All the guard followed. The wagon was left in

Breckinridge's troops were now drawn up in two lines,⁵¹ which later in the battle were shifted into one.⁵² To deceive the enemy and make his command appear more numerous these lines were arranged in echelon, the more advanced portion on the side of the river slightly overlapping the second part over toward the turnpike.⁵³ The Corps of the Cadets remained

charge of the black driver. Of the four who thus went, one was killed and two were wounded." J. S. Wise, "The West Point of the Confederacy," *place cited*, 467, 468.

⁵¹ Key, 7¹, 7, 6¹, 6.

⁵² See below, p. 57.

⁵³ "Upon the crest of this hill I formed my left of Wharton's Brigade. The Corps of Cadets was placed in the centre, and Echols with his right resting upon the turnpike completed my line of battle, which it will be seen was a single one without reserves." Breckinridge, Report. This is one of the many misleading statements which have been made about the Confederate tactics. Some of those who wrote seem to have forgotten the Confederate arrangements or not to have comprehended them. "We had but one line in two ranks, with no reserves." J. S. Johnston, *The Battle of New Market*, 7. "Here General Breckinridge sent for me and gave me in person my instructions. The general's plans seem to have undergone some modification. Instead of one line with a reserve, he formed his infantry in two, artillery in rear and to the right, the cavalry deployed and guarding the right flank, left flank resting on a stream. Wharton's brigade of infantry constituted the first line; Echols' brigade the second. The battalion of Cadets, brigaded with Echols, was the last battalion but one from the left of the second line, Edgar's battalion being on the left." Report of Lieut.-Col. Scott Shipp, in *War Records*, ser. I, vol. XXXVII, part I, 90. "On the left was our whole force of infantry, drawn up in two long lines" . . . Captain Frank Preston, in *Lexington Gazette*, May 25, 1864. "I recall that there were two lines and we were in the rear one." MS. letter of Andrew Pizzini, Jr., (C) to Henry A. Wise, March 30, 1909. "The Confederate army was formed in two lines of battle, the Cadet battalion being in the second line, two hundred yards in rear of the first." MS. letter of Gideon Davenport to Preston Coker, Jan. 28, 1895. Also MS. letter of Lawrence Royster (C) to Henry A. Wise, Jan. 12, 1895.

slightly to the rear of the left of the second line.⁵⁴ Beyond the turnpike, farther over to the right, was what remained of Imboden's cavalry,⁵⁵ the 18th and 23d Virginia Regiments, McNeill's Rangers, and four guns of McClanahan's battery, these troops, as will appear, acting separately. The larger part of the Confederate artillery, under McLaughlin, was advanced along the turnpike, moving forward with the army, and firing from convenient positions.

The Federal army was by this time drawn up in its second position on the hills to the north of the town. Its position was one of great natural strength in that the right was guarded by a precipitous slope thickly wooded leading down to the river; the left, which sloped down to the pike, was partly protected by cedar thickets and woods which extended over to Smith's Creek and beyond to the mountains; the center was fronted by cleared ground, consisting of a wheat-field, on that day deep with mud.⁵⁶ In part the Federal lines were protected by a stone wall.⁵⁷

In drawing up his army Sigel followed the plan which had characterized his tactics throughout. His troops were still scattered, but those which had arrived upon the scene he divided into two parts, a small force near the pike constituting his first line, the larger part of his army, several hundred yards in the rear, extending from the pike over to the river bluffs, constituting the second. The advanced line was to

⁵⁴ Key, 5.

⁵⁵ Key, 10. The 62d Virginia Regiment was part of Imboden's command, but had been dismounted and placed with Wharton. MS. letter of Brig.-General Imboden to Henry A. Wise, June 6, 1895.

⁵⁶ MS. letter of Major Peter J. Otey to Lieutenant-Colonel Scott Shipp, April 14, 1873.

⁵⁷ J. S. Johnston, *The Battle of New Market*, 9.

break the Confederate strength, the hinder one was to win the battle. It must be said that this arrangement was unfortunate, perhaps because of the men upon whom it depended. When tactics fail, it is all too easy to criticise them in the light of their failure, and not in terms of their real value. It is quite true moreover that Breckinridge, who won the battle, drew up his army in several lines. This was done, however, as a temporary expedient, and to deceive the enemy. As his men went forward, Breckinridge maneuvered them into one powerful line. With Sigel the arrangement was not so much a temporary expedient as a settled plan of battle. After all Sigel may have made no mistake. Had the men of the first line offered a stern resistance, the advancing Confederates might easily have been defeated by the men of the second. As it was, the foremost regiments fled almost at the first onset, carrying confusion to those behind them.

In taking up this new position the Federal commands were shifted considerably. In the first position Moor had had one regiment of his own brigade, the 123d Ohio, and two from Thoburn's Brigade, the 1st West Virginia and the 34th Massachusetts.⁵⁸ Now in the rearrangement the parts of the two brigades seem to have been united again, so far as they had come upon the scene.

The first line was held by the First Brigade, Colonel Augustus Moor. It consisted of the 123d Ohio Regiment, Major Horace Kellogg, the left of which rested upon the pike, and the 18th Connecticut Regiment, Major Henry Peale, extending to the right.⁵⁹ To the left of this line was the battery of Captain Von Kleiser, consisting of six twelve-pound Napoleon

⁵⁸ *War Records*, ser. I, vol. XXXVII, part I, 79, 81.

⁵⁹ Key, 12. *War Records*, ser. I, vol. XXXVII, part I, 80.

guns.⁶⁰ The remainder of Moor's Brigade, the 28th Ohio Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Gottfried Becker, and the 116th Ohio Regiment, Colonel James Washburn, had not yet arrived upon the field, and took no part in the conflict.

In the second line, four hundred or more yards to the rear of the first, Sigel disposed the commands of the Second Brigade, Colonel Joseph Thoburn, the greater part of his available forces. Far over on the right, almost by the bluffs of the Shenandoah, Sigel placed the larger part of his artillery, the batteries commanded respectively by Captain John Carlin and Captain Alonzo Snow, each consisting of six three-inch rifled guns.⁶¹ To the left of these batteries were the 34th Massachusetts Regiment, Colonel George D. Wells, the 1st West Virginia Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob Weddle, and the 54th Pennsylvania Regiment, Colonel Jacob M. Campbell.⁶² To the left was the battery of Captain Chatham T. Ewing, consisting of four three-inch guns.⁶³ This line extended from the

⁶⁰ Key, 12c. Sigel states that Von Kleiser's Battery was between the 18th Connecticut and the 123d Ohio. "Sigel in the Shenandoah Valley," *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, IV, 489. Colonel Moor, however, says: "I was now ordered . . . to form the One hundred and twenty-third Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry and Eighteenth Connecticut on the right of a battery." *War Records*, ser. I, vol. XXXVII, part I, 80. MS. letter of Captain H. A. Du Pont to Lieut.-Col. Edgar, October 1, 1908.

⁶¹ Key, 21. Sigel, "Sigel in the Shenandoah Valley," *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, IV, 489. Part of Snow's Battery had been with Moor in the first position. In the second position its place was taken by the battery of Captain Von Kleiser.

⁶² Key, 23. Sigel, *ibid.* The 54th Pennsylvania, after making a forced march from Mount Jackson, was able to take its place in line about 2 P. M., just before the Confederates began their attack. MS. letter of J. F. Klingaman (Company C, 54th Pennsylvania Regiment) to B. A. Colonna, Jan. 26, 1911.

⁶³ Key, 24. Sigel, *ibid.*

Shenandoah River on its right to the turnpike and beyond on its left.⁶⁴ Farther to the left and beyond the turnpike was the Federal cavalry under Major-General Julius Stahel.⁶⁵ To support Snow's and Carlin's batteries one company of the 34th Massachusetts was stationed in the woods by the Shenandoah.⁶⁶ Some distance behind the 34th Massachusetts and the 1st West Virginia the 12th West Virginia Regiment, Colonel William B. Curtis, was posted as a reserve.⁶⁷ Far in the rear the 28th Ohio Regiment and the 116th Ohio Regiment had come no farther than Mount Jackson.⁶⁸ The battery of Captain H. A. Du Pont, six three-inch rifled guns, was also back near the river crossing.⁶⁹

So in the second part of the battle, as in the first, Sigel's army was handled if not badly, at least not to the best advantage. His total force was numerically superior to the Confederate army, but he had not many more men in action than Breckinridge, who, though really outnumbered, used nearly all of his men in one place at one time.

⁶⁴ Key, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24.

⁶⁵ Key, 25. Sigel, *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, IV, 489.

⁶⁶ Key, 20. Sigel, *ibid.*

⁶⁷ Key, 28. Sigel, *ibid.*

⁶⁸ Report of Colonel Augustus Moor, *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 80.

⁶⁹ Letter of Captain H. A. Du Pont to Lieut.-Col. Edgar, October 1, 1908.

CHAPTER IV.

THE BATTLE.

THE battle, which had paused for a while after the dislodgement of the Federal troops from their first line about New Market, was renewed about two o'clock in the afternoon¹ with the general advance of the Confederate army.

The artillery, which had already been handled so well, reopened fire from more advanced positions. To the right of the infantry Major McLaughlin moved his eight pieces, Chapman's Battery and two guns under Lieutenant Carter Berkeley, forward along the pike, the two pieces of the Cadet Corps also going with him.² Still farther to the right the four guns under Captain McClanahan taking part in the circuitous move-

¹ This is Edgar's conclusion. Critical Notes upon the Battle of New Market. It is approximately sustained by Du Pont, letter to Edgar, Oct. 1, 1908. Cf. also above, p. 37, note 62. It is exceedingly difficult to ascertain the time at which successive events in the battle occurred.

² "The artillery, which had been posted on the heights to the southwest of the town, became unavailable as it advanced, from the impossibility of firing over our troops, but General Breckinridge, having ascertained that to the north of the town and to the right of the pike there were good artillery positions, he boldly threw ten pieces of artillery, under Major McLaughlin, in this direction, which he accompanied himself." J. S. Johnston, *The Battle of New Market*, 8, 9. "Having begun a flank movement to the left about two miles south of New Market, the nature of the ground was such as to render it impossible that the artillery should continue with the infantry column. I ordered Lieutenant Minge to join the general artillery column in the main road and to report to Major McLaughlin. After that I did not see the section of artillery until near the close of the engagement." Report of Lieut.-Col. Scott Shipp, in *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 90.

ment of Imboden, presently to be described, crossed Smith's Creek and took up an advanced position over upon the Federal left flank.³ Thus the placing of the artillery, which was largely supervised by Breckinridge, was so ordered that as the battle proceeded and the lines went forward, the pieces were from time to time limbered up and dragged to the front, forming as it were a skirmish line.⁴ A fierce duel now began, for the Federal cannon were superbly served. Moreover the Federal gunners having at first the advantage of position and getting the range, directed a terrific fire upon the approaching Confederates, sending one shell after another plunging and bursting into their ranks.⁵

The preparations upon Sigel's front were accompanied by a movement around the Federal left. The Confederate cavalry⁶ under Imboden on Breckinridge's right was fronted by the Federal cavalry⁷ under Stahel on Sigel's left. Each was hidden from the other by an extensive wood which lay in between; and at first it is probable that each was unaware of the other's position. Soon, however, Imboden in person with one of his staff went through the forest on foot, and discovered the enemy's horsemen posted in close order just beyond.⁸ He at once sent a messenger to General Breckinridge to say that he thought he knew a way to cross Smith's Creek unobserved by the enemy, and so gain Stahel's flank; and therefore asked per-

³ Key, 26. Imboden, letter to Henry A. Wise, June 6, 1895; Sigel, *place cited*, IV, 489.

⁴ J. S. Johnston, *The Battle of New Market*, 9.

⁵ Upshur, "Address," *New Market Day*, 15.

⁶ Key, 10.

⁷ Key, 25.

⁸ Letter of Imboden to Henry A. Wise, June 6, 1895.



BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN D. IMBODEN,

C. S. A.

mission to uncover the Confederate right.⁹ This was immediately granted.¹⁰ Taking the 18th Virginia Cavalry, the 23d Virginia and four pieces of McClanahan's battery, Imboden then moved around the wood to the right to where the Luray road crosses the creek, and getting his men over, proceeded behind a low hill unobserved by Stahel until he had gained a position immediately upon his opponent's flank.¹¹ Here he ordered his guns to be unlimbered and fired as fast as they could be served.¹² Imboden himself says that the effect of this shell-fire upon the massed squadrons of the enemy was startling; that it was as impossible for Stahel to reach Imboden's new position as it was for his horsemen to hold their ground under the cannonade;¹³ that a part of them broke and fled, while the remainder were soon in full retreat to a sheltered position farther to the rear; and that thereupon McClanahan turned his fire upon Von Kleiser's Battery, and materially assisted in covering the Confederate advance along the front. Imboden asserts, and his account is partly borne out by Sigel, that this whole movement possessed great importance in that the Confederates now held a commanding position upon the Federal flank, whence they could pour an enfilading fire into the enemy's lines, and where they could not be reached by the enemy unless the whole Confederate army were forced to retreat.¹⁴

⁹ Imboden, letter to Henry A. Wise, June 6, 1895.

¹⁰ "His reply through Berkeley was, 'Tell General Imboden as he knows this ground, and I don't, to make any movement he thinks advantageous, and I will take all the responsibility and consequences.'" *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.* Also Imboden, "The Battle of New Market," *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, IV, 483, 484. Cf. Sigel, "Sigel in the Shenan-

The truth, however, seems to be that this movement was almost entirely a mistake. Imboden merely took the Confederate cavalry and a portion of the artillery where they could not be used against the enemy. McClanahan's guns did indeed send some well directed shots into Stahel's midst, but this fire simply caused the Federal horsemen to move out of range, and did not prevent them a little later from making a vigorous attack upon Derrick and the Confederate right.¹⁵ The guns were probably too far away to do much damage to the rest of the Federal army. Had this been otherwise there is little doubt that they would soon have been silenced by Ewing or Von Kleiser. It will be shown that on the Confederate right Derrick with the 23d Battalion had to cover a wide extent of ground with insufficient numbers.¹⁶ Here Imboden's men might have done good service against Stahel's cavalry. As it was they were away where they could be of no service whatever.¹⁷

Imboden's horsemen accomplished nothing where they were. In their station across the creek they were of course not able to strike at the enemy. Breckinridge had ordered them to complete the circuit around the Federal left, and destroy the bridge over the Shenandoah in Sigel's rear.¹⁸ They

doah Valley," *ibid.*, IV, 489, note. Imboden's printed account of this matter is such as to make it impossible to ascertain when the movement was made. It is so inaccurate in many places that its value is comparatively small.

¹⁵ Key, 14^b.

¹⁶ See below, p. 61.

¹⁷ Edgar, Critical Notes upon the Battle of New Market; MS. letter of C. W. Humphreys to Henry A. Wise, Feb. 20, 1911.

¹⁸ "Brigadier-General Imboden was directed to take position . . . with his cavalry . . . on the extreme right covering that flank, and to use every effort to destroy the bridge across the river in rear of the

did attempt to do this, but the waters of Smith's Creek were so high that they could not recross, and as the sequel will show, Sigel retreating reached the bridge unmolested and got his army safely across. The Confederate cavalry, therefore, which had done such brilliant service in resisting the Federal advance before Breckinridge arrived, may be said to have done almost nothing on the day when the battle of New Market was fought.¹⁹

After Imboden had gained the Federal flank and while his cavalry was seeking to get in the enemy's rear, the decisive struggle took place north of New Market town, where the two armies joined battle. A general advance had begun all along the Confederate front, and Sigel prepared to make a final and desperate stand in his lines along Bushong's Hill.

The second stage of the battle is made up of two parts: first, the defeat of the Federal line posted near the turnpike on the Federal left, somewhat in advance of Sigel's other regiments; secondly, the struggle with the second line, placed farther back, and with the Federal cavalry east of the pike. The first task was accomplished easily; the second only after a desperate contest.

When the Confederates renewed their advance between one

enemy with a view to cut off his retreat in case of a reverse to his arms." Breckinridge, Report. Long afterwards this was denied by one who was well informed as to the circumstances. "I know now, I knew then, that Imboden was not expected to cross Smith's Creek or the Shenandoah River to burn the bridge at Mount Jackson." MS. letter of Captain G. Julian Pratt (18th Virginia Cavalry) to B. A. Colonna, Nov. 19, 1910. Captain Pratt declares that Breckinridge knew that Smith's Creek was too high to be forded.

¹⁹ Major Peter J. Otey, describing the battle, says: "I haven't spoken of our cavalry as they did nothing." MS. letter to Lieutenant-Colonel Scott Shipp, April 14, 1873.

and two o'clock, they first encountered the 18th Connecticut and the 123d Ohio Regiments, supported by Von Kleiser's Battery of six guns.²⁰ These commands did not make sufficient resistance. If it is necessary to blame Sigel for having his army at this moment in three distinct pieces, one of which was too far in the rear to be of any assistance, it is nevertheless not possible to exonerate the men in the most advanced fragment, since a sturdier resistance ought to have been made, and would probably have caused a different outcome of the contest. As it was they gave way after a brief stand. First their skirmishers were driven in. Then as the foremost Confederates approached their line, an attempt was made to take up a better position some distance in the rear.²¹ This move-

²⁰ "I was now ordered to fall back some 800 yards to the rear of my first position, and to form the One hundred and twenty-third Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry and Eighteenth Connecticut on the right of a battery. The Eighteenth Connecticut was hardly in line when the rebels heralded their advance by their peculiar yell, and advanced in two strong lines, by far overlapping our own." Report of Colonel Augustus Moor, *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 80.

²¹ "Our skirmishers were driven in, and after a short but resolute struggle this line was forced to the rear, which created some confusion in the Eighteenth Connecticut Regiment, owing to knee-deep mud, fences, out-houses, and stables close to their rear, and the insufficient number of officers to control their movements." Report of Colonel Moor, *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 80. "It was at this time decided that a small knoll some 200 yards to the rear would afford a better position, thereby inflicting greater damage upon the enemy, who would be forced to pass over an eighth of a mile of nearly level ground before reaching our lines. The line accordingly marched in retreat. The new position of the regiment was most unfortunate for its efficiency, being in a lane backed by barns and two rows of fences. A continuous rain of five days had rendered traveling on other than the roads extremely difficult, and the men stood knee-deep in mud. . . . The skirmishers of the enemy now appeared on the brow of the hill and rapid firing ensued. . . . As our skirmishers retired around our flank the line fired several volleys,

ment, which in the face of the advancing foe was a difficult one, immediately degenerated into a rout, during which one gun is said to have been lost.²² It had consequences all the more serious because the men in rushing back threw into disorder the commands posted behind and to the right in the second line. Some of the fugitives were rallied and along with Stahel's cavalry continued to oppose the Confederate right, but others did not come to a halt until they had reached Sigel's hindmost regiments near the crossing of the Shenandoah River.²³

Thus relieved on their right the Confederates were enabled to concentrate their strength upon their left against the Federal right, leaving only Derrick's scanty battalion and the artillery to oppose the Federal left.

when, it being apparent that the line of the enemy greatly outnumbered our own, and that farther stay in that position was worse than useless, the commander of the regiment on the left of the brigade gave the order to retreat, which movement was followed by the Eighteenth. The regiment marched by the flank at double-quick. On emerging from the lane (it) found itself some distance in the rear of the retreating line, and was thereby thrown into some confusion, but with some exceptions the men were rallied, and were reformed with the rest of the first line in rear of the second line, which now awaited the shock." Report of Major Peale, *ibid.*, 82.

²² Letter of Abraham Park (123d Ohio Regiment) to B. A. Colonna, February 16, 1911.

²³ "My regiment did not reform again until after we had crossed the river, and the Confederates had abandoned the pursuit." MS. letter of C. H. Richmond (18th Connecticut Regiment) to B. A. Colonna, Dec. 13, 1910. As in similar instances the retreat was not without its amusing incidents. "I found myself and a comrade, Norman Kelley, in a wheat-field. The deep mud greatly interfered with the rapidity of our flight. . . . Lieutenant Kerr of Company A, my regiment, who was of a very religious turn of mind, came up with us and said, 'Boys, our only chance for salvation is to kneel down and pray to God to save us.' But Kelley said, 'That's what God gave (us) our legs for, and I'm going to use them while I can.'" MS. letter of same, Feb. 10, 1911.

The struggle with the second Federal line is made up of three important incidents, which, while they were largely simultaneous, must yet be treated separately for the sake of clearness, and hence will be described approximately in the order in which they occurred. They were first, the movement of the Confederate left, Wharton's command, the 51st Virginia Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Wolfe, and the 26th Virginia Battalion under Lieutenant-Colonel Edgar, against the Federal right, as a result of which the Federal line was broken, the artillery on the right driven off the field, and the Federal position rendered insecure; second, the failure of the Federal cavalry on the left to break the Confederate right, Derrick with the 23d Virginia Battalion fighting manfully against greatly superior numbers, while McLaughlin's artillery was breaking their offensive power; and third, the desperate charges of what may be called the Confederate center, the Cadets, the 22d Virginia Regiment under Colonel Patton, and particularly the 62d Virginia Regiment under Colonel Smith, against Sigel's center, as a result of which the Federal army was forced to retreat from its position. It was in this part of the battle that the Cadets of the Virginia Military Institute won the laurels of the day.

It is probable that Breckinridge believed that the key to the Federal position was its extreme right. Here the position was by nature strongest, and here the ground was highest.²⁴ In this place Sigel had posted two powerful batteries with strong infantry supports. He had no doubt realized the importance of this part of the position and had guarded it accordingly. Here Breckinridge made ready to strike a hard blow with a view to turning the enemy's flank. Accordingly he

²⁴ Key, 20, 21, 22.



THE NORTH FORK OF THE SHENANDOAH RIVER,
AND THE BLUFFS UPON WHICH THE FEDERAL

RIGHT RESTED. AT THIS POINT THE HEIGHT OF
THE CLIFF IS ABOUT SIXTY FEET.

reinforced the 51st Virginia Regiment, which was as yet the extreme left of the Confederate army, with the 26th Virginia Battalion, which he moved forward from the second line to the farthest position on the left of the first.²⁵ As showing the importance of the movement about to be undertaken, General Echols, from whose command the 26th had been taken, put the rest of his men under Colonel Patton, and accompanied the 26th, while just before the advance began General Breckinridge himself arrived.²⁶

In the part of the field which was to be traversed there rises a wooded hill which, at a distance of about a half a mile, runs nearly parallel with the pike. The effect of this eminence is that here the battlefield is divided into two parts. After advancing beyond New Market the line of march of the 26th Battalion and part of the 51st Regiment was to the west of the ridge. For the most part these men were out of sight of the remainder of the army. When the movement began the 26th was to the left of the 51st, but soon it was found that the winding of the river, which here sweeps inward toward the east, left too narrow a space for both commands to proceed abreast. Accordingly Edgar's men dropped to the rear.²⁷ For some distance the line of march was through a wood which obscured and protected the men, but when open ground was reached the 51st Regiment received a most galling fire from

²⁵ See above, p. 28.

²⁶ C. W. Humphreys, "Battle of New Market," in (Richmond) *Times-Dispatch*, October 8, 1905. Dr. Humphreys took part in the movement which he describes. His statements are approved by his commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Edgar.

²⁷ "As my battalion advanced, the front became too narrow because of the winding of the river, and I found it necessary to order one company after another to drop to the rear of the regiment on my right, until my entire battalion was in its rear." Letter of Lieutenant-Colonel Edgar to Henry A. Wise, February 18, 1896.

the sharp-shooters on the river-bluff, from the artillery in front, and from the 34th Massachusetts Regiment supporting it. So terrible was the fire that some of the men halted, wavered, fell into confusion, and began to rush back toward the rear.²⁸ Thus almost at the beginning of the movement the Confederates were threatened with defeat, since there seemed imminent danger of a rout. As will be shown, the Confederate line farther to the east, the 62d Virginia and the commands adjoining, had been brought to a halt by the terrific fire from the Federal position. At this time the Federal commanders believed that victory would be with them.²⁹

²⁸ "There were four companies of our regiment on our right. My company was A, and belonged at the head of the regiment; but when on the march we walked so fast that the command could not keep up, and General Wharton put us back in the right center. Those companies on our right gave way one at a time, slowly falling back; they dropped down to try to stay under the shot and shell from the enemy that seemed to keep the air blue. I called to the company next to mine to stand firm, as I was not going to run. My men always told me they never would run until I did, and I believed them. The officer tried to hold his company, but could not. I saw something had to be done, and saw no officer of higher rank than myself. The time had come for no foolishness; at least half our command was giving way." D. H. Bruce (51st Regiment). "Battle of New Market, Va.," *Confederate Veteran*, XV, 554. Humphreys says that the men of the 51st very properly lay down to avoid the first volley, and that their mistake was in not rising for the charge immediately after the Federal marksmen had fired. "Battle of New Market," (Richmond) *Times-Dispatch*, Oct. 15, 1905. Edgar, however, expresses himself more strongly. "It wasn't long until the regiment gave way, the men breaking through my line in several places. Seeing the danger of a stampede of the left wing, I ordered my officers to fall to the rear a few paces and draw their pistols and use them, if necessary, to stop the fugitives". . . . Letter of Edgar to Henry A. Wise, Feb. 18, 1896.

²⁹ Cf. the report of Colonel Wells, *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 84.

So much controversy has arisen that one can hardly be certain about all that transpired, but it seems probable that the day was saved for the Confederates on their left by the splendid conduct of the 26th Battalion under Colonel Edgar. Since the 51st had so far borne the brunt of the battle in this part of the field, the men of the 26th had suffered little harm. In spite of the fact that their ranks were somewhat broken by the fugitives streaming to the rear, they held their ground steadily. Then Colonel Edgar springing to the front, shouted the charge.³⁰ His men responded gallantly, and a determined forward movement was begun along the slope of the hill near the river. To some of those who were present this advance seemed to occupy but a brief space of time,³¹ but in reality there was a great deal of hard fighting.³² Gradually the Federal sharp-shooters were dislodged, and the artillery deprived of its support. Finally a last rush was made under circumstances which seemed picturesque to those who afterwards remembered them. The weather was heavy, and the rain had continued falling, sometimes in heavy showers, so that now

³⁰ "Colonel Edgar, in front, faced his men, waving his sword over his head, and cried. 'Forward! men, forward!' At the same instant General Breckinridge dashed along our line in the rear, shouting: 'Charge! charge! charge!'" Humphreys, *Times-Dispatch*, Oct. 15, 1905. "I . . . especially urged *my men* to move forward to meet the enemy. My efforts were successful." Letter of Edgar to Henry A. Wise, Feb. 18, 1896.

³¹ Humphreys, *Times-Dispatch*, Oct. 15, 1905.

³² "This was not the work of a few minutes, as might be hastily inferred from the brief statements of some of the officers who participated in the two charges made, but covered a period of two or more hours of persistent fighting through rain and mud" . . . Edgar, Critical Notes upon the Battle of New Market. Colonel Smith, of the 62d Virginia, is of the opinion that the actual fighting in the second part of the battle occupied a very short time.

the smoke from the cannon lay low along the ground and cut off the view ahead.³³ Through this smoke the men of the 26th plunged, and at last the enemy gave way. For some time now the Federal army had been pressed all along its center and right. Along most of the line it had made good the defense, as will be seen. The 62d Virginia had been repulsed, and the 51st thrown into confusion.³⁴ But now its extreme right was being broken. For a brief space the detached company of the 34th Massachusetts maintained a running fight back along the river-bluff, but it suffered severely and was finally disposed of.³⁵ Meanwhile the artillery, deprived of its supports and threatened by the renewed advance of the 51st Virginia Regiment in front, was limbered up and moved off hastily to the rear;³⁶ not quickly enough, however, to prevent the capture by the 26th Battalion of two pieces, while a third was afterwards found by the victors abandoned in a pond.³⁷ There was a brief conflict with a handful of Federal soldiers who attempted to fall upon Edgar's rear from the left, but they were soon put to flight,³⁸ after which this part of the field remained in the possession of the Confederate troops.

³³ "Just as we began the assault a May shower in big drops began to fall, causing the smoke of the enemy's guns to stand still in a long string with the lower edge about two feet above the ground. We saw the legs of the enemy by looking through under the smoke" . . . Humphreys, *Times-Dispatch*, Oct. 15, 1905.

³⁴ See above, p. 47, and below, p. 54.

³⁵ "Company C was sent off to skirmish on the right of the line, and lost half its numbers prisoners, together with its two officers." Report of Colonel Wells, *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 85.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 84.

³⁷ Edgar, Report; Humphreys, *Times-Dispatch*, Oct. 15, 1905.

³⁸ Humphreys, *ibid.*

In thus standing firm when a rout seemed possible, in advancing steadily upon the enemy and gradually forcing him back, and in doing so much to compel him to withdraw two of his batteries, the 26th Virginia Battalion rendered a most important service. On the Confederate right the 23d and the 22d were with difficulty holding their own, in the center the 62d, the Cadets, and the 30th were at a standstill, on the left the 51st was in confusion. This was the moment when Edgar began to lead his men forward. The result of his movement was to break the Federal line and turn their flank. Meanwhile the other Confederate commands had continued their advance, and it was the successful contest which they were now everywhere waging which made it possible for the 26th to do what it did. Nevertheless this must not detract from their service which, if not necessarily the decisive factor, had much to do with deciding the issue of the day.

It is the irony of fate that for a long time these men were denied all honor. Because at first the 26th had been posted in the rear, it was said in after days that throughout the battle it had acted as a reserve.³⁹ It is accordingly the more necessary to emphasize the part which they played, a part substantiated by the official report of Colonel Edgar and by the affidavits of his officers.⁴⁰

As to the guns near the river there has been much controversy. Edgar and the men of the 26th have declared vehemently that they captured them. Edgar asserted it in his re-

³⁹ Humphreys wrote his articles in the *Richmond Times-Dispatch* partly for the purpose of disproving this.

⁴⁰ See below, pp. 134-141.

port rendered shortly after the battle. Unfortunately there is no independent evidence to corroborate this, and the men of the 51st have put forward claims for themselves.⁴¹ There is no question of good faith or conviction. Both commands were nearby when the cannon were abandoned and as will be shown there were reasons why each might think that it had caused the retreat of the enemy. Nevertheless the evidence presented by the 26th Battalion is considerably better than that presented by the 51st Battalion, and in this volume it has been accepted.

Considering this part of the battle in its entirety, it may be said that the withdrawal of the batteries and the retreat of the Federal troops from Bushong's Hill were the result of the nearly simultaneous advance of the Confederate army all along the line, and that on the left the 26th, the 51st, and the Cadets moved forward nearly together from different places. While Edgar was routing the detached company of the 34th Massachusetts, the 51st and the Cadets were driving off the remainder of the Regiment, at the same time that the 62d and 22d were putting to flight the 1st West Virginia and the 54th Pennsylvania. It was because of all this that Carlin and Snow had to withdraw such guns as they could take off the field. Since, however, it is proper to award honor particularly to the command nearest and most directly responsible, that honor should go to Edgar and the men of the 26th Battalion.

While the 26th Virginia Battalion and part of the 51st Virginia Regiment were advancing out of the sight of their comrades, behind the ridge near the river, they were taking part in a general forward movement of the Confederate army.

⁴¹ See below, pp. 142-145.

To the east of the ridge was part of the 51st. On its right was the 30th Battalion, beyond which was the 62d Virginia Regiment. To the right of the 62d, but somewhat behind and making part of the second echelon, was the 22d Virginia Regiment, while some distance behind the 62d was the Corps of Cadets posted in the rear as a reserve. Some time before two o'clock this part of the army also began its attack upon Sigel's second position. In general it may be said that the brunt of the fighting was borne by the 62d, and in a lesser degree, because of the fewness of their numbers, by the Cadets; and that these commands later supported by the 51st, which had recovered from its confusion, and by the 22d, which brought assistance, drove the Federal forces from their lines. In many respects the leading part was taken by the 62d, by the movements of which were largely determined the movements of the other commands.⁴²

In their forward movement the men of the 62d suffered no check until they had passed over the larger part of the space which separated the two armies, and had arrived at the northern fence of the yard of the Bushong House,^{42 a} the principal landmark upon the slope of the hill up which they were making their charge. They came to this point just at the time when that part of the 51st Regiment which was beyond the ridge had halted in confusion. The line of march lay toward the 1st West Virginia Regiment, strongly posted, supported by the 34th Massachusetts on its right and the 54th Pennsylvania on its left, and flanked by artillery to the right.⁴³ Thus the 62d came directly under the concentrated fire of those forces

⁴² MS. letter of Colonel Smith to Lieutenant-Colonel Edgar, March 16, 1906.

^{42 a} Key, 18.

⁴³ Key, 23, 22, 21.

which had apparently completed the discomfiture of the 51st. The effect was terrible. In a few moments Smith lost nearly half of his command.⁴⁴ He led his men on a little farther, but the 51st had halted to return the enemy's fire, and the 22d had not yet come up to his support on the right, so that he found himself alone and in danger of annihilation under the Federal guns. Accordingly he was compelled to order his shattered regiment to fall back and reform behind a low hill.⁴⁵

This part of the battle was made memorable by a splendid act of heroism. Immediately upon the retreat of the 62d Regiment, Sigel pushed out to an advanced position Von Kleiser's Battery, which had apparently been withdrawn from

⁴⁴ 243 officers and men out of about 500. These numbers include the appalling losses of Captain Woodson's Missouri company. See above, p. 27, note 24. The loss suffered by Smith's men was much the heaviest loss sustained by any command in the Confederate army. MS. letter of Colonel Smith to Lieutenant-Colonel Edgar, March 16, 1906. See also his account in the *Confederate Veteran*, XVI, 570.

⁴⁵ "I, therefore, seeing that the regiment would be annihilated by a few minutes continuance of the fire to which it was exposed, drew it back under cover of the hill south of us;" . . . Letter of Colonel Smith to Edgar, March 16, 1906. Key, 18. "At this point Wharton's Brigade was, say, two or three hundred yards in advance of any of the other troops; but owing to our moving too much to the left, the left part of the Brigade was—as I understood—thrown out of line by the bluff, and the center stopped at the further fence of Bushong's yard, leaving the 62d Regiment alone to advance. This resulted in the concentration of the enemies' fire on that regiment; and seeing the men rapidly melting away . . . I brought them back a short distance to a hollow place to reform them and to wait for the other troops" . . . MS. letter of Colonel Smith to Henry A. Wise, March 7, 1896. Cf. *Confederate Veteran*, XVI, 570. "I do not disparage these center boys, for I was there. But they were in front before the line became one general line. They had had all the infantry fire, all the artillery fire . . . they were cut up . . . they had done their part." MS. letter of Major Peter J. Otey to Lieut.-Col. Scott Shipp, April 14, 1873. It is probable that this has particular reference to the 51st Regiment and the 30th Battalion.



ROCKY SLOPE TO THE EAST OF THE BUSHONG
HOUSE. UP THIS SLOPE THE 62D VIRGINIA REGI-
MENT ADVANCED IN ITS FIRST CHARGE, AND AT

THE BASE, IN THE FOREGROUND, IT RALLIED
AFTER ITS REPULSE.

the turnpike when the Federal rout occurred there, and was now brought directly to the front of the 62d and the Cadets, who had just arrived on their left. From its advanced position Von Kleiser's Battery poured in a terrible fire of canister, which wrought havoc in both commands. Then Captain Woodson's Company of Missourians detached itself from the left of the 62d and moved forward to within easy range, directly under the cannon fire. Every member of this Western company was an expert marksman, and so they began shooting down the Federal gunners. In a few moments the work was done, and the battery was temporarily silenced; but in those few moments the company had disappeared. Out of a total of seventy, six were killed and fifty-four wounded. More than any other men in the battle of New Market these soldiers from the West sacrificed themselves for their cause. On the spot where they fell there is now a granite marker bearing a brief and simple inscription, as it fitting.^{45a}

To the Federal commanders on Bushong's Hill it seemed that the day was won. Their troops had been subjected to a heavy artillery fire, their skirmishers had been driven in,⁴⁶ and

^{45a} MS. letter of James H. Dwyer (Sergeant of Woodson's company) to P. D. Stephenson, May 15, 1909 (this letter is accompanied by affidavits); MS. letter of James H. Dwyer to the author, March 11, 1912; *Rockingham Register*, May 20, 1864. According to Dwyer the command contained only sixty-five men.

⁴⁶ "The rebels advanced in three lines of battle, each, I think, as heavy as ours, with masses on the right and left. The ground was perfectly open, not a tree or shrub to obstruct the view. Nothing could be finer than their advance. Their yelling grew steadily nearer; our skirmishers and infantry in front came back on the double-quick, some of them running through and over my lines." Report of Colonel Wells, 34th Massachusetts Regiment, *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 83. "As soon as we arrived on that ridge we began to fire. . . . I was kept busy pulling our men back out of the line as they were killed and wounded . . . the smoke was so thick I could see nothing in front." MS. letter

their advanced line put to rout,⁴⁷ but the principal line of battle had remained unshaken, and the enemy had been sent reeling back.⁴⁸ This was the moment for a vigorous counter-attack.⁴⁹ Had it been possible now to hurl a strong force of cavalry upon the shaken Confederates their line might have been irretrievably broken.⁵⁰ This was impossible since Sigel had massed his cavalry under Stahel on the Federal left;⁵¹ but preparations were made to send forward the infantry.

As a matter of fact, however, the Federal success was only temporary. The Confederates were not demoralized. Except for the heavy artillery fire from both sides there was for a short time a lull in the battle in this part of the field. The Confederate line was being strengthened and rectified once more.

of David R. Bryan (54th Pennsylvania Regiment, Company A) to B. A. Colonna, March 8, 1911.

⁴⁷ See above, p. 44.

⁴⁸ "Our front fire was heavy, and the artillery had an enfilading fire, under which their first line went down. They staggered, went back, and their whole advance halted. Their fire ceased to be effective. A cheer ran along our line, and the first success was ours. I gave the order to 'cease firing.'" Report of Colonel Wells, *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 84. "There was an interruption of a few minutes, when the enemy's lines recoiled, and our men cheered" . . . Sigel, "Sigel in the Shenandoah Valley," *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, IV, 489.

⁴⁹ "When his" (Breckinridge's) "line had reached within two hundred yards of that of the enemy, the position was very critical, and for a time it seemed doubtful as to which would be the first to give way." J. S. Johnston, *The Battle of New Market*, 10.

⁵⁰ "Just here a cavalry charge would have won the day for the Yankees, and it was suggested by a *Prussian officer* whose name I forget but whom my battalion captured, and General Sigel would not allow it, but ordered it elsewhere as we will see" . . . Letter of Major Peter J. Otey to Lieutenant-Colonel Scott Shipp, April 14, 1873.

⁵¹ Key, 25.

The men of the 62d were undaunted by the disaster which had just occurred. Indeed they had retired partly for the purpose of waiting until the other commands should come up with them.⁵² The gap between the 62d and the 51st was being filled by the Cadets in the course of a brilliant movement to be described hereafter. To the left the 51st had recovered its order and was ready to go forward again. To the right of the 62d the 22d Regiment under Colonel Patton was hastening up to complete the line.

This was the time chosen by Sigel for the Federal counter-charge.⁵³ Perhaps it had no chance to succeed, although the result might have been different had this charge been made immediately after the repulse of the Confederates, and had the Federal left been holding its own. Now there was little hope. As the Federal soldiers moved down the slope they were met by a terrible fire.⁵⁴ Curiously enough what had happened to the Confederates a little before now befell their opponents. The 54th Pennsylvania and probably the 1st West Virginia⁵⁵

⁵² Letter of Colonel Smith to Lieutenant-Colonel Edgar, March 16, 1906. "It was common talk just after the battle that he" (Colonel Smith) "halted his regiment and aligned them under a heavy fire and then moved forward in perfect order" . . . MS. letter of Charles A. Holt to Captain T. C. Morton, Feb. 10, 1896.

⁵³ "Just then Colonel Thoburn, brigade commander, rode along the lines telling the men to 'prepare to charge.' He rode by me shouting some order I could not catch, and went to the regiment on my left, which immediately charged. I supposed this to be his order to me, and I commanded to fix bayonets and charge. Then men fairly sprang forward." Report of Colonel Wells, *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 84.

⁵⁴ "As we neared the crest of the hill we met the entire rebel force advancing and firing." Report of Colonel Wells, *ibid.*

⁵⁵ "Observing the regiment on my right making a charge in the absence of orders, presuming it proper to imitate their example, I ordered the Fifty-fourth also to charge, which was done with alacrity and spirit.

halted in confusion and turned back leaving the 34th Massachusetts to advance alone.⁵⁶ The men of this command charged gallantly toward the fence of Bushong's yard, but were repulsed in disorder, partly because of the splendid fighting of the Cadets.⁵⁷ Accordingly they retreated with heavy loss.⁵⁸ In some respects the repulse of Sigel's countercharge was the

Advancing beyond the crest of the hill, a rapid, vigorous, and, as I believe, effective fire was for some time kept up on the enemy, and every effort made by them to advance on the front occupied by my regiment was firmly and resolutely resisted, and proved abortive, although we sustained a galling and destructive fire, in which many of my men were killed and wounded." Report of Colonel Jacob M. Campbell, 54th Pennsylvania Regiment, *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 86.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ "But here the Cadets step in their way and utterly rout them—I speak by the card and have no hesitancy in saying that this saved the battle (for I was lying" nearby "shot, and was directly between these charging Yanks and your boys). Had the Cadets given away at this point it is very clear that the Yankees would have driven a wedge as it were into our attacking column, and would have cut it in two." Letter of Major Otey to Lieut.-Col. Shipp, April 14, 1873. Since the 1st West Virginia was easily driven back, and since Edgar was now turning the Federal flank, the writer exaggerates the importance of the repulse of the 34th Massachusetts.

⁵⁸ "The regiment on my left, which first met the fire, turned and went back, leaving the Thirty-fourth rushing alone into the enemy's line. I shouted to them to halt but could not make a single man hear or heed me, and it was not until they had climbed an intervening fence, and were rushing ahead on the other side, that I was able to run along the lines, and, seizing the color bearer by the shoulder, hold him fast as the only way of stopping the regiment. The wings surged ahead, but, losing sight of the colors, halted. The alignment rectified, we faced about and marched back to our position in common time. I could hear the officers saying to the men, and the men to each other, 'Don't run!'—'Keep your line!'—'Common time!' &c. On reaching our position the regiment was halted, faced about, and resumed its fire. The path of the regiment between our line and the fence was sadly strewn with our fallen." Report of Colonel Wells, *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 84.

critical point in this part of the engagement, for the tide of battle now turned. The 22d Virginia Regiment, which formed the left of the hinder echelon, had now come up upon the right of the 62d Virginia. Together they formed a solid line of eight hundred veteran troops.⁵⁹ A forward movement was begun immediately, leaving the shaken Federal troops no time to recover. The Cadets also under Captain Henry A. Wise and the other Professor Captains, Colonel Shipp, the commander, having been disabled, sprang forward with heroic enthusiasm, their boyish cheers arousing the veterans on both sides of them.⁶⁰ The 51st Virginia to the left of the Cadets had recovered from its earlier confusion and had been fighting vigorously.⁶¹ It also took part in the general forward movement, so that substantially the entire Confederate army swept up toward the Federal position. By this time Edgar had completed his work of turning the Federal right; the troops posted along the river had been driven back, and the artillery was hastening to move off. Over on the left the Federal attack had been repulsed, and there the Confederate right was driving the enemy back. In fact the Federal line was breaking up now, and Breckinridge encountered no serious

⁵⁹ MS. letter of Colonel George H. Smith to Henry A. Wise, April 1, 1911.

⁶⁰ "Our *esprit de corps* made us vie with the magnificent veterans to our right and left. They yelled, we yelled with them. The onrush was irresistible." MS. letter of B. A. Colonna (C) to Henry A. Wise, May 15, 1909.

⁶¹ Captain D. H. Bruce, Company A of the 51st Virginia Regiment, who contends that his company did not fall into confusion and that it took a leading part in defeating Sigel's army, says: "We stayed in that position and fired as fast as we could load for one hour and fifteen minutes, according to a man who was not in the battle and noted the time." "Battle of New Market, Va.," *Confederate Veteran*, XV, 553.

resistance. The 54th Pennsylvania and the 1st West Virginia, hotly pressed and in danger of being flanked, gave way.⁶² The 34th Massachusetts was thus left in a perilous position. The 62d and the 22d were driving away its supports on the left; the 26th, the 51st, and the Cadets were driving off the artillery on its right; while it was being assailed in front by part of the Cadet Battalion, the 30th Virginia, and part of the 62d. It fought stubbornly and well, and sustained heavy losses, but could not retrieve the day.⁶³ As it was it lacked little of being cut off.⁶⁴ Thus both the right and the center of the Federal army were broken.

⁶² See below, p. 92.

⁶³ "Just as we halted Lieutenant-Colonel Lincoln fell. The loss of his invaluable services, and the impossibility of making my voice heard in the din, rendered it necessary for me to go along the whole line to make the men understand what was wanted. The alignment perfected and the men well at work, I was able to look about the field, and saw, to my surprise, that the artillery had limbered up and was moving off the field, and that the infantry had gone, save one regiment, which was gallantly holding its ground far to the left. The rebel line advanced until I could see, above the smoke, two battle-flags on the hill in front of the position where the artillery had been posted. I ordered a retreat, but they either could not hear or would not heed the order. I was finally obliged to take hold of the color bearer, face him about, and tell him to follow me, in order to get the regiment off the field. They fell back slowly, firing in retreat, and encouraging each other not to run. But the rebels were coming on at the double-quick and concentrating their whole fire upon us. I told the men to run and get out of the fire as quickly as possible, and rally behind the first cavalry line found to the rear." Report of Colonel Wells, 34th Massachusetts, *War Records*, ser. I, vol. XXXVII, part I, 84.

⁶⁴ This would probably have been the case had Edgar advanced still farther and got in its rear. Cf. Humphreys, in (Richmond) *Times-Dispatch*, Oct. 15, 1905, who imputes the failure to do this to the fact that Edgar was waiting for orders from his superior. Humphreys even believes that an aggressive movement at this time would have spared the other Confederate commands much hard fighting.

Meanwhile on the other side of the field, over by the turnpike and down to Smith's Creek, the Confederate line had held its own against superior numbers, and turned apparent defeat into victory. Here was posted on the Federal side such parts of the 18th Connecticut and 123d Ohio as had not left the field, and all of Sigel's available cavalry, commanded by Major-General Stahel. On the Confederate side was the 23d Virginia Battalion under Lieutenant-Colonel Derrick,⁶⁵ assisted on its left by the 22d Virginia Regiment under Colonel Patton,⁶⁶ though the 22d was mostly occupied along with the 62d to its left in confronting the Federal regiments to the west of the Valley turnpike. As a matter of fact, while Sigel on his left was still strong, Breckinridge on his right was weak. The defense of this part of the Confederate line lay with Derrick and the Confederate artillery.

It is probable that Sigel had as good a chance to break the Confederate right as Breckinridge had to break the right of the Federals. This Stahel's cavalry did attempt to do. Had they succeeded, they might have effectually counterbalanced the good fortune of the Confederates at the other end of the field, and the entire Federal center might have been enabled to continue its resistance. As has been shown, however, the Confederate left broke the Federal right. On the other hand the Federal left failed to shake the Confederate right. Roughly this is the explanation of Sigel's defeat.

The position of Derrick might well have seemed perilous. He had to confront a force greatly superior to his own, and in order to prevent his opponents getting around his flank, he had to cover a long stretch of ground. With the force at his

⁶⁵ Key, 14 b.

⁶⁶ Key, 14 a.

disposal it was necessary for him to guard the line for nearly half a mile, from where Patton's right ended all the way to Smith's Creek. It was possible to do this only by extending two companies of his command as skirmishers. So he confronted the masses of the enemy's cavalry.⁶⁷ In this perilous situation, however, he was supported by the larger part of the Confederate artillery under McLaughlin. Without this assistance it would seem that he must have been swept aside.⁶⁸

The Federal cavalry seems to have been driven back somewhat away from Smith's Creek after the Confederate guns under Imboden had begun firing upon them from across the stream.⁶⁹ Accordingly Derrick and the 22d were not closely engaged until some time after the Confederate left and center were struggling with their opponents. As Derrick moved forward, however, he was soon face to face with the remnants of the 123d Ohio and the supporting cavalry, and became involved in a furious contest, in which his men managed to hold their own, fighting with stubborn courage.⁷⁰


Somewhat behind the Confederate right was the greater part of Breckinridge's artillery under Captain Chapman, Cap-

⁶⁷ "When I saw part of the men on my left front dashing back through my fire, and saw no reserve in my rear, with two of my largest and best companies extended as skirmishers nearly half a mile to my right, you may know what I apprehended, and how all my attention was concentrated at home, holding my men solid." MS. letter of Lieutenant-Colonel Derrick to Lieutenant-Colonel Edgar.

⁶⁸ MS. letter of Adjutant Noyes Rand (22d Virginia Regiment) to Edgar; MS. letter of Captain C. H. Minge (C) to Edgar.

⁶⁹ See above, p. 41.

⁷⁰ "The left was in contact and in action with the enemy before the right, where I was; and when we, a little later, came to the crest of the hill in plain sight of at least two lines of the enemy, we got such a hot reception that my men knelt down and held their position." MS. letter of Derrick to Edgar.



THE BOTTOM LANDS NEAR SMITH'S CREEK,
WHICH IS MARKED BY THE LINE OF TREES. BE-
YOND THE CREEK, IN THE BACKGROUND, DER-

RICK'S SKIRMISHERS HELD THE CONFEDERATE
RIGHT. IN THE FOREGROUND IMBODEN MOVED
IN ATTEMPTING TO TURN THE FEDERAL LEFT.

tain Jackson,^{70a} Lieutenant Berkeley, and Cadet Captain Minge, all of whom were under the command of Major McLaughlin and to some extent under the personal direction of Breckinridge himself. Altogether there were fourteen guns, the entire available artillery force of the Confederate army except for the four cannon which had gone across Smith's Creek with Imboden.

The Confederate artillery had been engaged during the entire battle, moving forward from one position to another as the Federal army drew back. It had done particularly good service in driving Sigel's men from their first position before and in New Market, but its decisive part was to be played now.

Sigel while holding his right and center on the defensive undertook an aggressive movement on his left. The Federal cavalry under Stahel were massed for a charge down the pike to sweep away their opponents and turn the Confederate flank. As they came on with a mighty rush Derrick's skirmishers ran together in little groups among the trees and sought shelter wherever they could.⁷¹ Derrick ordered his men to hold their ground and fire low. In a moment, he says, the whole field was covered with smoke.⁷² Meanwhile McLaughlin's guns were made ready for the charging horsemen, and as they came

^{70a} There is some doubt about Jackson's guns having taken part in this fighting.

⁷¹ "I saw for the first time in battle our skirmishers run together and form themselves in fours, placing backs together" . . . MS. letter of Sergeant J. G. Stevens (Chapman's Battery) to Lieutenant-Colonel Edgar. Also MS. letter of Captain J. K. Thompson (22d Regiment) to Edgar.

⁷² "The cavalry, and, I think, the infantry started to charge us on the right, and I ordered my men to fire low, and waited for them to debouch out of the heavy smoke" . . . MS. letter of Lieutenant-Colonel Derrick to Edgar.

nearer opened fire with deadly effect, dropping shells in their very midst.⁷³ At the same moment to the left of the turnpike part of the 22d Regiment swung round till it was facing the road, and began shooting down the horses. On the other side Derrick's men did the same.⁷⁴ Thus met in the front with a withering fire, and exposed on both flanks, the charge ended in utter disaster: only three Federal horsemen reached the Confederate lines.⁷⁵ So ended in entire failure Sigel's most important aggressive movement in the second period of the battle.⁷⁶

It is difficult to praise too highly the conduct of the Confederates in this section of the battle-field. To a certain extent their part was to have been a passive one. While the soldiers on the Confederate left were dealing a deadly thrust at their antagonists, and the men in the center were locked in desperate struggle, the few remaining on the right were to act on the defensive. They were to hold their ground while their comrades won the day. This they did in magnificent fashion. The artillery maintained a duel with the batteries of Ewing and Von Kleiser, probably disabling one of the guns, and helping to repulse Stahel's charge. Derrick's men greatly outnumbered, maintained a prolonged conflict until their comrades had triumphed farther down the line. Had they faltered or given way the result might have been different. Now as

⁷³ MS. letter of Captain J. K. Thompson to Edgar.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ "Only three of the cavalry got through, two of whom, when they saw their predicament, dismounted and lay down, the third man, Captain John J. Carter, rode back through our line and escaped down the pike." *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ MS. letter of Major William C. McLaughlin to Henry A. Wise, Jan. 27, 1897; Breckinridge, Report; J. S. Johnston, *The Battle of New Market*, 10; Imboden, "The Battle of New Market," *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, IV, 484.

the horsemen streamed back along the pike, the 22d advanced moving to the left and front with the 62d. Together with the Cadets and the 51st these regiments began their last charge, which drove Sigel out of his lines. The Federal army now moved back toward the river-crossing, and the decisive part of the battle was over.⁷⁷

⁷⁷ As to all this part of the battle the report of General Breckinridge is absolutely meager. "My troops advanced with great steadiness in the face of a most galling fire. This steadiness together with the well directed fire of the artillery soon showed its effect upon the enemy. His right less favored by natural advantages than his left was first thrown into confusion . . . my troops charged with a defiant shout and the enemy fled precipitately leaving his dead and wounded upon the field" . . . Breckinridge, Report.

CHAPTER V.

THE PART OF THE CADETS.

THE most difficult task in writing a history of the battle of New Market is to give an account of the part taken by the Cadets. What they did was so brilliant, so unusual, and so unexpected, that after a while their exploits came to be shrouded in a mist of tradition and romance very difficult for the historian to penetrate. In after days enthusiastic advocates and friends made exaggerated and contradictory assertions about their deeds on the fifteenth of May. It was said that they had made the only Confederate charge of the battle; that they had stormed a battery firing grape and shrapnel into them and supported by masses of infantry; that they had rallied the veterans faltering around them, and won the battle of New Market when all hope seemed lost. Some said they broke the Federal line near the Shenandoah, some where the center regiments were posted, some over by the turnpike. It did not matter that many of these assertions were absurd, and many of the things asserted impossible. The statements were taken up and repeated enthusiastically by newspaper writers and old soldiers. Gradually as time went on, there being a lack of maps, plans of position, and circumstantial statement, the whole subject of the battle became loose, hazy, and indistinct. It now became possible to fit into an account of it incidents of any kind without apparent violation of the truth. All the while the part of the Cadets grew in magnitude and importance. It made little difference that soldiers from the other commands at New Market protested indignantly and wrote careful accounts in disproof. It mattered not that many of

the assertions for the Cadets were made long after the war, or by writers who had seen nothing of what they described. Emphatic repetition and wide publicity have often served to make history. It is thus that myths originate.

In the process of time, however, some circumstantial narratives were prepared and published.¹ To a greater or less extent they were based upon a study of the topography of the battlefield, the exact positions of the forces engaged, and such official reports as had been made immediately after the battle. It was then seen that many of the assertions about the Cadets were so foolish and contradictory as to carry no weight whatever with the competent critic. The result of this was that in the end those who knew anything about the battle of New Market were divided into three classes: those who believed that the Cadets had won the day; those who believed that the Cadets had done some uncertain thing which had been greatly exaggerated; and those who believed that their part had been wholly without importance.

It is the purpose of this chapter to ascertain the truth so far as the truth may now be discovered. An effort will be made to do justice to the veteran commands who have suffered from the unfortunate statements made in behalf of their younger comrades, and at the same time to give historical credibility to the undoubted and brilliant services of the Cadets, so that in the future no injustice may be done to them. It will be best to begin by sweeping away some of the most obvious fictions.

¹ Especially C. W. Humphreys, "Battle of New Market," (Richmond) *Times-Dispatch*, Oct. 8, 15, 1905; Colonel George H. Smith, "More of the Battle of New Market," *Confederate Veteran*, XVI, 569-572; the MS. critical notes of Colonel Smith and of Lieutenant-Colonel Edgar; and the topographical researches of Benjamin A. Colonna (C).

The most famous of all these stories is that about the capture of a Federal battery by the Cadets. If some of the accounts could be credited, one of the batteries on Bushong's Hill was doing deadly execution upon the Confederate army. All attempts to take it failed until at last the boy soldiers of the Virginia Military Institute dashed across the slope against it. The battery hidden in smoke poured grape and canister into them as they struggled along through the mud. On both sides of the battery the riflemen were shooting fast and furiously. The hill shook under the roar of the guns. Yet they charged on until they reached the cannon, some of which were even then fired for the last time, and routing the gunners took possession of the battery.

A multitude of writers have borne witness to most of the details here given. Perhaps no account is apparently more worthy of credence than that given by Captain Franklin E. Town, Chief Signal Officer of Sigel's army. Thirty-four years after the battle he wrote the following account:

"Standing on the crest of this slope after a short time, I observed a line forming in the ravine at the foot of the hill, which seemed about like a regiment in extent, but so 'smart' and 'natty' in appearance as instantly to suggest our own pet 'Seventh Regiment' of New York City. They appeared more like militia on parade than troops in campaign. We were soon able to identify the command as the Battalion of the Virginia Military Institute, and certainly a more soldierly appearing corps never faced an enemy.

"After perfecting their alignment this young regiment advanced toward our battery. It approached only a short distance when it halted and turned back, toward the ravine. There was no apparent disorder, nor did it seem that they were fall-

ing back in panic, but rather as if by some change of plan and in pursuance of orders.

"The Battalion remained but a short time in the ravine, and again advanced. They came on steadily up the slope, swept as it was by the fire of these guns. Their line was as perfectly preserved as if on dress parade or in the evolutions of a review. As they advanced, our guns played with utmost vigor upon their line; at first with shrapnel, then, as they came nearer, with canister, and, finally, with double loads of canister. As the Battalion continued to advance, our gunners loaded at the last, without stopping to sponge, and I think it would have been impossible to eject from six guns more missiles than these boys faced in their wild charge up that hill. But still they advanced steadily, without any sign of faltering. I saw, here and there, a soldier drop from their line and lie where he fell, as his comrades closed up the gaps and passed on. Their pace was increased from a quick-step to a double time, and at last to the charge, as through the fire they came on, and up to the guns, which they surrounded and captured; our artillerymen giving way when the bayonets, having passed the guns, were at their breasts."²

This story would seem at first sight to be worthy of entire credence. Captain Town declares that he was very close to

² "An Eye Witness from the Other Side," *New Market Day*, 82, 83. This account was printed also in the (Richmond) *Times-Dispatch*, April 24, 1898. Cf. the account given by Major Theodore F. Lang, a member of Sigel's Staff: "I must say that I never witnessed a more gallant advance and final charge than was given by those brave boys on that field. They fought like veterans, nor did the dropping of their comrades by the ruthless bullets deter them from their mission, but on they came, ravines or fence, or shot or shell was all the same to those brave boys, who faltered not until they waved their battle-flag over the captured battery of Captain Von Kleiser." MS. Personal Recollections of the Battle of New Market, (no date).

what he saw.³ Apparently he is relating only what he actually did see. There are some unfortunate difficulties, however.

In the first place it has been remarked that the capture of a battery in the manner described would have been a most wonderful achievement. It is asserted that the Cadets charged upon a powerful battery, superbly served up to the last moment of its capture, and that they did this, moreover, after crossing a field, which as we know from other sources, was ankle-deep in mud. At Agincourt a slough of mud through which the French soldiers charged proved their absolute undoing, even though in numbers they were overwhelmingly superior to the enemy. The mere exertion was such as to make them unfit to cope with their opponents. It might be supposed that similarly the Cadets, boys as they were, would have been no match for full-grown men after dragging themselves through the mud and sprouting grain of Bushong's field. Moreover during this progress, necessarily slow, they must have afforded an excellent target for the six guns said to have been before them. It has been well said that one volley of grape from such a battery ought to have caused as many casualties as they suffered during the entire battle.

In the second place while the accounts of the part of the Cadets are usually based upon such sources as those just quoted,⁴ it seems to be forgotten that these accounts were written a generation after the events happened, when memories were fading, and when tradition was taking the place of truth. The contemporary narratives cannot be used for a very evident reason. Lieutenant-Colonel Scott Shipp, who commanded the

³ "I watched this action from my position, but a few yards from the left of the battery" . . . *New Market Day*, 83.

⁴ Cf. for example Dr. John N. Upshur, "Address," *New Market Day*, 19, 20.



EXTREME SOUTHERN CONTINUATION OF
BUSHONG'S HILL, SLIGHTLY TO THE NORTHWEST
OF THE TOWN OF NEW MARKET. AT THE BASE OF
THIS HILL---IN THE LEFT OF THE PICTURE---SOME

OF THE CONFEDERATE COMMANDS FOUND TEMPO-
RARY SHELTER FROM THE FEDERAL FIRE, AS THEY
WERE MARCHING TO ATTACK SIGEL'S SECOND
POSITION.

Cadets, made an official report on July 4, 1864, while Captain Frank Preston of Company B wrote an account four days after the battle.⁵ Neither of them says anything about the Cadets capturing a battery by assault, or capturing any battery at all.

It has usually been asserted that the Cadets took Von Kleiser's Battery, but they could scarcely have done this, since Von Kleiser's Battery was not captured. No Federal battery was captured at New Market. Sigel lost five or six cannon. Two of these were captured by the Confederates from the batteries near the river, while another they found afterwards abandoned in a pond.⁶ Von Kleiser lost two guns,⁷ one of which, there is no doubt, was taken by the Cadets when the Federal line gave way,⁸ and they may have captured the other. But they did not capture a battery.

⁵ Report of Lieutenant-Colonel Scott Shipp, *War Records*, ser. I, vol. XXXVII, part I, 89-91; "Letter Written by Captain Frank Preston, Company B, V. M. I. Corps, from New Market, May 19, 1864, to a Member of His Family in Lexington, Va.," *Lexington Gazette*, May 25, 1864.

⁶ See above, p. 50.

⁷ "Two pieces of Von Kleiser's battery fell into the enemy's hands" . . . Sigel, "Sigel in the Shenandoah Valley," *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, IV, 489.

⁸ There is no doubt that they captured a gun, and persistent tradition has asserted that it was from Von Kleiser's Battery. The capture was made during the confusion and *melée* when the Federal army was breaking up. This gun could not have been taken over by the turnpike, where Von Kleiser's Battery was stationed in the first line. The Cadets were not in that part of the field. See below, p. 129. There is no record that Von Kleiser's Battery was moved from the Federal left to the center and to the north of Bushong's house, but Lieutenant-Colonel Lincoln of the 34th Massachusetts Regiment asserts that it was there, *Life with the Thirty-Fourth Massachusetts Infantry*, 281, and it is certain that it did not remain in its first position after the rout of the 18th Connecticut and the 123d Ohio. At the end of the day one cannon was abandoned by the retreating Federals near Rude's Hill. MS. letter of H. A. Du Pont to Edgar, October 1, 1908.

Not less exaggerated have been the assertions about the results of the action of the Cadets. There has been a tendency to maintain that they saved the day and won the battle,⁹ and that General Breckinridge acknowledged that they had done so.¹⁰ As a matter of fact there is no ground for such an assertion, and it is grossly unjust to the veteran soldiers who bore the brunt of the fighting. The Cadets made up about one-sixteenth of the Confederate army, so that it would have been physically impossible for them to have turned the tide of battle. They did bear themselves gloriously, and they performed all that was expected of them and much more, but the battle of New Market was won by the stubborn resistance of Derrick and the wondrous handling of the artillery on the right, by the steady advance and desperate rushes of the Confederate center, and by Edgar's movement on the extreme left.

Not the least unfortunate result of this careless writing is the confusion attaching to the movements of the Cadets. They have been described as fighting in so many different parts of the field at the same time that some of the most careful writers have come to exactly opposite conclusions as to where they were, while some have abandoned as impossible the task of finding their position. They are said to have been on the right with Derrick, on the left with Edgar, next to Patton, on the right of Smith, on the left of Smith, next to the 51st. It is very probable that before they made their charge they occupied this last position.¹¹ The confusion has arisen partly from

⁹ "Not the devoted few who stood in the pass at Thermopylae, the noble six hundred that charged at Balaklava, nor Pickett's men, who stormed the blazing crest at Gettysburg, deserve more praise than that Cadet Battalion which, amid a storm of shot and shell, won that glorious day at New Market." Upshur, "Address," *New Market Day*, 20, 21.

¹⁰ See below, p. 88, note, 57.

¹¹ See below, pp. 126-130.

the fact that the Cadets actually did occupy different positions at different times, and partly because careless writers have striven to give the proper setting for the statements which they were trying to prove.

The result of all this has been much popular exaggeration of the exploits of the Cadet soldiers, and some critical disparagement of what they really did perform. None have lamented this more than the Cadets themselves. It is not they for the most part who have written the misleading accounts. On the contrary members of the Corps have made some of the most careful investigations that have been undertaken.¹² It has been their desire, so far as possible, to clear away the fictions and discover the truth.

At the beginning of the forward movement of the Confederate army the Cadets had been stationed in the rear line as a reserve. As the advance continued they were subjected to a heavy fire from the Federal batteries, which got their range exactly. Shells began to burst among them, causing several casualties, but they kept their ranks and maintained discipline with such admirable coolness as to augur well for their conduct in the struggle before them.¹³ Under this, the first fire to

¹² Especially Captain Henry A. Wise, Mr. Benjamin A. Colonna, and Mr. Preston Cocke.

¹³ "As Wharton's line ascended a knoll it came in full view of the enemy's batteries, which opened a heavy fire, but not having gotten the range, did but little damage. By the time the second line reached the same ground the Yankee gunners had gotten the exact range, and their fire began to tell on our line with fearful accuracy. It was here that Captain Hill and others fell. Great gaps were made through the ranks, but the cadet, true to his discipline, would close in to the center to fill the interval and push steadily forward. The alignment of the battalion under this terrible fire, which strewed the ground with killed and wounded for more than a mile on open ground, would have been creditable even on a field day." Report of Lieutenant-Colonel Shipp, *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 90.

which they had been subjected, they continued their march for more than half a mile, all the while preserving their order in magnificent fashion.¹⁴ After some time they reached the shelter of a hill, and there they halted.¹⁵

Meanwhile the changes in the position of the Confederate commands had taken place.¹⁶ Edgar had been moved away from his place in the reserve next to the Cadets, over to the extreme left of the Confederate line. It is probable that shortly afterward Shipp also marched his battalion obliquely forward, though of such a movement there is almost no record.^{16a} It is

¹⁴ "In the center just on the left of the Valley turnpike through my strong field-glasses I beheld an unfamiliar sight for the battle-field, a body of several hundred with bright uniforms, shining swords, . . . polished buttons, and handsome flags as if just come from the manufacturer, kept the alignment perfect . . . on came the line, and on came the bright uniforms" . . . Major T. F. Lang, *Personal Recollections of the Battle of New Market*. Also D. G. Mohler (C), *MS. Recollections of the Battle of New Market*; MS. letter of Preston Cocke (C) to Henry A. Wise, July 25, 1895.

¹⁵ Captain Frank Preston, Company B, thus describes the march: "Marching down the first hill we were exposed to the enemy's batteries, but were too far to reply with small arms. In this advance one man was killed in the first line, and several wounded in our Battalion. . . . After getting to the bottom of the hill we were entirely covered, and here we waited half an hour, while some change was made in the lines. A half hour of intense suspense—the artillery on either side firing—the shot and shell flying and bursting high over our heads—knowing that in a short time we must charge the infantry, whose dark lines we saw drawn up in the woods. . . . After some time the first line began to move forward up the hill. . . . Then the second line began to move, and our nerves were strung and our lips firmly closed, our breath coming short and quick, waiting for the crash of musketry which we expected would receive the first line" . . . *Lexington Gazette*, May 25, 1864.

¹⁶ See above, p. 28.

^{16a} "Having begun a flank movement to the left, about two miles south of New Market, the nature of the ground was such as to render it impossible that the artillery should continue with the infantry column.

certain, however, that this line of march brought the Cadets to the immediate south of the Bushong House.¹⁷ By this time the Confederate center and left were engaged in a fierce struggle with Sigel's army, and were indeed in a critical position. This was the moment when the 51st had halted in confusion, with some of the men breaking ranks, while the 62d was unable to make headway. It appeared as though Breckinridge had been overbold and had run upon disaster. The enemy was unshaken; there was a break in the Confederate line; and some of the men were beginning to rush away to the rear.¹⁸ It was at this critical juncture that the Cadets, who had been appointed to act as a reserve, moved forward into the forefront of the contest and filled up the gap. They took position between the 51st Virginia Regiment and part of the 30th Battalion which was fighting along with the 62d Virginia.¹⁹ They had now become part of the first line of battle.²⁰

The movements of the Cadets at this time are known somewhat in detail. They had preserved their order splendidly during the heavy cannon fire, and had pressed forward in such beautiful alignment as to excite the admiration of all who saw

I ordered Lieutenant Minge to join the general artillery column in the main road and to report to Major McLaughlin. After that I did not see the section of artillery until near the close of the engagement." Report of Lieutenant-Colonel Shipp, *War Records*, ser. I, vol. XXXVII, part I, 90.

¹⁷ See below, p. 129.

¹⁸ "The troops in the first line . . . gave way; they began by ones and twos, and finally broke through our ranks in a wild rush that for a time threw us into some confusion." Letter of B. A. Colonna (C) to Henry A. Wise, May 6, 1909. "Some of our troops—Major Otey tells me it was the left of his Battalion, the 30th, and the right of the 51st, gave ground a little." MS. letter of Lieut.-Col. Shipp to A. P. Young, April 28, 1873.

¹⁹ Key, 18, 19. See below, p. 130.

²⁰ D. G. Mohler (C), *Recollections of the Battle of New Market*.

them. It was remarked by a Southern officer who was watching them from a point of vantage that they kept their course as if marching on dress parade.²¹ After ascending the hill at the base of which they had halted, they came to an open field muddy from the rains and exceedingly difficult to cross.²² A slight confusion was caused by the ends of the Battalion advancing faster than the center and so beyond it, thus causing the line hitherto straight to become curved; but here was displayed admirable coolness and discipline, for in the midst of a terrible artillery fire²³ the line was soon rectified, after which they proceeded in as perfect order as before.²⁴

²¹ Letter of Major P. J. Otey to Lieut.-Col. Shipp, April 14, 1873.

²² "The mud, which in many places was over the ankles, made it impossible to advance faster than at a walk, and the enemy's artillery had fair range all the while." Captain Frank Preston, *Lexington Gazette*, May 25, 1864. "We had to cross a ploughed field where the mud was up to our ankles. Here I remember that one of my shoes pulled off in the mud, and I went through the rest of the 'row' with nothing on one foot but a sock, and I'm prepared to 'Make affidavit' that there wasn't much of that." Letter of W. Kemp (C) to General Goggin, March 25, 1888.

²³ "In the advance on this third position, we were subjected to a terrible fire of artillery. When within four hundred yards of their line three of our boys fell dead from the explosion of one shell—Cabell, Jones, and Crockett, and fifty yards further on McDowell, from my company, fell pierced through the heart with a bullet." Captain Frank Preston, *Lexington Gazette*, May 25, 1864. "The bursting of shells about us was incessant, one of these passing directly through our colors. . . . About this time we passed a group of wounded soldiers who cheered us, but a shell, intended for us, burst in their midst, and they were silent." "Suddenly there was a crash in our front—a great gap appeared in our ranks, and 1st Sergeant W. H. Cabell, privates Wheelwright, Crockett, and Jones, fell dead, and others were wounded. The opening was immediately closed, and the line went forward in the best of order. Nothing could have been finer done." MS. letter of Gideon Davenport (C) to Preston Cocke, January 28, 1895.

²⁴ "I remember here a circumstance that we, the Cadets, thought



THE BUSHONG HOUSE, AROUND THE SIDES OF
WHICH THE CADETS PASSED IN TAKING THEIR
PLACE IN THE CONFEDERATE LINE OF BATTLE.

At the edge of the field was a frame house with other buildings, known by the name of the owner, Bushong.²⁵ Beyond was an orchard, and then a plateau, which formed the top of the hill, and which was also an open field.²⁶ When the house was reached the Cadets divided, Companies A and B passing to the right, Companies C and D to the left.²⁷ After the line was reformed on the other side, they found the grimmest part of their task before them, and it was here that their most terrible losses occurred.²⁸ From the Federal position

nothing of, believing it usual under like conditions, but which some of the old soldiers, who saw it, afterwards applauded. In advancing under heavy fire of shells and shot over the uneven and muddy ground, the wings of our battalion pushed forward, making our line crescent-shaped. In order to correct this our commandant gave the order he was used to give us on the parade-ground at drill, that is to 'mark time;' and this we did under fire, until the command 'forward' was given." Letter of W. Kemp (C) to General Goggin, March 25, 1888. General Shipp denies that such an incident took place at this time. MS. letter to Henry A. Wise, Feb. 3, 1910.

²⁵ See map, p. 132.

²⁶ "The top of the second ridge was a broad table land" . . . MS. letter of W. M. Patton (C) to Henry A. Wise, June 10, 1895. Upshur, "Address," *New Market Day*, 15, 16.

²⁷ "On the northern border of this field and to our front, stood Bushong's house, beyond which was an apple orchard. The enemy had slowly fallen back and taken up a third position several hundred yards beyond this house. On reaching the house, the ranks divided, A and B Companies passing to the right of the house, and C and D Companies to the left; A and B marking time until the other half came up and the line was reformed." Upshur (C), *New Market Day*, 15, 16. "In passing over the ground occupied by the farm-house . . . and its outhouses and orchard, we were thrown into disorder, especially in getting over a picket fence." MS. letter of W. O. Harris (C) to Henry A. Wise, April 19, 1909. Also MS. letter of F. L. Smith (C) to same, March 27, 1909.

²⁸ "In this fatal orchard Stanard, from my company fell mortally wounded, Jefferson was shot through the stomach, and in fact almost

beyond, the artillery had perfect range, and poured in a fire of canister and shrapnel incessant and terrific.²⁹ Moreover the distance was now short, and masses of Federal infantry played upon them with incessant volleys.³⁰ Accordingly for a time the advance was halted.

The position of Sigel's army was so well chosen and so well defended that for a while it seemed impossible to force it. During some time the Confederate advance was checked, and certain regiments were rolled back and thrown into confusion.³¹ The front lines melted away under the terrific fire.³² Echols' men were still occupied on the right; some of Wharton's commands fell into disorder. From the Federal lines the tide of battle seemed to be running strongly against the Confederates.³³ Sigel afterward described this part of the action

all our loss was here." Captain Frank Preston, *Lexington Gazette*, May 25, 1864. "At the time we passed the house the Federals were directing their fire upon us, and the house was made a sounding-board by the striking of the missiles upon its sides." MS. letter of R. H. Cousins (C) to Henry A. Wise, May 12, 1909. "We then went past the house and got into the orchard, where canister and other missiles were raining like hail. It seemed impossible for men to pass through such a storm." MS. letter of G. T. Lee (C) to Henry A. Wise, May 15, 1909.

²⁹ "Carlin's Battery . . . was just above us on a knoll and was sending shells over our heads with terrible effect into the ranks of these boys." MS. letter of J. N. Waddell (12th West Virginia Regiment) to B. A. Colonna, Nov. 28, 1910.

³⁰ Upshur, "Address," *New Market Day*, 16.

³¹ See above, pp. 47, 48, 53, 54.

³² "The batteries of our first and second lines poured grape and canister into their infantry" . . . Report of Major Henry Peale, *War Records*, ser. I, vol. XXXVII, part I, 82.

³³ "We poured a rapid and well directed fire into the enemy; which, aided by the heavy enfilading fire from our artillery, checked his advance. For a moment he staggered, appeared to give way, and the day seemed

as a very sharp conflict in which the enemy charged repeatedly and with determination, but were as often repulsed by the bravery and coolness of his infantry on the right.³⁴ It is the opinion of an officer who watched the struggle that had Sigel hurled his cavalry into the opening in the advancing lines, that is, between the 51st and 62d Regiments, at this critical moment, the Confederates would have been put to total rout.³⁵ It is known now that the Southern soldiers stood their ground sturdily. Where the wavering was at its worst, most of them seem to have held their own under the cannonade;³⁶ and from what has come down concerning this stage of the battle the conduct of the several divisions seems to have been replete with heroic incidents.³⁷ Nevertheless here was the moment of greatest danger.

When the Cadets reformed their line on the north side of Bushong's house, they filled in the gap between the 51st Virginia Regiment on their left and the 62d Virginia Regiment

ours." Lincoln, *Life with the Thirty-Fourth Massachusetts Infantry*,

32. Sigel, "Sigel in the Shenandoah Valley," *place cited*, IV, 489. Report of Colonel Wells, *War Records*, ser. I, vol. XXXVII, part I, 84.

³⁴ Sigel, *place cited*, IV, 489.

³⁵ MS. letter of Major P. J. Otey to Lieut.-Col. Scott Shipp, April 14, 1873.

³⁶ Colonel Smith, speaking of the march of the 62d, says: "From the first advance of Wharton's Brigade to the close of the fight, the only pause was on the occasion above described, where the 62d Regiment waited for the coming of Echols' Brigade, then commanded by Patton." Letter to Henry A. Wise, March 7, 1896.

³⁷ It is said that when the men of the 51st were in confusion, and had fallen back a hundred yards, the color-bearer, Frank Lindamood, walked back slowly, and standing in full sight of the enemy, shook his banner aloft until his comrades rallied about him again. MS. letter of J. W. McGavock (C) to Henry A. Wise, May 20, 1909.

with the attached companies of the 30th Virginia Battalion on their right. They were in the van of the battle, and at one time seem to have been in advance of the other commands.³⁸ To each side their comrades were suffering heavily, especially the 62d Virginia to the right. While the veterans around them were wavering,³⁹ they also suffered fearfully from the combined artillery and musketry fire.⁴⁰ The young soldiers were falling right and left, and for a while it seemed that they could go no farther.

This was one of the most critical moments in the battle of New Market. Breckinridge was in danger of defeat. He had boldly taken the aggressive, and so far success had attended his efforts, for he had pushed a portion of the Federal army out of New Market, and his right wing had driven back the Federal left, while Imboden had gained a position on the Federal flank. But Imboden's men were practically useless where they were, and the town was untenable so long as the Federal forces remained on the heights beyond. To drive them out Breckinridge had launched all his remaining strength in a frontal attack, and this attack seemed to be meeting with failure. On the right Echols' commands had made little progress; on the left Wharton's men had advanced farther to

³⁸ "When we got to the 'Peach Orchard' we were from 150 to 200 yards in front of the front line." MS. letter of H. C. Bowen (C) to Henry A. Wise, May 5, 1909. Also MS. letter of N. B. Noland (C) to Henry A. Wise, May 24, 1909; letter of R. B. Tunstall (C), Dec. 27, 1894.

³⁹ "We encountered men of our army who were leaving the line of battle, some of them passed around the flanks of the Battalion, and some lay down for us to pass over." MS. letter of F. L. Smith (C) to Henry A. Wise, March 27, 1909. Also MS. letter of Preston Cocke (C) to same, July 25, 1895; letter of B. A. Colonna (C) to same, April 14, 1909.

⁴⁰ See below, Appendix F, p. 148, for the account of Cadet N. B. Noland.

within striking distance of the enemy, but with the exception of the 26th Battalion, had suffered so heavily as to be compelled to fall back.

It was at this deadly moment that the Cadets of the Virginia Military Institute pushed out into the orchard beyond Bushong's house. Close to them now was Sigel's army shooting from the fences and cedar groves, while nearer still were the Federal batteries which had already wrought such havoc in the advancing lines. The Cadets seemed to have rushed into certain destruction. The artillery concentrated upon them its fire continuous and terrific, hurling shells into the orchard and tearing the trees to pieces. Their commandant, Lieutenant-Colonel Shipp, was wounded by a piece of a shell,⁴¹ whereupon there began a wavering and confusion among them. Some one gave the order to lie down. They obeyed, and began firing from the ground, crouching behind a worm fence along the edge of the orchard.⁴² But the firing of the cannon

⁴¹ "The advance was thus continued until having passed Bushong's house, a mile or more beyond New Market, and still to the left of the main road, the enemy's batteries, at 250 or 300 yards, opened upon us with canister and case-shot, and their long lines of infantry were put into action at the same time. The fire was withering. It seemed impossible that any living creature could escape; and here we sustained our heaviest loss, a great many being wounded and numbers knocked down, stunned, and temporarily disabled. I was here disabled for a time, and the command devolved upon Captain H. A. Wise, Company A. He gallantly pressed onward. We had before this gotten into the front line." Report of Lieutenant-Colonel Shipp, *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 90, 91.

⁴² "At a given order they fell flat on the ground, and we could see nothing but a gray streak across that meadow. Directly they arose on their knees, and immediately a streak of fire and smoke flashed across that field, and the bullets flew thick and fast through our ranks." MS. letter of J. N. Waddell (12th West Virginia) to B. A. Colonna, Nov. 28, 1910. "About the middle of the orchard, Colonel Shipp was knocked

in front of them continued with fearful effect,⁴³ until at last the cry arose that they should fall back and rally on the veterans to the rear.⁴⁴ Fortunately this was not done, but the Cadets continued to fire from their exposed position,⁴⁵ though all the while they were being riddled.

At this opportune moment, when victory seemed within his reach, Sigel launched the counter-attack upon the enemy before him. The 34th Massachusetts with the adjoining regiments sprang forward at the 51st, the Cadets, and the 62d.

down, and, we thought, mortally wounded. Here for the first and only time our line was broken. Even then these brave boys did not retreat, but ran forward thirty yards where in confusion, yet still together, we lay down behind a fence, and began for the first time to fire upon the enemy." Captain Frank Preston, *Lexington Gazette*, May 25, 1864. "I remember distinctly the fact of our lying down in this position, because I was immediately next to Captain Preston, who, having lost one of his arms at the first battle of Manassas, protected the other as well as he could by keeping it under his body." Letter of F. L. Smith (C) to Henry A. Wise, March 27, 1909. It may be remarked that by this time many of the old fashioned Belgian rifles with which the Cadets were armed had become useless, owing to the fact that the wet weather had caused the clasps about the ramrods to swell, making it impossible to draw them out. During the battle they supplied themselves with the rifles of fallen soldiers whenever possible. Letter of B. A. Colonna (C) to Henry A. Wise, April 14, 1909.

⁴³ "We were exposed to such a fire . . . that, if we had long remained in this position, we would have been almost exterminated." MS. letter of J. B. Baylor (C) to Henry A. Wise, June 6, 1909.

⁴⁴ "Some one shouted out that the whole line was giving way, and for a moment I thought that all was lost." Captain Frank Preston, *Lexington Gazette*, May 25, 1864.

⁴⁵ "We came into line again at the edge of the orchard and opened on the enemy with our muskets . . . we were ordered to lie down, the fire from the enemy being quite severe . . . I myself and our whole command fired on them . . . lying down." MS. letter of F. W. James (C) to Henry A. Wise, March 29, 1909.

Had the charge been well directed and firmly pressed, it might have decided the day. The 54th Pennsylvania fought well, but was forced to retreat; while the 1st West Virginia suffered heavily and halted almost at once. The 34th Massachusetts, however, charged down nearly to the fence behind which the Cadets had their position. Could they have done this somewhat earlier, they would have found the place unoccupied, and it may be would have broken the Confederate line.⁴⁶ This was where the Cadets did their best service. With the men to the right and left of them they held the place with stubborn resolution, and after a sharp struggle the 34th was driven back to the position which it had left just before.⁴⁷

We know now that this was indeed the turning-point of the engagement. On the right Stahel's cavalry was being repulsed, and the Confederate artillery was shaking the Federal line. In the center Colonel Smith had led back his regiment to await the arrival of Echols' force; the 22d Regiment had now come up; and there was a long line of men ready to go forward. On the left the 51st had recovered; Edgar had won his way along the river-bluff; and the Federal batteries were preparing to move off. At the moment, however, all of these things were known to no one commander. The Federal position still seemed far stronger than it really was.

After the fall of Lieutenant-Colonel Shipp the command of the Cadets had devolved upon Professor Captain Henry A. Wise. He says that he believed that the longer the Cadets lay inactive behind their scanty shelter under the enemy's fire the less would be their courage, and the more impossible would it be for them to do anything. At the moment it seemed to

⁴⁶ See above, p. 58, note 57.


⁴⁷ Letter of Major Otey to Lieut.-Col. Shipp, April 14, 1873; report of Colonel Wells, *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 84.

him that there were two possible courses: either to fall back, as had been suggested, or to rise and continue the advance. He felt instinctively that this was the decisive moment of the battle; and that if the Cadets fell back and opened a gap in the center of the line it might mean the loss of the day. Moreover he thought that to fall back under an artillery fire like that to which they had been subjected would entail nearly as much hazard as a charge right at the enemy's guns.⁴⁸ The chance was a terrible one, but he made his decision instantly. His comrades still recall how he sprang to his feet and shouted the charge.⁴⁹ At once the magnificent training of the Cadets asserted itself: they rose as a man, got over the fence, and moved forward across the field straight for the enemy's guns.⁵⁰ There is no doubt that at this moment the 62d and the 22d had begun their charge, but the influence of the Cadets stirred

⁴⁸ Statement of Captain Wise to the author.

⁴⁹ "It seems to me that I can see you now, tall, handsome, and soldierly-looking, as you ran down the Cadet line with sword drawn, until you reached our center, very near where the colors were carried by Evans, when you said: 'Get up from here and give the Yankees Hell.'" MS. letter of R. E. Waller (C) to Henry A. Wise, May 26, 1909. Captain Frank Preston of Company B says that he gave a like command at the same moment. *Lexington Gazette*, May 25, 1864. According to P. B. Hiden (C), some years later Captain Robinson, Company D, asserted that he gave the order, and that he did so at the solicitation of the Cadets. MS. letter to Henry A. Wise, May 6, 1909. According to Captain Robinson, "Colonna, my First Lieutenant, came up and said (I can repeat his words), 'Captain, Shipp is out and Wise is out, you are in command. My God, we can't stand this, order a charge.'" "I stepped to the rear and gave the order 'Charge.' The order was like applying a spark to powder. With deafening rebel yells the battery was taken in less time than it takes to tell it." "Those Noble Cadets," in *Virginia Citizen*, Dec. 7, 1894.

⁵⁰ "The Federal battery . . . was not immediately in front, but to the left oblique" . . . D. G. Mohler (C), *Recollections of the Battle of New Market*.



THE SLOPE OF BUSHONG'S HILL NEAR THE
BUSHONG HOUSE, ORCHARD, AND BUILDINGS.

to enthusiasm the adjacent commands, and the whole Confederate line rushed forward.⁵¹ The Federal troops from their position saw the movement, and prepared to hold their ground.

Unfortunately it is not possible for the historian to feel that he can narrate exactly the details of what followed, such vivid, contradictory, and exaggerated accounts have been given. It is probable that some shells were bursting over the field as the Corps advanced, but they kept their ranks and pressed forward. The incessant rains of the morning and the day preceding had drenched the whole country. The ground over which they were toiling was a wheat-field not long since ploughed, now sodden and ankle-deep in mud. At times the Cadets found it an heroic task even to drag their feet out of the slough into which they had sunk,⁵² and in many cases shoes and even socks were pulled off as they struggled along. Furthermore the rain, which had ceased, had ceased only for a while. A black thunder-cloud which had gathered hung low, and now when the charge began, burst over the field in torrents.⁵³ The air was dim with the driving rain and the darkness, and murky with the volumes of smoke which drifted

⁵¹ "As we began to clear the veterans on our flanks they inspired us by calling out, 'Look at the Seed Corn Battalion, look! look!' And they in turn were inspired and sprang to the front . . . they yelled, we yelled with them, the onrush was irresistible. The Federal line wavered, fell slowly back to the battery, and broke into full retreat." Letter of B. A. Colonna (C) to Henry A. Wise, April 14, 1909.

⁵² Letter of G. T. Lee (C) to Henry A. Wise, May 15, 1909.

⁵³ "There was just then a heavy rain storm, and it was very dark, yet I could see the blaze of fire from the guns ten feet beyond the men. The picture is vivid in my mind to this day." Captain J. W. Parsons (18th Virginia Cavalry), who saw the charge from a distance, in *Confederate Veteran*, XVII, 119 (March, 1909). "The rain was falling in torrents and the smoke obscured our view—the noise was deafening." Letter of G. A. Davenport (C) to Preston Cocke, Jan. 28, 1895.

along the ground,⁵⁴ so that it was difficult to see twenty paces ahead save for the lightning-flashes and the fire where the riflemen were shooting.⁵⁵ The elements themselves seemed at war.

But there was no faltering. The distance to be traversed grew less, and soon the audacity of their courage told. The Federal soldiers were too much shaken and too hard pressed to make a stout resistance. There was some attempt, but on the Cadets came, and then at last in the midst of a wavering in the enemy's ranks, they dashed up to the Federal lines, wild with enthusiasm, and shot down the horses of one of the guns. There was a brief hand to hand struggle, but the Federal army was already giving way. The Cadets ran here and there capturing prisoners. The color-bearer sprang upon the gun-carriage and waved his flag. The position had been stormed.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Sigel himself says, "The smoke from the infantry fire on the left and the batteries on the right became so dense that I could not distinguish friend from foe." "Sigel in the Shenandoah Valley," *place cited*, IV, 489.

⁵⁵ "The smoke became so dense that I could only see the flash of their guns" . . . MS. letter of S. H. Letcher (C) to Henry A. Wise, May 2, 1909.

⁵⁶ A Federal officer, who witnessed the advance of the Cadets, wrote as follows: "I well recollect even now our own position, the field of battle, and the appearance of each army. We were upon the right of the infantry line; to our right, upon ground slightly elevated, a six-gun battery. The Sixty-second Virginia, which formed the extreme left of the attacking force, advanced directly against us. To the right of the Sixty-second were the cadets. The line of advance was a little diagonal to that of our formation, and as it was continued the Sixty-second passed beyond and the cadets came directly to our front. Our fire, both that of artillery and infantry, was rapid and continuous, and, when the battery opened with canister, was destructive. As the advance was continued, it was apparent that the cadets were in advance of the general line of the attacking force. Here their forward movement ceased, and for a moment it

This charge of the Cadets upon the Federal position at New Market is one of the most remarkable episodes of the Civil War, or, indeed, of any war.^{56 a} That a body of youths, ranging in age from fourteen to twenty should conduct themselves well in battle would in itself have been sufficiently creditable. But that in the first battle in which they had ever served they should do what they did is almost beyond belief. That called from the quiet seclusion of a military school they should have endured long, fatiguing marches for three days over muddy roads and miry fields; that wearied with their journey and yet roused from their sleep on the night before the battle and sent onward they should have chafed at being held in sheltered position, and insisted on pressing forward into the front and central part of the battle; that they should have borne their part steadily; that they should have stood

seemed as if their advance was checked. But what seemed a check was in reality a *halt*, during which 'those boys' marked time, dressed their ranks, and when again aligned on the left, came forward in most admirable form. The whole thing was done with as much precision and steadiness as if on parade, and this while all the time subjected to a destructive fire. No one who saw it will ever forget it. No command but one most admirably drilled and disciplined could have done it. And if any other troops on that field *could*, it is safe to say no other body *did* do that thing. In after time around our camp-fire, the gallant conduct of those little fellows (for such they seemed to be), was spoken of among ourselves, and always in terms of the highest commendation. With no desire to disparage the conduct of other organizations in that army, I should be doing injustice to myself, the brave men of my own command, and the young men who composed that gallant battalion, if I failed to render to them unqualified praise" . . . "Letter of Gen. Lincoln to Rev. James H. Smith, March 10, 1888," in (Richmond) *State*, April 4, 1888. Among the popular descriptions of the charge of the Cadets *cf.* William A. Thom, Jr., in *Norfolk Virginian*, Sept. 9. 1894; Ex-Governor William E. Cameron, in (Baltimore) *Herald*, Oct. 28, 1894.

^{56 a} See below, Appendix G, p. 150.

their ground under a withering fire when veteran regiments were hard pressed; and that finally in the crisis of the struggle they should have met the shock of the enemy unmoved; all of these facts are as astounding as they are true. The battle of New Market was a small battle, and relatively speaking the Cadet Battalion was a mere handful; but what these boys did is comparable with what older troops have done in some of the most famous battles in the world. It may be that the words of incautious admirers have served to cast doubt upon their exploits. They did not rally the Confederate army, nor stem a rout, nor capture unaided a powerful battery under impossible circumstances. But at a critical moment they did conduct themselves in a manner beyond all praise, and what they did had much to do with determining the issue of the battle.⁵⁷

⁵⁷ Breckinridge always acknowledged this. "General John C. Breckinridge, commanding, accompanied by several members of his staff, rode up. We presented arms. He raised his hat and said, 'Young gentlemen, I have to thank you for the result of to-day's operations.' He then rode away followed by our cheers, and taking our hearts along with him." MS. letter of B. A. Colonna (C) to Henry A. Wise, April 14, 1909. "While we were in line at the foot of Rude's Hill, before we started for the town, General Breckinridge rode up and thanked us for what we had done, saying that his line was broken when we made the charge, that we had saved the day when we took the battery" . . . MS. letter of W. M. Kirk (C) to Henry A. Wise, April 27, 1909. "After General Lee's surrender I was going south . . . and when I passed through Greensborough, N. C., I . . . called on General Breckinridge to ask his advice . . . as to what I should do. When I told him that I was a Cadet and had been under his command at New Market, he was very kind and fatherly to me, and in parting with me said, 'Give my thanks to your fellow Cadets whenever you meet them, and tell them from me that they won the day for us at New Market.'" MS. letter of V. F. Garrett (C) to Henry A. Wise, April 26, 1909. George Ross, Assistant Surgeon in charge of the Cadet Battalion, says that some years after the battle he met General Breckinridge who "expressed profound regret that

conditions had arisen making it necessary to put those boys into the fight, and then commending their gallant action, said that their steadfastness and splendid courage had turned the tide of battle, and been the chief factor in bringing victory to the Confederate arms." MS. letter to Preston Cocke (C), Dec. 28, 1894. These letters are quoted to substantiate the statement in the text, and are to be regarded as subject to the general criticisms premised at the beginning of this chapter. Speaking of the charge, Lieutenant-Colonel Edgar says: "I imagine that that advance and the advance of my battalion on the left, which I have described, were the turning points of the engagement. If either had not been promptly and effectively done, the day would have been lost." MS. letter to Henry A. Wise (C), February 18, 1896.

CHAPTER VI.

THE CONFEDERATE TRIUMPH.

THE issue of the battle of New Market was decided when the Confederates drove the Federal troops out of their lines in the second position. The resistance of some of the Northern troops in the second line had been superb, and had Sigel been able to bring the remainder of his army into action, quite probably he would not have been driven to retreat. He had not succeeded in concentrating his army, however, and now in the supreme moment some of his regiments were found to be far in the rear.¹ Hence though his army was actually larger than that of the Confederates his numerical superiority availed him nothing, and in face of the magnificent advance of the Southern troops his men were driven off the field. The contest was not yet finished, for there was still some fighting;

¹ "I was ordered to bring up the two other regiments of my brigade to the support of a battery on the left in the rear, forming a third line. After some inquiry where these regiments could be found, I learned that five companies of the Twenty-eighth and the One hundred and sixteenth Regiments Ohio Volunteer Infantry, under the command of Colonel Washburn, were in charge of the train, and did not leave Woodstock until 8 A. M. They had been halted at Mount Jackson, six miles in our rear. I sent my staff officers to order them up double-quick. They reported to me about 4 o'clock, Colonel Washburn stating that he had ordered bayonets to be fixed to clear his way on the pike up to the battlefield through disgraceful fleeing masses of cavalry and straggling infantry." Report of Colonel Augustus Moor (28th Ohio Regiment), *War Records*, ser. I, vol. XXXVII, part I, 80. Cf. Walker, *History Eighteenth Regiment Connecticut Volunteers*, 221; Rawling, *History First Regiment Virginia Infantry*, 167; Lincoln, *Life with the Thirty-Fourth Massachusetts Infantry*, 288, 289.

but the advance now became general and successful all along the Confederate line, and the whole Federal army was pressed back. In a little while the remnant of Sigel's army found itself attacked fiercely on all sides, and saved itself from being surrounded only by precipitate retreat.² On the far right of the Federal line Edgar had routed the detached company of the 34th Massachusetts and parts of 12th West Virginia, and had taken three Federal cannon. The advance of the 51st Virginia and the Cadets pursued the retreating artillery and flanked the 34th Massachusetts on its right. In its front the same regiment was pressed by the 62d Virginia, which along with the 22d Virginia had put to flight the 1st West Virginia and was now closing in upon the 54th Pennsylvania on the Federal left. The 18th Connecticut and the 123d Ohio, which had been routed in the first line,³ gave no assistance here. On the extreme left of the Federal line the discomfiture of Stahel's cavalry had been completed by Patton, Derrick, and the Confederate artillery.

In general the backward movement of Sigel's army was a retreat rather than a rout, though the different commands withdrew with varying degrees of steadiness.⁴ On the Federal left the retreat once begun seems to have been most disorderly. Here the cavalry and the infantry went streaming down the pike in confused masses. In the center and on the right, where the defence had been so obstinate, the retreat was

² "Before we left we were receiving fire not only from our front but from our left, and almost from our rear. In fact we were nearly surrounded." MS. letter of General Lincoln to V. F. Garrett (C), by him quoted in MS. letter to Henry A. Wise, April 26, 1909.

³ See above, pp. 44, 45.

⁴ "There was some confusion and scattering of our retreating forces, but very soon order was restored." Sigel, "Sigel in the Shenandoah

made sullenly and in good order. The 54th Pennsylvania held out gallantly, but after a short time was compelled to give way.⁵ The sternest resistance, however, was made by the 34th Massachusetts. After the disastrous charge upon the Confederates,⁶ it fell back to its position and attempted to hold its ground. It continued a hand to hand struggle until it had been deserted by its supports on either side. Then it continued the contest, and did not fall back until it was in imminent danger of being entirely surrounded. In spite of heavy losses it withdrew in good order.⁷ In the pursuit some pris-

Valley," *place cited*, IV, 490. Captain Frank Preston says: "Then everything was forgotten but the excitement of pursuit. We ran after them in not much better order, but in far better spirits, and firing as we ran. The Cadets captured from 60 to 100 prisoners. One of my company, Faulkner, took 23 to the rear. We pursued the enemy about half a mile . . . until we were halted by order of General Breckinridge." *Lexington Gazette*, May 25, 1864.

⁵ "The enemy . . . pressed forward his right, which extended some distance beyond our left, and was rapidly flanking me in that direction despite the most determined resistance, when my attention was called to the fact that the regiment on my right (owing to the overwhelming numbers brought against it) had given way, and the enemy was advancing at almost right angle with my line and extending beyond the rear and right of my regiment. A few minutes only would be required to completely surround my regiment, and in the absence of any appearance of advancing support I was reluctantly compelled to order my command to retire. This was done in as good order as the circumstances would allow, two stands being made by a portion of the command before passing beyond musket-range, and the whole of it finally rallying and forming at a point indicated by the colonel commanding brigade." Report of Colonel Campbell (54th Pennsylvania Regiment), *War Records*, ser. I, vol. XXXVII, part I, 86.

⁶ See above, p. 58.

⁷ "The colors were halted several times by different officers in positions where it was impossible to make a stand, and would only start again at my direct order. I felt much relieved on receiving an order from General Sullivan, who was conspicuous on the field, that the line would be



COLONEL GEORGE D. WELLS,
THIRTY-FOURTH MASSACHUSETTS INFANTRY.

oners were captured, but the Confederates were too exhausted to pursue very vigorously.⁸

The pursuit which was retarded by the 34th Massachusetts on the Federal right was checked on the left by the arrival of some companies of the belated 28th and 116th Ohio Regiments, and also of Du Pont's Battery.⁹ This battery did excellent service, firing into the enemy and withdrawing slowly by platoon.¹⁰

Had the Confederates been fresh, or if they had been able to use reserves, they might well have turned the retreat into

formed on the ridge and no stand made before it was reached. I directed the color bearer to march directly there without halting, and, after getting out of fire, rode to the rear and went round into the pike and toward the front looking for stragglers. I saw none, and, meeting the colors, found most of the regiment with them . . . the command was gallantly withdrawn along the single road and across the narrow bridge into Mount Jackson in the most admirable order" . . . Report of Colonel Wells (34th Massachusetts Regiment), *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 84, 85.

⁸ "It had rained almost incessantly during the battle, and at its termination the Cadets were well-nigh exhausted. Wet, hungry, and many of them shoeless—for they had lost their shoes and socks in the deep mud through which it was necessary to march—they bore their hardships with that uncomplaining resignation which characterizes the true soldier." Report of Lieutenant-Colonel Shipp, *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 91.

⁹ *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 80.

¹⁰ "A curtain of smoke very largely obscured the enemy's position, and the Union forces were falling back in the greatest disorder; everything was in the utmost confusion. I received any number of contradictory orders, given on their own initiative by various staff officers—most of them young and inexperienced—and I took the responsibility of acting on my own judgment. Accordingly, I put one platoon (two guns) in position on the turnpike and opened fire immediately. I then designated two other positions along the turnpike to the rear and sent the other two platoons back to go in position, and as our troops fell back I retired my advanced platoon and opened fire with the others successively, sending

a rout. As it was, however, they were themselves exhausted and disorganized. After a while the 26th Battalion and the 62d Regiment found themselves far in advance of the rest of the army.¹¹ Breckinridge, who had been the soul of valor throughout the day, and who was now with the foremost, realized that his troops must halt until order could be restored and ammunition replenished.¹²

During this time Breckinridge continued the tactics which had made his artillery so effective. His cannon fired from advanced positions,¹³ while a section of McClanahan's Battery under Lieutenant Carter Berkeley made a daring dash down the pike and shelled the fleeing masses.¹⁴ This splendid and

the platoon which had been in advance to another position still further to the rear—a movement which is called in the tactics 'retiring by echelons of platoons.'" MS. letter of Captain H. A. Du Pont to Lieutenant-Colonel Edgar, Oct. 1, 1908.

¹¹"We followed the enemy until they were out of sight. I found myself abreast of that regiment" (62d). "The Colonel and I called a halt . . . my battalion and his regiment were in advance of all the other infantry." MS. letter of Edgar to (?), May 9, 1895, in possession of Henry A. Wise. "Not long after I found myself near Colonel George H. Smith. . . . We soon saw that our commands were much in advance of any other troops, and halted them." MS. letter of Edgar to Henry A. Wise, Feb. 18, 1896.

¹²"As we were pursuing the fleeing lines of the enemy, I, up to shoe-tops in the mud, getting on with difficulty, General Breckinridge and staff rode past me. The General said, 'Colonel, we are mightily scattered, but we are driving them.'" *Ibid.* A little later General Imboden found Breckinridge muddled to the waist and all unmindful of the enemy's shells. "I learned that he had been much of the time off his horse during the whole day, mingling with and cheering his brave, tired, hungry, drenched, and muddy infantry and artillery." Imboden, "The Battle of New Market," *place cited*, IV, 485.

¹³MS. letter of George W. Gazeby (Second Lieutenant, Company D, 54th Pennsylvania Regiment), to B. A. Colonna, May 27, 1911.

¹⁴Lieutenant Carter Berkeley, "Fought with the Boys," (Baltimore) *Sun*, July 25, 1903.

effective handling of the Confederate artillery is one of the most remarkable episodes in the battle. At the beginning of the contest the Confederate gunners might seem to have been hopelessly outclassed, for the Federal army was disproportionately strong in powerful guns. Altogether Sigel had 28 cannon, consisting of three inch rifles and Napoleons, 22 of which he used during the greater part of the struggle. On the other hand the Confederates had upon the field 18 guns; but four, those of Jackson's Battery, seem to have done little, while Imboden took four of his cannon far over on the right flank, where they were of small use against the Federal batteries. Of the ten which remained, however, under the command of Major McLaughlin, the record is remarkable. At the beginning of the struggle they drove Snow's guns out of New Market. In the second part of the battle Von Kleiser's Battery, stationed in the first Federal line, was partly disabled and forced to withdraw. Then when the Confederate advance was resumed, McLaughlin moved his guns forward along the pike to an eminence north of the town and close to the enemy, and not only engaged Ewing, Von Kleiser, Carlin, and Snow, but along with Derrick held the Confederate right against Stahel's cavalry. And finally when the victory had been won, McLaughlin continued to move forward aggressively until the Federal troops had reached Rude's Hill. No better use of material was made in the battle, and nothing contributed more to the Confederate success.

Presently cartridge-boxes were replenished and order re-established, and preparations made for a final charge. To cover the retreat Sigel had posted part of his artillery and a portion of his army on Rude's Hill near the river-crossing. After four o'clock there was a cannonade for some time,¹⁵ but

¹⁵ MS. letter of Captain C. H. Minge (Cadet artillery) to Lieutenant-Colonel Edgar.

no more heavy fighting, for Sigel was unwilling to make another stand. He realized that his new position was not a good one, that his army was not concentrated, and he says that his ammunition was exhausted.¹⁶ He therefore abandoned Rude's Hill, and, taking the remainder of his army across the Shenandoah, destroyed the bridge, and so cut off all pursuit.¹⁷ It is said that Imboden had been instructed to try to get around the Federal army and destroy this bridge in Sigel's rear dur-

¹⁶ "I met General Sullivan, and after some consultation we came to the conclusion not to await another attack, for the reason that our losses were severe; that the regiments that had sustained the brunt of the fight were nearly out of ammunition and would have no time to receive it from the train, which was in the rear, beyond the bridge; that our position was not a good one, being commanded by the enemy's guns, posted on the hill in front of our left, and that in case of defeat we could not cross the swollen river, except by the bridge." Sigel, "Sigel in the Shenandoah Valley," *place cited*, IV, 490. Cf. J. S. Johnston, *The Battle of New Market*, 11; also MS. letter of W. M. Kirk (C) to Henry A. Wise, April 27, 1909. The Cadets were not allowed to take part in the work at Rude's Hill. They were anxious to do so, but were probably almost exhausted. MS. letter of G. A. Davenport (C) to Preston Cocke, Jan. 28, 1895.

¹⁷ "There was some cannonading, but nothing else was undertaken by the enemy for at least half an hour. I therefore directed the troops to withdraw to Mount Jackson, which was done slowly and in perfect order" . . . Sigel, *place cited*, IV, 490. "I advanced upon Rood's Hill from which the enemy kept up a brisk artillery fire. On a near approach, however, the fire ceased, and on reaching the top of the hill the rear of the enemy's column could be seen crossing the bridge at Mount Jackson. As soon as the passage of which was effected it was fired. My troops pursued to the river, when night setting in, and it being impossible to cross the river in its swollen condition, they were halted on Rude's Hill, where wet and weary they bivouacked till morning." Breckinridge, Report. This bridge spanned the Shenandoah at Mount Jackson. *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 486; Captain J. W. Parsons, in *Confederate Veteran*, XVII (March, 1909), 119. The destruction of this bridge is described by Du Pont. "The bridge planking was torn up under my personal direction by Quarter-master Sergeant Robert Sauthoff and the artificers of light battery B, 5th U. S. Artillery. When we got ready to do

ing the progress of the battle.¹⁸ The Confederate officers have always bewailed the fact that Imboden was not able to carry out the plan as proposed, since, they assert, Breckinridge thus lost an opportunity to capture the whole Federal army.¹⁹ Whether this be true or not one may hardly say, for the Confederates had fought almost to the limit of their endurance, and their enemies though retreating were rather in confusion than badly broken. But on the other hand when it is remembered that the Federal forces had just been driven away from the strongest position in the vicinity, that their ammunition was exhausted, and that their trains were on the other side of the Shenandoah, that they were worn out by long marching and lack of food,²⁰ and that they were no doubt dispirited by continued failure and discouraged by the bad leadership which caused it, then there seems to be some reason for believing that if the bridge had been gone when they reached the river, while there would have been some desperate fighting, yet the

this I sent to the officer commanding this detachment of cavalry (I did not know his name) to tell him that he must cross the bridge immediately as we were going to tear it up. This he did apparently with some reluctance, which I could not understand at the time. After the cavalry detachment had passed to the other side, on my order the bridge was torn up, I being the last man to cross it". MS. letter to Edgar, Oct. 1, 1908.

¹⁸ See above, p. 42.

¹⁹ J. S. Johnston, *The Battle of New Market*, 11.

²⁰ Colonel Moor thus describes conditions at the close of the day. "The manner in which this chaotic mass of wagons, horsemen, artillery, and stragglers moved on (sometimes two or three wagons abreast), was exceedingly fatiguing to the infantry, especially to those regiments that marched out with me on the 14th, they having been continually on their legs for two days and nights without a cup of coffee or even meat rations, numbers of them barefooted." *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 81.

day might have closed with the capture of Sigel and the overwhelming triumph of the Confederate army.²¹

That the battle had been fiercely fought and stubbornly contested is revealed by the heavy losses on both sides. Out of about 6,000 Sigel had lost more than 800, many of them prisoners.²² Of about 4,500 Breckinridge had lost nearly 600.²³ Sigel's losses were particularly heavy in the retreat from his second position back to Rude's Hill and the river;²⁴ while in the terrible struggle on the Federal right parts of Wharton's command were almost cut to pieces, the 62d Virginia losing half its numbers, and the Cadets almost one quarter.²⁵ In addition to his losses in men Sigel lost many small arms, which

²¹ On May 17 Imboden, who was then rebuilding the bridge, wrote to Breckinridge, "Enemy reported much disorganized and demoralized." *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I. 739; also 742-745.

²² Major Lang of Sigel's Staff says that the Federal army lost 93 killed, 552 wounded, 186 captured or missing; total 831. MS. Personal Recollections of the Battle of New Market. Cf. *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 479-483. The 34th Massachusetts Regiment lost more than 200 out of 450 in line, while the detached company was nearly destroyed. *Ibid.*, 85. The 54th Pennsylvania lost 174 out of 566. *Ibid.*, 87.

²³ Killed, 42; wounded, 522; captured or missing, 13. Lang, Personal Recollections. This makes a total of 577.

²⁴ Imboden, "The Battle of New Market," *place cited*, IV, 485. Lieutenant Carter Berkeley says: "Now we had everything our own way; the poor, panic-stricken wretches were flying before us in easy range of our guns and relentlessly we poured the shot and shell into them. It was awful;" . . . (Baltimore) *Sun*, July 25, 1903.

²⁵ "The whole loss of the regiment" (62d) "in the fight was two hundred and forty-one out of an aggregate of about five hundred, including seven of the captains. These, it should be mentioned, were eleven in all" . . . *Confederate Veteran*, XVI, 570. The Cadets lost 9 killed and 48 wounded out of about 280. These figures are based upon the exhaustive researches of Joseph R. Anderson, President of the Virginia Military Institute Alumni Association. Of all the commands the most terrific losses were suffered by the company of Missourians under Captain Woodson, which was during the battle attached to the 62d Virginia. Out

were abandoned in the fight, and five pieces of artillery, possibly six.²⁶

Thus Breckinridge had won a splendid victory, and had accomplished all that he had been ordered to do. His strategy had been entirely successful; his boldness, his energy, and his daring, completely justified.²⁷ The result of his success was for a short while to render Lee's flank safe, and keep his base of supplies untouched. All this Breckinridge, with a makeshift force hastily brought together, had been able to do against

of 70 they lost 60 killed and wounded. MS. letter of James H. Dwyer to P. D. Stephenson, May 15, 1909; Edgar, *Critical Notes*; *Rockingham Register*, May 20, 1864, cited in *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, IV, 491.

²⁶ A multitude of eye-witnesses have reported the capture of three cannon on the Federal right, where Snow's and Carlin's Batteries were posted. See above, p. 50; below, pp. 135-141. There is a well-established tradition that the piece taken by the Cadets was lost by Von Kleiser's Battery. The Federal left is said to have abandoned one piece when the first line was forced in the second part of the battle. MS. letter of Abraham Park (123d Ohio Regiment) to B. A. Colonna, Feb. 16, 1911. Du Pont saw one piece left on the field at the close of the day. Letter to Edgar, Oct. 1, 1908. Colonel J. S. Johnston asserts that Sigel lost five pieces of artillery. Battle of New Market, 11. Captain Frank Preston says the same. *Lexington Gazette*, May 25, 1864. Major P. J. Otey says, "Six pieces of artillery were taken". Letter to Lieut.-Col. Shipp, April 14, 1873. Captain Preston says that the Federal army lost about 1,000 small arms. *Lexington Gazette*, May 25, 1864.

²⁷ The *Daily Richmond Enquirer*, May 18, 1864, after commenting upon the fact that the Confederates had marched forty-nine miles and fought a battle in two and a half days, adds: "This simple statement will show our readers that celerity of movement, as well as vigor of action, did not desert our cause when Stonewall Jackson died." "I have always regarded the New Market fight as the best planned and best managed fight in which I was engaged. General Breckinridge had few if any superiors on the field of battle. Besides being a man of wonderful courage, he had a keen eye to discern the strong and weak points of the enemy's position, skill in using his forces to the best advantage, and a celerity of movement which reminded me of Jackson. If he had commanded in the Valley instead of Early, Sheridan would have found it far more difficult to drive our army out." Letter of Lieutenant-Colonel Edgar to Henry A. Wise, Feb. 18, 1896.

an army considerably more numerous than his own. He was able to do it because of his own admirable generalship, and because of the splendid qualities of the troops who fought under him; but also still more because of the clumsiness and misfortune of the man who opposed him.

General Sigel may have been a good soldier, and undoubtedly he was a brave man,²⁸ but he should not have commanded the Federal army in the Valley of Virginia. After the battle he took credit for compelling the Confederates to concentrate their forces against him, thus giving Crook a free hand; and this was indeed the main purpose of his expedition.²⁹ Some years later³⁰ he maintained that the battle of New Market was well and stubbornly fought, and that this was shown by the heavy losses of his own and of the enemy's army. He excused the capture of his cannon, and asserted that he withdrew from Rude's Hill slowly and in good order, and that he retreated beyond Mount Jackson through no necessity of his own.³¹ His judgment upon his own campaign, as well as

²⁸ Colonel Wells of the 34th Massachusetts says: "Gen. Sigel was on his horse on the right of our line during most of the engagement, and in the hottest of the fire. How he escaped is a mystery to me." *War Records, ser. 1*, vol. XXXVII, part I, 85, 86.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 489.

³⁰ 1884.

³¹ Sigel, "Sigel in the Shenandoah Valley," *place cited*, IV, 499. Cf. his report to Brigadier-General Kelley, May 17, 1864: "After two days skirmishing, a severe battle was fought at New Market between our forces and those of Echols and Imboden, under Breckinridge. I had to withdraw our troops from the battle-field toward evening, and recrossed the Shenandoah. I will go back to my position behind Cedar Creek and accept another battle, if necessary. The troops are in very good spirits, but greatly outnumbered, as Breckinridge has evidently thrown his principal forces against me. I will, however, do my best and depend on your assistance. I wish that you would send me immediately the Fourth Vir-

the other Federal movements in the Valley just before and after, was that they were an utter failure; but he said this could not be otherwise since the Confederates were acting from interior lines; and because of this it was hopeless to attempt with 5,000 or 10,000 men, what at last had to be done with 40,000.³² Much of this is probably true, at least in part, and yet Sigel was himself largely to blame. From the beginning of the campaign his movements had been dilatory.³³ At no time did he display initiative or dash. In the battle itself he made excellent use of his artillery,³⁴ and part of his infantry was well handled; but his troops were poorly arranged, and he made one fatal error for which nothing else could atone, he allowed himself to be drawn into battle when a large part of his army was not ready to fight.³⁵ It is in the conduct of

ginia Infantry, and the Second Maryland Infantry as there is no serious danger for Cumberland and New Creek, or other places west, as long as I can maintain my position here. Please inform General Crook by any means, and direct him to operate against Staunton, and to destroy if possible the railroad between Staunton and Jackson River Depot." *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 478, 479.

³² Sigel, "Sigel in the Shenandoah Valley," *place cited*, IV, 491.

³³ See above, p. 5.

³⁴ Breckinridge, Report. "Sigel's artillerists were especially excellent." MS. letter of W. Kemp (C) to General J. A. Goggin, March 25, 1888.

³⁵ "We had attacked with the head of the column while the rear was several miles from the field, and it appeared likely (as it really resulted) that we would be whipped before we got our troops on the field." Captain Franklin E. Town, in *New Market Day*, 82. Another Federal officer estimates that only about half of Sigel's army was actually engaged, and that those who fought were exhausted by the march of the night before. Lincoln, *Life with the Thirty-Fourth Massachusetts Infantry*, 289, 290. "The writer has never forgotten the absolute mismanagement of that splendid body of veteran soldiers that composed Sigel's army" . . . Major T. F. Lang, *Personal Recollections of the Battle of New Market*.

his subordinates that the chief excuse may be found. The efficiency of the brigade commanders had been suspected by an observer early in the campaign.³⁶ However this may be it would seem that Sigel had ordered the belated regiments to take their place in his line, and supposed that he could rely upon them in the battle.³⁷ Whether there was lack of co-operation or mere inefficiency on the part of his subordinates cannot now be known.³⁸ At all events here as in so many other instances the Confederates were fortunate in the commanders who opposed them.

The Federal commander reported that he had been overpowered by superior numbers, and losing the battle, would be forced to retire to Cedar Creek. Grant, utterly disgusted with the miscarriage of his plans in the Shenandoah, urged that another commander be at once appointed.³⁹ Sigel's career was

After telling how he dispatched courier after courier bidding Sigel hurry forward the remainder of his army, Major Lang says: "I mention this incident . . . in the nature of a charge against Sigel for his dilatory action in bringing forward his troops. The battle of New Market was fought by the splendid handling of the entire force of the Confederates, while Sigel's army was brought into battle by detail,—two of his regiments not even getting to the field of battle." *Ibid.*

³⁶ "Our officers, high in place, do not enjoy the full confidence of the command. The two Acting Brigadiers—if they are to be judged by the condition of their own regiments—and is not such a fair test? are poor soldiers." Lincoln, "Diary," in *Life with the Thirty-Fourth Massachusetts Infantry*, 260, 261.

³⁷ Lincoln, *ibid.*, 289, 290.

³⁸ Cf. Rawling, *History First Regiment Virginia Infantry*, 170, 171.

³⁹ On May 17 Halleck wrote to Grant: "I have sent the substance of your dispatch to General Sigel. Instead of advancing on Staunton he is already in full retreat on Strasburg. If you expect anything from him you will be mistaken. He will do nothing but run. He never did anything else. The Secretary of War proposes to put General Hunter in his place. Send him up immediately." *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVI.

over, and he soon resigned from the service.⁴⁰ It may be observed that Hunter, who succeeded him, was neither more competent nor more successful.⁴¹

Breckinridge sent in a brief report, saying that he had met the enemy and defeated him with heavy loss, driving him across the Shenandoah River.⁴² For the present his work was done thoroughly and well. It was even possible for him to send some of his men from the Valley to strengthen Lee.⁴³ It is true that this work was shortly afterwards undone. New Federal armies pushed into the Valley, and despite fresh victories the successors of Breckinridge were unable permanently to hold them back. Within a year the country was turned into a desert, and Lee's base of supplies was destroyed. But this

part II, 840, 841. In his *Personal Memoirs*, II, 147, Grant says: "Sigel's record is almost equally brief. He moved out, it is true, according to programme; but just when I was hoping to hear of good work being done in the Valley I received instead the following announcement from Halleck: 'Sigel is in full retreat on Strasburg. He will do nothing but run; never did anything else.' The enemy had intercepted about New Market and handled him roughly, leaving him short six guns and some nine hundred men out of his six thousand." Just before the news came Grant had sent inquiry to Halleck to learn whether Sigel could not get to Staunton and stop supplies coming from there to Lee. He now asked that Sigel be removed at once. *Ibid.*, II, 238; *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVI, part I, 23, 24; vol. XXXVII, part I, 492.

⁴⁰ For his doings after New Market see his own account, "Sigel in the Shenandoah Valley," *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, IV, 490, 491.

⁴¹ Hunter was appointed May 19. *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 492, 493, 508.

⁴² "This morning, two miles above New Market, my command met the enemy, under General Sigel, advancing up the Valley, and defeated him with heavy loss. The action has just closed at Shenandoah River. Enemy fled across North Fork of the Shenandoah, burning the bridge behind him." *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 87.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 738; *Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant*, II, 241.

was largely because the Federal authorities were able to draw upon new and inexhaustible supplies of men.⁴⁴

On the day of New Market all this was not foreseen. When the Confederate army camped near the battle-field that night there was rejoicing and congratulation, tempered by the sombre scenes of death around them. Their losses had been heavy. On the slopes and in the fields where the batteries had stood the dead lay scattered thickly. Up beyond the town in the orchard and in the wheat-field the bodies of the Cadets were lying. Twenty years later John S. Wise in words memorable for their pathos and beauty, told how when the battle was over, and when his own wound was bound up, he sought the fatal slope, and there found the bodies of his comrades.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ General Imboden believed that the battle of New Market was the most important secondary battle of the war, since if Sigel had triumphed the whole Valley would have been at his mercy, because Lee could not at that time have spared any force as he did to check Hunter a month later. "The Battle of New Market," *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, IV, 485. It has been said that Lee was thus enabled to hold out a year longer.

⁴⁵ "It was hard, indeed, to recognize all that remained of Cabell, who, but a few hours before, had stood first in his class as a scholar, second as a soldier, and the peer of any boy that ever lived in every trait of physical and moral manliness.

"A little removed from the spot where Cabell fell, and nearer to the position of the enemy, lay McDowell. It was a sight to wring one's heart. That little boy was lying there asleep, more fit, indeed, for the cradle than the grave. He was barely sixteen, I judge, and by no means robust for his age. He was a North Carolinian. He had torn open his jacket and shirt, and, even in death, lay clutching them back, exposing a fair breast with its red wound. I had come too late. Stanard had breathed his last but a few moments before I reached the old farm-house where the battery had stood, now converted into a hospital. His body was still warm and his last messages had been words of love. Poor Jack! Playmate, room-mate, friend—farewell.

"Standing there, my mind sped back to the old scenes at Lexington when we were shooting together in the 'Grassy Hills'; to our games and

It was to commemorate their sacrifice that in 1903 was unveiled on the parade ground of the Virginia Military Institute the beautiful statue, "Virginia Mourning Her Dead," by Sir Moses Ezekiel, himself a former Cadet.⁴⁶ In 1898 there had been placed in Saint Matthew's Lutheran Cemetery, New Market, a monument to the Cadets and to the Confederate soldiers who fell in the battle.⁴⁷

In spite of the sadness in the Confederate camp that evening, humorous incidents abounded. The town of New Market was filled with soldiers laughing, feasting, carousing. Many were the laughable tales told.⁴⁸ When the members of the

sports; to that day, one week ago, when he had knelt at the chancel and was confirmed; to the previous night at the guard-fire when he confessed to a presentiment that he would be killed; to his wistful, earnest farewell when we parted at the baggage-wagon, and my heart half reproached me for ordering him into the fight. The warm tears of youthful friendship came welling up for one I had learned to love as a brother; and now, twenty-four years later, I thank God that life's buffetings and the cold-heartedness of later struggles have not dammed the pure fountains of boyhood's friendship. A truer-hearted, braver, better fellow never died than Jacquelin B. Stanard." "The West Point of the Confederacy," *Century*, XXXVII, 470, 471.

⁴⁶ *New Market Day*, V. M. I. Also (Richmond) *Times-Dispatch*, June 24, 1903; (Baltimore) *Sun*, June 25, 1903. On the same day Armistead C. Gordon read his beautiful poem beginning:

"How shall the eternal fame of them be told,
Who, dying in the heyday of life's morn,
Thrust from their lips the chalice of bright gold
Filled to the brim with joy, and went forlorn
Into the abysmal darkness of that bourn
Whence they who thither go may nevermore return."

"New Market: A Threnody." *New Market Day*, 48-50; (Richmond) *Times-Dispatch*, June 24, 1903.

⁴⁷ (Baltimore) *Morning Herald*, May 13, 1898.

⁴⁸ Captain Henry A. Wise relates to this day how the fragment of a shell having shot away all his garments from one particular place, he

Cadet Battalion dragged themselves back hungry, footsore, and exhausted, they were given a rousing reception by the townsfolk, while the veterans, who that morning had jeered with banter and mirth, greeted them with applause, and generously accorded them full share in the victory.

To the veterans of Breckinridge and Imboden the battle of New Market was but an incident, however glorious, in a series of campaigns. Some of them had seen much fighting, some of them were to see much more, and many of them were soon to lay down their lives in defense of the Valley. But to the Cadets this was the one day in a lifetime. They were thanked by General Breckinridge;⁴⁹ and they were given an ovation in New Market town.⁵⁰ This was repeated all along the line of march through the Valley.⁵¹ Meanwhile they had been

hunted around desperately for clothes enough to sit on. Account given to the author. "I remember well when you lost your coat-tail and the seat of your trousers." MS. letter of H. C. Bowen (C) to Henry A. Wise, May 5, 1909. Some years ago another comrade told how Captain Wise after awing all the young Cadets with his puritanical aspect, and admonishing them never to swear, himself swore in terrific fashion during the progress of the fight. *Memorial Address of Hon. John S. Wise*, 31; also "Address," *New Market Day*, 58.

⁴⁹ See above, p. 88, note 57.

⁵⁰ "The ladies of the town also overwhelmed us with tenderness, and as for ourselves we drank in greedily the praise which made us the lions of the hour." J. S. Wise, "The West Point of the Confederacy," *place cited*, 470.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 471, "At Harrisonburg, at Staunton, at Charlottesville, everywhere, an ovation awaited us such as we did not dream of, and such as has seldom greeted any troops." "I know that when we marched down the Valley Pike the day after the battle, that all the old Confederate veterans lined both sides of the road and cheered us to the echo. It was the proudest day of my life" . . . MS. letter of A. P. Thompson (C) to Henry A. Wise, April 1, 1909. Also MS. letter of Louis C. Wise (C) to Henry A. Wise, April 26, 1909.

ordered to Richmond, and their progress thither was one of triumph.⁵² When they arrived there a flag was presented to them in Capitol Square in the presence of a vast throng of spectators by the Governor of Virginia in behalf of the state;⁵³ and this was done on the same day that there was communicated to them the resolution which had been passed by the Confederate House of Representatives, thanking them for their gallant conduct.⁵⁴ After a short service in the works around Richmond they were sent back to Lexington; but they had hardly arrived there when the invasion of Hunter forced them to withdraw. It was at this time that in retaliation for the part played by the Cadets, Hunter burned the Virginia Military Institute and all the buildings connected with it.⁵⁵ Returning to Lexington again after Hunter had been driven off, the Cadets were furloughed until fall, when they were ordered to Richmond again, and after serving in the lines below the city, were later placed in quarters in the almshouse

⁵² J. S. Wise, "The West Point of the Confederacy," *place cited*, 471.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ MS. Journal of the Confederate House of Representatives, First Session, Second Congress, May 23, 1864. (Richmond) *Daily Dispatch*, May 28, 1864; *Daily Richmond Enquirer*, *Daily Richmond Examiner*, *Richmond Whig*, May 28, 1864. "The Confederate Congress thanked us for what we had done, and appointed Bocock, the speaker of the House, C. S., to deliver it to us, which he did from the steps of the Capitol in Richmond. At the same time President Davis thanked us in the name of the Confederacy. The governor thanked us in the name of the state and presented us with a new flag, and hoped we would defend it as heroically as we had the old." MS. letter of W. M. Kirk (C) to Henry A. Wise, April 27, 1909; also MS. letter of W. M. Patton (C) to the same, June 10, 1895; MS. letter of W. Kemp (C) to General J. A. Goggin, March 25, 1882.

⁵⁵ June 12, 1864. See his report, August 8, 1864, in *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 97. Cf. *ibid.*, 759.

nearby, where academic studies were resumed and continued with many interruptions until the evacuation of the city. Meanwhile of the veterans who had stood with them on New Market field many had already gone to death in the last fierce battles fought for the dying Confederacy.

Such was the battle of New Market. It was a small battle, in an obscure and secluded corner of the South, and at first sight it might seem to have been preserved to memory among a thousand other conflicts mainly by virtue of the romantic incidents which attended it. This is not true, for the contest was important in itself. But more than this, it is well worthy of study as a type. One of the things which does most to give enduring interest to the story of our Civil War is the matchless endurance with which the people of the Southern Confederacy, hopelessly outnumbered, held out during four years of continuous warfare. When wellnigh every man who could bear arms had been pressed into the service and there were no more to fight; when their supplies were exhausted and their munitions were almost gone; when the blockade had shut them in from the world, and the loss of their great river had cut the states in two; when their strong fortresses had been taken, and whole tracts of their country had been turned into a desert; still the people of the Confederacy held out so steadfastly that until the very end it seemed nearly impossible to subdue them. If the causes of their ability to do this be sought, they may be summed up particularly in these two things: the ability and skill of their generals; and the splendid qualities and patriotism of their soldiery. These things were displayed in numberless battles and sieges, some of them memorable conflicts which the world will not soon forget. Perhaps, however, they can nowhere be studied to better advantage than in those first two weeks of May, 1864, when Im-

boden and Breckinridge hastily gathered their meager squadrons and in dire need called out the boys of a training school; then hurrying forward by forced marches, struck the enemy with lightning blow, drove him off defeated, and kept their country secure. After which they dispersed their scanty forces to guard again the borders of their country.

APPENDIX A

THE OPPOSING ARMIES.

THE UNION ARMY.—Major-General Franz Sigel.

FIRST INFANTRY DIVISION.—Brigadier-General Jeremiah C. Sullivan.

First Brigade.—Colonel Augustus Moor.

18th Connecticut—Major Henry Peale.

28th Ohio—Lieutenant-Colonel Gottfried Becker.

116th Ohio—Colonel James Washburn.

123d Ohio—Major Horace Kellogg.

Second Brigade.—Colonel Joseph Thoburn.

1st West Virginia—Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob Weddle.

12th West Virginia—Colonel William B. Curtis.

34th Massachusetts—Colonel George D. Wells.

54th Pennsylvania—Colonel Jacob M. Campbell.

FIRST CAVALRY DIVISION.—Major-General Julius Stahel.

First Brigade.—Colonel William B. Tibbitts.

1st New York (Veteran)—Colonel R. F. Taylor.

1st New York (Lincoln)—Lieutenant-Colonel A. W. Adams.

* 1st Maryland, P. H. B.—Major J. T. Daniel.

21st New York—Major C. G. Otis.

* 14th Pennsylvania—Lieutenant-Colonel William Blakely.

Second Brigade.—Colonel John E. Wynkoop.

† 15th New York—

† 20th Pennsylvania—

† 22d Pennsylvania—

* Detachment.

† Small detachment.



BRIGADIER-GENERAL GABRIEL C. WHARTON,
C. S. A.

ARTILLERY—

- B, Maryland—Captain Alonzo Snow.
- 30th New York—Captain Albert Von Kleiser.
- D, 1st West Virginia—Captain John Carlin.
- G, 1st West Virginia—Captain C. T. Ewing.
- B, 5th United States—Captain Henry A. Du Pont.

“The effective strength of Sigel’s command was about 6,500, about 5,150 men and 22 guns being available in the battle.”¹

Sigel gives the numbers of his forces as 5,500 infantry and artillery, 1,000 cavalry, and 28 guns.²

A study of the evidence makes it probable that after the losses of the preceding days the Federal army did not amount to more than 6,000 men.

THE CONFEDERATE ARMY.—Major-General John C. Breckinridge.

Echols’ Brigade.—Brigadier-General John Echols.

- 22d Virginia Regiment—Colonel George M. Patton.
- 23d Virginia Battalion—Lieutenant-Colonel Clarence Derrick.
- 26th Virginia Battalion—Lieutenant-Colonel George M. Edgar.

Wharton’s Brigade.—Brigadier-General Gabriel C. Wharton.

- 51st Virginia Regiment—Colonel Forsberg.
- 30th Virginia Battalion—Colonel Lyle Clark.

Imboden’s Brigade.—Cavalry.—Brigadier-General John D. Imboden.

- 62d Virginia Regiment³—Colonel George H. Smith.
- 23d Virginia Regiment—Colonel Robert White.
- 18th Virginia Regiment—Colonel George W. Imboden.
- Gilmor’s Maryland Battalion—Major Harry Gilmor.
- Davis’s Maryland Battalion⁴—Major Sturgis Davis.
- Partisan Rangers—Captain John H. McNeill.

Cadet Corps (four companies).—Lieutenant-Colonel Scott Shipp.

¹ “The Opposing Forces at New Market, Va., May 15, 1864,” *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, IV, 491.

² “Sigel in the Shenandoah Valley,” *ibid.*, 488.

³ Mounted infantry.

⁴ Detachment.

Artillery.—Major William C. McLaughlin.

Chapman's Battery—Captain Chapman.

Cadet Battery Section—Captain C. H. Minge.

McClanahan's Battery⁵—Captain McClanahan.

Jackson's Battery—Captain Jackson.

An estimate of the Confederate numbers is given by General Imboden, "as shown in reports furnished me by Col. Wm. S. Lincoln."⁶

Infantry

General G. C. Wharton's Brigade,.....	1,400
Attached 62d Virginia Regiment,.....	570
General John Echols' Brigade,.....	1,250
Attached Battalion of Cadets,	220
Captain W. I. Hart's Eng. Corps,.....	
	————— 3,440

Cavalry

Imboden's Brigade, two Regiments,.....	800	800
--	-----	-----

Artillery

McClanahan's Battery, 6 guns,.....	120
Chapman's Battery, 6 guns,.....	120
Jackson's Battery, 4 guns,.....	80
Cadet Section, 2 guns,.....	30
	————— 350
Total,	4,590

A note in the margin shows that the aggregate force might amount to 4,898.

⁵ Attached to Imboden's Brigade.

⁶ MS. copy in possession of Henry A. Wise.

General Sigel, in an estimate based on the official reports, placed Breckinridge's strength as follows:⁷

Wharton's Brigade, ⁷	1,578
Echols' Brigade,	1,622
Engineer Company,	56
Cadet Corps,	227
Company of Missourians,	70
Jackson's Battery,	100
Chapman's Battery,	135
McClanahan's Battery, ⁸	93
Cadet Section,	35
Imboden's Cavalry, ⁹	900
Total,	4,816

A partial and apparently hasty statement by Colonel J. Stoddard Johnston, of Breckinridge's Staff, May 21, 1864, gives the following numbers:

<i>Echols' Brigade</i>	<i>Total effective.</i>	<i>Total present.</i>
22d Virginia,	514	549
26th Virginia,	441	478
23d Virginia	393	429
	1,348	1,456

<i>Wharton's Brigade</i>	<i>Total effective.</i>	<i>Present.</i>	<i>Aggregate.</i>
Field and staff,	2	2	8
51st Virginia,	588	607	643
62d Virginia,	288	308	334
30th Virginia,	260	282	303
Jackson's Battery,	83	85	90
	1,221	1,284	1,378

⁷ *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, IV, 491.

⁸ Given as "Callahan's."

⁹ Not including the 62d Virginia Regiment with Wharton's Brigade.

Other commands are named, but the numbers are not given.¹⁰

Colonel George H. Smith, after much study, estimates the Confederate infantry as follows:¹¹

22d Regiment,	500
62d Regiment,	500
51st Regiment,	637
Cadets,	221
26th and 23d Battalions,	800
30th Battalion,	300
	2,958

This would seem to be somewhat under the truth. An earlier estimate is probably somewhat more accurate:¹²

Infantry,	3,220
Cavalry,	800
Artillerymen,	120
	4,140

After a comparison of the different estimates, and after making allowance for underestimate to the same extent that allowance was made in considering the strength of the Federal army, I conclude that Breckinridge had on May 15 an army of about 4,500 men.

The strength, then, of the opposing armies was

	<i>Infantry.</i>	<i>Cavalry.</i>	<i>Artillerymen.</i>	<i>Total.</i>	<i>Guns.</i>
Federal,	4,700	1,000	300	6,000	28
Confederate,	3,400	900	200	4,500	18

¹⁰ MS. copy in possession of Henry A. Wise.

¹¹ MS. notes in possession of B. A. Colonna.

¹² *Confederate Veteran*, XVI, 571.

The relative strength of the combatants in artillery may be seen from a summary:

Federal—5 batteries, 28 guns.

Carlin's—six 3-inch rifled guns.

Snow's—six 3-inch rifled guns.

Du Pont's—six 3-inch rifled guns.

Von Kleiser's—six 12-pound Napoleon guns.

Ewing's—four 3-inch guns.

Confederate—two batteries and three sections, 18 guns.

Chapman's—four 12-pound howitzers, two 6-inch guns.

McClanahan's—six guns.

Minge's section—two guns.

Jackson's—four guns.

The actual fighting was not done by nearly so many, however. The Confederate cavalry took practically no part in the battle, and it is doubtful whether Breckinridge had more than 3,000 men in line at any time. On the other hand Sigel lost the battle because his army was scattered along the line of march in detached fragments. The 28th and 116th Ohio Regiments arrived on the field when the battle was practically over. They contained 740 men. The 12th West Virginia and part of the artillery were kept in the rear. The 18th Connecticut and the 123d Ohio gave way without serious resistance. The strength of these two regiments was 926. No effective use was made of the cavalry. Probably not more than 4,000 men were concentrated against the Confederates, and probably no more than 2,000 bore the brunt of the fighting.

It may be remarked that a careful measurement of the battle-field has shown that as the Confederates were arranged no more than 2,100 could have marched in line in the struggle

on Bushong's Hill. On both sides many were crowded to the rear, or were compelled to fight behind their comrades.

In accordance with a custom which has held unbroken sway since the time of Herodotos and Jordanes, a great many rough, popular, baseless estimates have been made, characterized by gross exaggeration, misapprehension, and underestimation.

Colonel George M. Edgar at one time believed that Sigel had from 10,000 to 15,000 men, and that Breckinridge had 3,400 all told.¹³

John W. Adams, 34th Massachusetts Regiment, believed that Sigel had 1,500 men, Breckinridge 8,000.¹⁴

Sigel himself thought that the Confederate force numbered 7,000.¹⁵

Major William McLaughlin, who commanded the Confederate artillery, says: Federals about 8,000; Confederates, about 3,000.¹⁶

General Scott Shipp, who commanded the Cadet Corps, says: Confederates, about 3,200; Federals, 7,000 to 8,000.¹⁷ Some years before he had put the Confederate force at 3,400 to 3,500.¹⁸

¹³ MS. letter to Henry A. Wise, Feb. 18, 1896.

¹⁴ MS. letter to B. A. Colonna, Feb. 23, 1911.

¹⁵ "Sigel in the Shenandoah Valley," *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, IV, 488.

¹⁶ MS. letter to Henry A. Wise, Jan. 27, 1897.

¹⁷ MS. letter to Henry A. Wise, Feb. 15, 1897.

¹⁸ MS. letter to A. P. Young, April 28, 1873.

APPENDIX B.

GENERAL SIGEL.

FRANZ SIGEL was one of the most illustrious of all the immigrants who came from Germany to America. Like Carl Schurz he left his old home in consequence of the revolutionary agitation of 1848 and 1849. Although unsuccessful as a general and apparently lacking executive ability as an independent commander, he possessed to the full those solid and sterling qualities which have made the men of his race such excellent citizens in their adopted home.

He was born at Sinsheim, Baden, in 1824. In 1848 he took a prominent part in the revolutionary movements in Baden, and in the next year when the radicals resorted to arms he was a member of the provisional government and minister of war. When the movement collapsed he led the remains of the revolutionary army into Switzerland. The outlook in the Fatherland then seemed so hopeless that in 1852 he emigrated to the United States.

At the outbreak of the Civil War Sigel at once entered the service of his adopted country, organizing a regiment of infantry and a battery of artillery, and taking an active part in the early campaigns in the West. He was at Carthage and at Dug Springs, and conducted the retreat of the Federal army from Wilson's Creek. For these services he was made brigadier-general of volunteers, and after his timely charge at Pea Ridge, which decided the issue of the battle, he was made major-general. He was then removed to the East, receiving command of Harper's Ferry, and later taking part in the cam-

paign which ended in the second battle of Bull Run. In 1864 he was put over the Department of West Virginia, and in conjunction with Crook undertook to destroy the Confederate power in the Valley of Virginia. Here, however, his fortune changed, and either because he was not fitted to manage a campaign or because he was confronted by abler antagonists, he met with speedy and signal defeat. He was replaced by Hunter, and although in July he successfully defended Maryland Heights against Early, he found that he had lost the confidence of his superiors. He resigned in May, 1865.

His later years were spent quietly. For some time he was in public life as register of New York City, and later as United States pension agent in the same place. During several years he published the *New York Monthly*, a German-American periodical. He died in 1902.¹

¹ For a part of this information I am indebted to the article in the *New International Encyclopedia*.

APPENDIX C.

GENERAL BRECKINRIDGE.

JOHN CABELL BRECKINRIDGE¹ was born at Lexington, Kentucky, in 1821. He was of distinguished ancestry. On his mother's side he was descended from John Witherspoon, one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence, and in other ways he was connected with some of the greatest families in the South, notably the Breckinridges, the Prestons, and the Cabells, of Virginia.

After studying law at Princeton he went west, and after a while settled permanently at Lexington. Here his splendid talents caused him to rise at once to the top of his profession. During the war with Mexico he served with distinction under General Scott, after which he returned to Kentucky, and there entered political life. In 1849 he was elected to the state legislature, and in 1851 as Democratic candidate for the United States House of Representatives he defeated his opponent in one of the strongest Whig districts in the country, displaying such qualities in this contest that he was thereafter one of the foremost men in the political affairs of his state.

By 1856 his reputation was so great that although he was but thirty-five years of age, he was unanimously nominated as candidate for the vice-presidency of the United States by the Democratic Convention at Cincinnati. In 1860, against

¹ This sketch is largely based upon the *Address on the Life and Character of General John C. Breckinridge*, by Brigadier-General John Echols, New Market, Va., 1877.

his will, it is said, he was nominated for the presidency at Baltimore. During the dark days which followed the election of Lincoln he was sent to Washington as senator. Presently when the results of the election had caused the South to look with dread upon her union with the North, when Southern members were leaving Congress daily, Breckinridge, though an ardent State Rights man and strongly favoring the South, remained at his post to the last, exhibiting, as his admirer said, all the dignity and high resolve of a senator of old Rome.² Only when he thought that the last hope of reconciliation was gone did he withdraw. He then went quietly to his native state.

After his return to Kentucky it is said that he designed to follow the fortunes of that commonwealth. What would have been the outcome of this intention one may not say now, since he was forced to decide more quickly. In a short time he fell under the suspicion of the Federal authorities, who determined to arrest him. Before this could be done, however, he escaped and entered the service of the Confederate Government. Here his work was brilliant and his rise rapid. Entering with the rank of brigadier-general, he was speedily raised to the rank of major-general, and as such took part in the fighting at Shiloh, Corinth, Vicksburg, Chickamauga, Missionary Ridge, New Market, Cold Harbor, and Monocacy. During the winter of 1864-5, when the Confederacy was in its death-throes, he was called to administer the War Department, and in Richmond he remained until the city was on fire.

When Lee and Johnston had surrendered he advised President Davis that the result be accepted, and the war be brought to a close; but when the end came he himself fled from the

² Echols' *Address*, p. 10.

country. Three years later when sectional hatred had died down a little, he returned to take part in the heroic task of building up his shattered country. In 1875 his death came after a lingering illness.

This man who in peace displayed all the nobleness, the dignity, and attractive qualities, together with the eloquence and ability, of the leader and the statesman, was a Bayard in battle, and a skilful and daring general in war. His splendid presence and stately bearing won the admiration of his soldiers, and after forty-five years they still speak with admiring devotion of his magnificent bearing as he galloped past them at New Market.³ To this feeling was added their confidence in his tried ability and skill as a commander. In 1864 his reputation was at its height.

³ "We learned its import as Breckinridge and his staff approached, and we joined in the huzza as that soldierly man, mounted magnificently, dashed past us, uncovered, bowing, and riding like the Cid." John S. Wise, "The West Point of the Confederacy," *place cited*, p. 466. "Before the battle I had ridden up to where General John D. Imboden and staff were on an eminence southwest of the town. Just then General Breckinridge and staff went there too. I think he was the handsomest man I ever saw." Captain J. W. Parsons, 18th Virginia Cavalry, *Confederate Veteran*, XVII, 119 (March, 1909).


APPENDIX D.

THE POSITIONS OF THE COMMANDS.

THE question as to the positions of the different commands when the Federal army was drawn up in its second position and the Confederates renewed their advance, has given rise to a great deal of controversy and difference of opinion; yet a correct account of this part of the battle cannot be written until each command has been assigned definitely to its proper place.

In the case of the Federal army there is not so much difficulty in ascertaining the order in the lines. Sigel has himself described the arrangement. The right, he says, was held by Carlin's and Snow's Batteries near the river-bluff, with three regiments of infantry to their left, the 34th Massachusetts, the 1st West Virginia, and the 54th Pennsylvania. The center was made up of the 18th Connecticut and the 123d Ohio, with Von Kleiser's Battery between. On the left was Stahel's cavalry and Ewing's Battery. The 12th West Virginia and Du Pont's Battery, he says, were posted behind the right as a reserve. The 28th and 116th Ohio were in the rear at Rude's Hill.¹ While this account requires modification as regards some details, it is nevertheless substantially correct if it be understood that the available portion of Moor's Brigade, the 18th Connecticut and the 123d Ohio were some distance in advance of the other commands, so that there were in the second part of the battle two distinct lines.

¹ Sigel, "Sigel in the Shenandoah Valley," *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, IV, 489, 490.



BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN ECHOLS,
C. S. A.

Colonel Wells of the 34th Massachusetts says: "After considerable maneuvering our line was formed about where it was the night before—the artillery on the right, on rising ground, resting on the river; the Thirty-fourth in line, its right on the battery, its left touching a dirt road; other regiments on our left, and one in column in our rear."² Colonel Campbell of the 54th Pennsylvania says: "We at once deployed into column by division to the left and rear of the 12th Virginia, which regiment shortly afterward moved toward the right, unmasking us, and about the same time my regiment was deployed and took position on the left of the First Virginia and on the extreme left of the line of battle."³ Here he evidently means the extreme left of Thoburn's Brigade. Colonel Moor, in command of the first or advanced line of the Federal army, which covered the left of Thoburn's Brigade, and which virtually constituted the center of the Federal army, says: "I was now ordered to fall back" (that is from the first position about New Market) "some 800 yards to the rear of my first position, and to form the One hundred and twenty-third Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry and Eighteenth Connecticut on the right of a battery."⁴ According to Major Peale the 18th Connecticut was to the right of the 123d Ohio.⁵ Thus far the reports of Sigel's subordinates corroborate his statement almost entirely.

There has been some uncertainty about the positions of the batteries, however. It has been thought by some that Von Kleiser's guns were on the right next to Carlin's, and that Snow's were in the center. Snow's Battery had undoubtedly

² *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 83.

³ *Ibid.*, 86.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 80.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 82.

been there in the first part of the battle,⁶ but after the withdrawal from New Market it was certainly removed to the right. Von Kleiser's Battery is said by Sigel to have been between the 18th Connecticut and the 123d Ohio,⁷ but Colonel Moor declares that it was to the left of both these regiments,⁸ and he was probably better informed as to the truth. Nevertheless so long as Moor's line held its position, there can be no doubt that this battery remained in the center. When the first line was put to rout, however, the guns were most probably withdrawn, though there is no record of this movement. That they were withdrawn to the Federal right, near to the 34th Massachusetts, however, seems fairly certain. Lieutenant-Colonel Lincoln, describing the formation of Sigel's second line in this part of the battle, says: "Meanwhile the troops composing the 2d Brigade, which in reality formed our *only* line of battle, were placed in position, under the immediate direction of General Sigel himself. 'On the extreme right were two Batteries (Snow's and Carlin's), close to the woods reaching down to the river. Von Kleiser's on an eminence in the center, a little advanced; and Ewing's on a ridge on our extreme left; the cavalry behind our right and left centre.'"⁹ As the Cadets advanced in their charge they came into conflict with Von Kleiser's Battery, and it has been supposed by some that the Cadets were stationed on the right of the Confederate line, in which case they could have crossed the position which Sigel says the battery occupied.¹⁰ The part of the

⁶ Report of Col. Moor, *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 79.

⁷ *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, IV, 489.

⁸ *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 80.

⁹ Lincoln, *Life with the Thirty-Fourth Massachusetts Infantry*, 281.

¹⁰ Dr. Humphreys and Lieutenant-Colonel Edgar in communications to the author.

line occupied by the Cadets, however, is fixed indubitably by the Bushong House around which they passed, and the line which they must have followed in marching beyond the house would have brought them to the place where Colonel Lincoln says Von Kleiser was stationed.¹¹ As to the position of Ewing's Battery there is no dispute: it was certainly on the left of the Federal infantry line, near Stahel's cavalry. Sigel asserts that Du Pont's Battery was in the rear of Thoburn's Brigade as a reserve,¹² but Du Pont himself has said that it was far in the rear and did not reach the field of battle until three o'clock in the afternoon.¹³

It is far more difficult to discover the positions of the Confederate commands, because there are no detailed official reports from the Confederate commanders, and because the positions were changed as the three lines were shifted into one.

After these changes had been made some of the commands occupied positions about which there can be no dispute. Thus there is no doubt that the 26th Virginia Battalion was on the extreme left,¹⁴ and the 23d Virginia Battalion on the extreme right.¹⁵ To the right of the 26th Battalion was the 51st Virginia Regiment.¹⁶ To the right of the 51st was the 62d Virginia Regiment.¹⁷ To the right of the 62d was the 22d Vir-

¹¹ See below, p. 129.

¹² *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, IV, 489.

¹³ MS. letter to Edgar, Oct. 1, 1908.

¹⁴ MS. letter of Edgar to Henry A. Wise, Feb. 18, 1896; Edgar, MS. Critical Notes; Humphreys, "Battle of New Market," *Times-Dispatch*, October 8, 1905.

¹⁵ MS. statement written by Lieutenant-Colonel Derrick for Edgar.

¹⁶ Captain D. H. Bruce (51st Virginia Regiment), *Confederate Veteran*, XV, 554.

¹⁷ Colonel George H. Smith, *ibid.*, XVI, 570.

ginia Regiment.¹⁸ To the right of the 22d was Derrick with the 23d Battalion. As to the positions of these commands after one long line had been formed there is now no controversy. It is far more difficult to ascertain the whereabouts of the Cadet Corps and the 30th Virginia Battalion.

As to the Cadets, Breckinridge in his report says: "Upon the crest of this hill I formed my left of Wharton's Brigade. The Corps of Cadets was placed in the center, and Echols with his right resting upon the turnpike completed my line of battle."¹⁹ The report of Lieutenant-Colonel Shipp is as follows: "Wharton's brigade of infantry constituted the first line; Echols' brigade the second. The battalion of cadets, brigaded with Echols, was the last battalion but one from the left of the second line, Edgar's battalion being on the left."²⁰ Accordingly it has been said again and again that the Cadets were between Wharton and Echols. The error lies in the fact that while these statements are roughly true for one stage of the advance, they are not necessarily true for later stages. So well informed a critic as Captain Wise, who commanded one of the companies of the Cadets, and who led the Battalion in their final charge, maintained for a long time that they were on the right of the 62d, the end of Wharton's line.²¹

Equally troublesome has been the assertion of Lieutenant-Colonel Derrick: "I saw the Cadets go into action on line with me and to my left." "Trees and obstacles hid all of our left from me except the Cadets, and at least two of them

¹⁸ *Confederate Veteran*, XVI, 570; MS. statement of Captain Thompson (22d Virginia Regiment) written for Edgar.

¹⁹ Breckinridge, Report.

²⁰ Report in *War Records*, ser. I, vol. XXXVII, part I, 90.

²¹ Statements to the author.

came to my battalion for a time. They behaved bravely and stood up to the music.”²² As Derrick was on the extreme right of the Confederate line this has been interpreted to prove that the Cadets were the last command but one on the right of that line.²³ Nevertheless the proximity of the Corps to the 23d could have existed only when the Cadets were held as a reserve, and not when their charge was made over Bushong’s Hill.

It would seem that the Cadets changed their position in the same manner and in the same direction as the 26th Battalion. Of the details of this change little is known,²⁴ so that the conclusion must be made rather from circumstances which arose after the change had taken place.

For the most part there has been substantial agreement that the Cadets were near the 62d Virginia, but there has been the greatest uncertainty as to whether they were to right or the left of that regiment. Many writers have asserted that they were to the right, and some of the best informed critics believe this at the present time. There can be no doubt, however, that they were to the left.

Lieutenant-Colonel Lincoln has described the charge of the Cadets. “The Sixty-second Virginia,” he says, “which formed the extreme left of the attacking force, advanced directly against us. To the right of the Sixty-second were the Cadets.

²² MS. statement of Derrick written for Edgar.

²³ The assertion made by Captain Town that the Cadets charged and took Von Kleiser’s Battery near which he was standing, has been thought to confirm this interpretation, because Sigel says that this battery was on the left of the Federal line. See above, p. 124.

²⁴ “We had before this gotten into the front line.” Report of Lieutenant-Colonel Shipp, *War Records*, ser. 1, vol. XXXVII, part I, 91. See above, p. 74, note 16a.

The line of advance was a little diagonal to that of our formation, and as it was continued the Sixty-second passed beyond and the Cadets came directly to our front.”²⁵ The 62d was not at either end of the Confederate line, but of Wharton’s Brigade it was the extreme right, but not the extreme left. When, therefore, Lieutenant-Colonel Lincoln says that it was the left, his statement is only intelligible when it is understood that he is using the terms “right” and “left” from his own point of view, so that these terms must be reversed when applied to the movements of the Confederate line. His statement would then be that the Cadets were to the left of the 62d. If this is not his meaning, then not only is his statement not true, but the thing could not have taken place, since the space between the 34th Massachusetts Regiment and the Shenandoah River would have been so narrow that it would have been physically impossible for the 26th Battalion, the 51st Regiment, and the 62d Regiment to have made any advance at all.

That the Cadets were not upon the right of the 62d is asserted with the utmost conviction by Colonel Smith, the commander of that regiment, who offers in proof of his contention the fact that the 22d Regiment was to his immediate right. “With regard to Patton’s position I speak from my own knowledge. I do not, of course, mean to say, that I was sufficiently familiar with his regiment to recognize the men, but Patton himself,—who was my first cousin,—I had known intimately from our early infancy; and I at least know that a large body of troops commanded by him came up on my right, and advanced with my regiment. This body I originally supposed was Echols’ Brigade, commanded by Patton;

²⁵ (Richmond) *State*, April 4, 1888.

but as I afterwards learned that Edgar's Battalion was on the extreme left, and Derrick's on the extreme right of the line, the inference is conclusive that it was Patton's Regiment only. I will add that he and I soon came together, and continued throughout the advance, elbow to elbow, conversing about the fight; and that while we were thus together, shortly after passing the enemy's line, the two regiments marching in double rank, and in regular formation, Breckinridge rode up, and wanted one of us to take his horse."²⁶

But the most effective proof that the Cadets were to the left of the 62d, and between the 62d and the 51st, is the fact that their line of march took them up to the Bushong House, at which the command divided, part going around one side, and part around the other, the companies uniting again beyond the house.²⁷ There is no dispute as to this.²⁸ Now this house is still standing, so that its position with respect to other points on the battlefield can be accurately measured. Had the 62d Regiment been to the left of the Cadets when they passed the Bushong House there would have been so narrow a space that the three commands in this part of the field could not possibly have maneuvered; while the assumption that the Cadets were to the right of the 22d, that is, that the 22d and 62d were both to the left of the Cadets and the Bushong House, simply makes the impossibility more absurd. As to the 62d Colonel Smith declares that it was always to the right of the house and near to the turnpike.²⁹

²⁶ MS. letter of Colonel Smith to Henry A. Wise, October. 1, 1910.

²⁷ See above, p. 77.

²⁸ I have received a very detailed statement from Captain Henry A. Wise, as well as numerous letters from Cadets, among others, MS. letter of J. T. Bransford (C) to Henry A. Wise, Nov. 10, 1910; MS. letter of B. A. Colonna (C) to the author, Dec. 11, 1911.

²⁹ MS letter of Colonel Smith to Henry A. Wise, Oct. 1, 1910.

Finally the part of the field in which the Cadets made their charge may be identified in the description given by Captain Frank Preston of the Corps, a few days after the charge was made. He says, "Still we pressed on, till we came to an orchard about two hundred yards from the enemy's line on the hill, and a battery of four pieces, on the right of the infantry. The battery, as I learn from prisoners, was Snow's Maryland Artillery, and the infantry, the 34th Massachusetts."³⁰

A comparison of all this testimony seems to make it certain that the Cadet Corps, when it took its place in the front line, was with the Confederate left, between the 51st Regiment and the 62d.³¹

It is just as difficult to ascertain the position of the 30th, Clarke's Battalion. It is known that at least some of the men of this command were thrown forward as skirmishers in the first part of the battle, and it seems probable that the different portions of the Battalion were not reunited afterward, but fought in fragments attached to other commands.³² Part of the Battalion skirmished before the 51st Regiment. When the battle was joined it fell back into the space between the 51st and the 62d Regiments, the space into which the Cadets entered also.³³ There are reasons for believing that another

³⁰ Letter in *Lexington Gazette*, May 25, 1864.

³¹ This was asserted by General Gabriel C. Wharton when he revisited the battlefield in 1898 and was giving his reminiscences; by Captain Bruce of the 51st Regiment, and by O. P. Evans, Cadet, *Confederate Veteran*, XVI, 569, 571; and by Robert E. Wolfe of the 51st Regiment, MS. letter to B. A. Colonna, June 23, 1911.

³² MS. letter of Colonel Lyle Clarke to Henry A. Wise, March 25, 1895.

³³ MS. letter of Lieut.-Col. Shipp to A. P. Young, April 28, 1873. This

part of the Battalion was on the right between the 22d and the 23d.⁸⁴

The Confederate artillery was on the right of the Confederate line throughout the battle. For the most part its line of advance lay along or near the Valley turnpike. It was under the general command of Major William McLaughlin, who was at times directed by Breckinridge himself. Under McLaughlin's immediate supervision were Chapman's Battery of six guns, part of Jackson's Battery, part of McClanahan's Battery, and the section under Captain Minge. Four guns of McClanahan's Battery had gone across Smith's Creek with Imboden, and were posted upon a hill in the bend of the stream.

is borne out by plans of the battle made by Major Peter J. Otey (30th Battalion) in 1873, and also by his letter to Lieut.-Col. Shipp, April 14, 1873.

⁸⁴ *Confederate Veteran*, XVI, 570, 571.

KEY.

- 1 Third echelon on Shirley's Hill; *a*, 26th Battalion; *b*, Corps of Cadets.
- 2 Second echelon on Shirley's Hill; *a*, 22d Regiment; *b*, 23d Battalion.
- 3 First echelon on Shirley's Hill; *a*, 51st Regiment; *b*, 62d Regiment.
- 4 Confederate artillery on Shirley's Hill, under McLaughlin.
- 5 Cadet Battalion in reserve, marching down Shirley's Hill.
- 6 Second echelon sheltered by hill, just before advance upon second Federal position; *a*, 22nd Regiment; *b*, 23d Battalion.
- 6¹ 26th Battalion attached to left of second echelon, before moving forward to left of first echelon (7¹).
- 7 First echelon sheltered by hill, just before advance upon second Federal position: *a*, 51st Regiment; *b*, 62d Regiment.
- 7¹ 26th Battalion forming left of first echelon.
- 8 Two sections of Snow's Battery in New Market.
- 9 Federal troops in New Market; first Federal position.
- 10 Imboden's cavalry, Confederate right, to south of woods, before moving to cross Smith's Creek.
- 11 30th Battalion, Confederate skirmish line.
- 12 First (Moor's) line in second Federal position; *a*, 18th Connecticut Regiment; *b*, 123d Ohio Regiment; *c*, Von Kleiser's Battery.
- 13 Confederate artillery under McLaughlin in advanced position, firing upon second Federal line upon Bushong's Hill.
- 14 Second Confederate line defending Confederate right; *a*, 22d Regiment *b*, 23d (Derrick's) Battalion extended in skirmish line.
- 15 Cadets in reserve behind Wharton's line, just before reaching the Bushong House.
- 16 26th (Edgar's) Battalion marching behind 51st Regiment, because of bend in river.
- 17 51st Regiment marching on both sides of ridge near river.
- 18 62d Regiment in hollow after retreat from advanced position at 19.
- 19 62d Regiment in advanced position on Bushong's Hill.
- 20 Company of 34th Massachusetts Regiment supporting Federal artillery on Sigel's right.
- 21 Federal artillery on extreme Federal right, near river-bluffs; *a*, Carlin's Battery; *b*, Snow's Battery.

— NEW MARKET BATTLEFIELD —

— MAY 15-1864 —

BY BRANCH B. MORGAN, C.E.
BASED UPON THE OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE WAR
— BENJAMIN A. COLVINA —
POSITIONS OF TROOPS BY
EDWARD RAYMOND TURNER



SCALE OF MILES





- 22 Von Kleiser's Battery on summit of Bushong's Hill, after retreat from Federal first line (12c).
- 23 Thoburn's Brigade, Federal second line, on Bushong's Hill; *a*, 34th Massachusetts Regiment; *b*, 1st West Virginia Regiment; *c*, 54th Pennsylvania Regiment.
- 24 Ewing's Battery.
- 25 Federal cavalry under Stahel.
- 26 Imboden's artillery and cavalry across Smith's Creek, on Federal left flank.
- 27 Du Pont's Battery in most advanced position, covering Federal retreat.
- 28 12th West Virginia Regiment in reserve.

APPENDIX E.

THE 26TH BATTALION AND THE 51ST REGIMENT.

THE conduct of Edgar's men as compared with that of the men of the 51st Regiment, and the relative merits of the two commands, have been the subject of bitter, even acrimonious controversy. Whether the 26th or the 51st dislodged the Federal troops on the river bluffs and captured the guns, whether the 26th remained idle in the rear of the 51st, or whether the day was saved in this part of the field by the advance of the 26th through the disordered ranks of the 51st, these queries have been the cause of mutual accusation, re-crimination, and disparagement. As it is better that the dispute be brought to an end the history of the controversy will not be traced here, but the evidence will be presented. It will not be possible to satisfy all of those concerned, but it is proposed to enable the curious to decide for themselves from the statements which have been furnished by the interested parties.

On August 8, 1864, Lieutenant-Colonel Edgar rendered the following report: "I respectfully submit the following report of the part which my Battalion bore in the engagement at New Market. . . . When the Division was drawn up in line of battle to attack the enemy at New Market, my Battalion was held as a reserve in rear of the 23d Virginia Battalion of this Brigade. It was shortly afterwards ordered to take position on the left of that battalion, and in rear of General Wharton's Brigade. It was kept in that part of the line until the Division reached the base of the hill upon which the

enemy's line was formed. It was then ordered to take position on General Wharton's left, and occupied this part (the extreme left) of the line during the engagement. Before reaching the crest of the hill I found it necessary (because of the course of the river) to throw my left wing in rear of the right, and still later, to throw my Battalion in rear of the Regiment on its right. As the ground would admit of it (in advancing) the companies of the left wing were successively thrown into line. When the Battalion reached the crest of the hill, a heavy fire was opened upon the Regiment in our front, and it gave way. I at once ordered my Battalion forward to its support; and though my line was a good deal broken in passing through that of the Regiment, it advanced steadily until the enemy gave way, when we took possession of two pieces of his battery. As my Battalion advanced, a portion was detached to dislodge a flanking party of the enemy that had taken position in the cliffs near the river. To cooperate with and protect the detachment referred to the Battalion was thrown further forward during the pursuit than the rest of the line.

"It is due to the Regiment that gave way at the commencement of the action to state that the officers and men who compose it soon rallied upon the right and left of my Battalion, and fought gallantly, and during the pursuit formed in their proper place on the right.

"The officers and men of my Battalion, with but few exceptions, fought *well* throughout the engagement. The following were conspicuous, under my own eye, for gallantry, viz: Captain John O. Carr, Adjutant H. B. Craig, Lieutenant G. W. Hines, Lieutenant James F. Patton, and Color-bearer George A. Woodrum. The following officers and men attracted by their good conduct and gallantry the attention of

their company commanders, viz: Sergeant Woods, Corporal Brown, and Private Joseph Wagoner, Company A; Lieutenant W. W. George and Privates James Keatley, Archibald Miller, and John E. Woodbine, Company H; Lieutenants Davidson, Stickley, and Branson, Company I.

"The aggregate number of officers and men engaged was about 425. The casualties were as follows: three (3) killed and twenty-one (21) wounded."¹

Edgar's account, which is one of the three reports of the battle of New Market known to have been written by Confederate officers, is the most important document connected with this controversy. It was written shortly after the battle. The statements contained in it are simple and definite. During half a century of writing and correspondence Colonel Edgar has reiterated these statements as he first gave them. In itself it would possess very great authority and weight, but it is corroborated by numerous accounts written by the men who served with him in the battle.

"This is to certify that I was present at the battle of New Market on May 15, 1864, and was in the charge made by Edgar's Battalion on the extreme left of the line, and know that our Battalion did take the Yankee battery of two pieces of artillery on that hill, and say this without fear of successful contradiction."²

"On the morning of the battle we were detached from our brigade and moved to the extreme left as supports to the 51st Virginia Infantry, which led the assault on the enemy's right. This position was a hill on which was a battery supported by

¹ MS. Report of Lieutenant-Colonel Edgar to Captain R. H. Catlett, A. A. G., August 8, 1864.

² MS. affidavit of Major Richard Woodruff (26th Battalion), March, 1906.

infantry. The 51st, having broken under the enemy's fire, we were pushed rapidly to the front. During this advance I received an order from you through Adjutant Craig to dislodge a squad of the enemy on the river bluffs on our extreme left. I gave an order to 'left oblique.' This order was obeyed by only a part of the company, the right files and both my first and second lieutenants not having heard it, pushed for the enemy's battery in their front. Very shortly we met the broken troops coming back and passing through our line, which was thrown into a good deal of confusion as it advanced. On gaining the top of the hill, the enemy's sharpshooters at once fled from their position on the bluff, and I found I had no force in my front, but had completely overlapped the enemy's right flank. I half-wheeled, fired, and we rushed the guns. Before we reached them, the enemy abandoned the position and retreated, and when I reached the battery, there were a good many of our men around the captured guns." ³

"In a very short time after reaching the summit of the hill, I very distinctly heard you give a command to move forward and take the battery that was nearly in front of the battalion. Your men at once started to obey that command, not moving merely at a double-quick, but at as rapid a run as the very muddy condition of the ground to be passed over would permit. They captured the battery and held it, the enemy being so thoroughly routed that they made no effort to rally and try to retake the pieces. . . . That your battalion was in the front on the top of the ridge, is very clear to my mind, and that it led in the charge to take the battery, I know, for I was in a position where I could see the rush made for the

³ MS. statement of Captain E. S. Read (26th Battalion), March 29, 1906.

pieces, and knew that the rush was made in obedience to your command. I heard your command very distinctly, for I was not many paces from you.”⁴

“This is to certify that I was a member of Captain E. S. Read’s Company, 26th Virginia Battalion, and was in the battle of New Market, May 15, 1864; and was in the charge made on the hill on the extreme left of our line; and say undoubtedly that Edgar’s Battalion did capture the Yankee battery; and that I was among the first to lay hands on these guns.”⁵

“Our battalion, the 26th Virginia Volunteers, was placed . . . behind . . . the 51st Virginia, and when that regiment went over the hill-top, it fell back under the first volley of the enemy. Colonel Edgar ordered the 26th . . . to push right through; the men responded gallantly, and though our line was broken by the way we went in, the men pushed forward rapidly and never stopped” (until they) “reached the battery of the enemy, captured two guns, and pressed forward in pursuit,”⁶ . . .

“When we reached the line of the rest of the regiment, we found it wavering and in much disorder. We pushed through and charged on, drove the enemy from his position, and captured three pieces of artillery. I do not remember what the 51st Regiment did on the field after we passed through its line, but I distinctly recollect that we were in front when the enemy retreated, and were foremost in the pursuit.”⁷

⁴ MS. statement of Lieutenant G. W. Hines (26th Battalion), February 20, 1906.

⁵ MS. statement of W. W. Jones (26th Battalion), March, 1906.

⁶ MS. statement of Captain F. C. Burdette (26th Battalion), April 23, 1906.

⁷ MS. statement of Lieutenant J. W. McDowell (26th Battalion), March 24, 1906.

"When the" (51st Regiment) "reached the crest of the hill, it was subjected to a heavy fire from the enemy and broke to the rear, when Colonel Edgar ordered the 26th Virginia Battalion forward, and we pushed through the retreating regiment and advanced upon the enemy, and put them to flight, and took two pieces of artillery. This I saw with my own eyes. After pressing a considerable distance beyond the battery, being distanced by the enemy, we were halted and dressed, and waited there for some time before the center of the brigade overcome the part of the line in its front and came up on a line with us. As we came up Colonel Edgar sent a detachment to the left on the river, to drive back some sharpshooters that were assailing us on the flank,"⁸

"When we reached the wheat-field on the top of the hill, we came under a very heavy fire of artillery and infantry. Climbing over or throwing down the fence, we advanced into the fields in a pouring rain. I soon noticed that a line of our troops in front of us began to give way. Soon they fell into disorder, and I could see plainly that the enemy was slowly advancing and pressing them back. I, and all, I think, understood that a critical time in the battle had come. You and other officers called loudly from the front of our line for us to hold our ground and press on. The men of the regiment, running and forcing themselves through our line, threatened the solidity of it and the force of our attack. It was then that you ran along the front of your line, cheering on your men, apparently, and calling out some orders which, owing to the din of battle, I could not hear distinctly, until you came opposite me, when I distinctly heard you say, 'Captain, do not let

⁸ MS. statement of Lieutenant T. H. Kirkpatrick (26th Battalion), February 15, 1906.

those men break through your line, draw your pistol on them (or shoot them), if they will not halt.' You then ran along the line, giving, as I suppose, the same warning order, while you checked some retreating men yourself. I did not know then to whose commands these retreating men belonged. We were then very heavily engaged for some time, but the rapidly falling rain interfering much with the firing of the guns, made but little progress, but at length pressed forward slowly, all fighting well and with fine spirit and determination. It was about this time that General Breckinridge rode along through our line to where you were, and I heard him say, 'Colonel, we are driving them,' to which you replied, 'Yes, General, but we are much broken (or scattered).' We began to move more rapidly as the enemy gave way, and hastened their retreat, capturing some of them. Reaching the fence at the further side of the wheat-field, we were halted to dress our line and allow the stragglers to get up. Then with a rush and great cheering we charged the battery, driving its infantry supports away, and capturing some guns."⁹

"Upon reaching the crest of the hill in front, the enemy poured in volleys from both infantry and artillery; two pieces of the latter being directly in front of the battalion. This heavy firing caused the 51st Virginia Regiment to give way, and it fell back in disorder through the ranks of the 26th Virginia Battalion. In spite of this demoralization, the battalion moved forward and captured the two pieces of artillery referred to. The enemy being routed, the army moved forward some distance and was halted for reformation. The 26th Virginia Battalion maintained its position on the extreme

⁹ MS. statement of Captain T. C. Morton (26th Battalion), March, 1906.

left, but now lined up with the 62d Virginia Regiment. During this formation, General Breckinridge rode up to Colonel Edgar and addressed him, as the writer recollects, as follows: 'Colonel, the men are a little scattered. I want you to detail an officer and have him take some men with him to the rear and gather the stragglers, as I think the enemy is reforming on Rude's Hill, and we will have to charge them.'"¹⁰

"When we entered the fight we were exposed to a heavy fire from a battery that was stationed near the top of a hill to reach which we had to pass through a pretty heavy body of woods. . . . As we ascended this hill, the 51st Virginia Regiment fell back through our battalion, causing some confusion and disorder. But as soon as they got through our line, our battalion reformed on our colors . . . pressed on up the hill and captured the battery. The formation on which the battery . . . was stationed was such that in capturing the battery our battalion had to swing somewhat to the right. Just after the capture of this battery, we were being subjected to a very galling infantry fire from what turned out to be some sharpshooters on our left front, and I was ordered to dislodge them and keep a lookout on our left flank, in doing which I was separated from the main body of the troops for a while, but at length came back with some prisoners, rejoining the battalion after its lining up with the 62d Virginia Regiment. The latter regiment and the Corps of Cadets of the Virginia Military Institute were under a most destructive fire as we emerged from the woods after we captured the battery."¹¹

¹⁰ MS. affidavit of Lieutenant W. W. George (26th Battalion), March 6, 1906.

¹¹ MS. statement of Captain John O. Carr (26th Battalion), March 25, 1906.

In general criticism of this testimony it may be said that these statements corroborate each other in almost all respects, and are in accord with the report which Edgar himself originally rendered. They are undoubtedly made by men who believe what they say, and who have good reason for believing it. On the other hand the only document which has original and contemporary value is the commander's report, and unfortunately this is not supported by any other contemporary evidence. The other statements made by the officers and men of the 26th have no contemporary value, and are therefore liable to the defects which arise from failing memory and incorrect interpretation. There is no doubt that the evidence presented is strong, and without further corroboration it might be received if it were not disputed. It has, however, been sharply attacked by the men of the 51st Regiment.

It may be said at once that the evidence presented by the men of the 51st Virginia is slighter both in magnitude and value. It does not rest upon any documents written immediately after the battle. It is less coherent, more scattered, and more conflicting.

Unfortunately Brigadier-General Wharton, who led the 51st at New Market, seems to have made no official report of the battle. In after years he described the conduct of his commands with emphasis and repetition, but his accounts show the inevitable inconsistency which results from fading recollection and lapse of time. There is no doubt, however, that he was unwilling to allow the claims made by the men of the 26th, and ascribed the success on the Confederate left to the gallantry and persistence of the 51st. In 1906 he declared that when the Confederates drove back the Federal right wing, one gun was captured by Company B of the 51st, another by the 51st and the 26th together, and two by the Cadets. "Cap-

tain Tate was shot by my side, just after we had captured the battery on the extreme right. I had just directed him to order his men to fire to the right oblique to strike the enemy in flank. As he turned to give the order he was pierced by the fatal ball, and fell at my feet.”¹²

Colonel Forsberg, commander of the 51st, was, at the time of the battle, sick in Lynchburg. His accounts, therefore, have not the value of original information. Almost immediately, however, the news reached him. A day or so after the battle he wrote as follows: “On May 15 occurred the battle of New Market. General Breckinridge defeated and routed forces under General Sigel. The conduct of my regiment under Lieutenant-Colonel Wolfe, in this engagement, *was highly complimented*. The casualties were 103 killed and wounded, among which we mourn the loss of Captain William H. Tate, a gallant officer and one of my most intimate friends.”¹³

That the 26th did not advance through the 51st, that the 51st took a leading part in the attack upon Sigel’s position, and that the 51st captured the guns on the Federal right, have been asserted by members of the regiment with force and earnestness.

“General Wharton, who had gone to the left of the regiment at the time of the final charge . . . directed Captain Tate to fire right oblique towards the battery. Just at this moment Captain Tate fell, and the General commanded, ‘Company B, right oblique, fire.’ The charge was now general along the whole line of the regiment. The center of the

¹² MS. letter of General G. C. Wharton to G. W. Dunford, March 26, 1906.

¹³ Colonel Forsberg, MS. Memoranda, no date, but the following entry is under May 18.

regiment fired left oblique. In less than five minutes the battery was ours. I was at the center of the regiment with Company A, on the right of the flag. You will observe that this battery was between the center and the left of the 51st. I passed within thirty yards of the battery without stopping, urging the men forward. The men on the left passed right through the smoking battery without halting.”¹⁴

“The enemy at the pike or west of it in three or four columns, one supporting the other, charged our center. . . . Here with a simultaneous action there appeared to be disorder in our ranks, the men breaking out and pushing forward with a deep, long drawn out Confederate yell . . . we . . . had covered half the distance to the enemy’s guns, and about fifty yards from their front, when my left leg was paralyzed. A ball had struck me just above the knee. From this point I could see the whole of the enemy’s force in the action, and could see the whole of our line, which but a moment before had seemed to sway in the center as a rope in the wind. It had now righted itself, and was moving forward in perfect order, and the enemy were moving back stubbornly but in disorder.”¹⁵

“I did not so much as see Edgar’s Battalion, and I know they did not run over us. . . . Just at the time the enemy began to retreat your brother, William H. Tate, was shot by a canister shot from the artillery we were charging, and fell on my left foot. I picked him up and carried him to the rear where several men took charge of him, and I followed the retreating enemy”¹⁶ . . .

¹⁴ MS. letter of R. E. Wolfe (51st Regiment) to C. B. Tate, June 7, 1911.

¹⁵ MS. Reminiscences of G. W. Dunford (51st Regiment).

¹⁶ MS. letter of G. S. Bralley (51st Regiment) to C. B. Tate, Jan. 28, 1911.

"I know that Edgar's Battalion was not, nor were any other troops, on our left until after we had charged and taken the battery. . . . I state that the 51st Virginia Regiment captured that battery. General Wharton says so, Colonel Forsberg says so, and a number of the company yet living, who took part in the battle, know positively that we did capture the battery. Any statement to the contrary, I care not by whom it is made, is absolutely false." In November, 1864, the writer visited General Breckinridge. "We talked quite a while of all the battles fought in the Valley during the summer. He had a great deal to say about the battle of New Market, and the part that the Cadets took in it, and was loud in his praise of Wharton's Brigade and the 51st Virginia Regiment, and made special mention of the battery that we captured."¹⁷

"We were confronted by the 34th Massachusetts Regiment, and we captured Colonel Lincoln's horse, and also two pieces of artillery. The battery was a very little to my left. We were within about 200 yards of it when they abandoned two pieces and passed out with the rest. It has been said that Edgar's Battalion ran over the 51st in that battle, but the man who says that was not there."¹⁸

"The regiment (51st) then made a charge with the old rebel yell. There were certainly no troops before us. We charged forward, but before we got to them, they broke ranks and left their cannon, and were running in disorder."¹⁹

"I question if Edgar's Battalion fired one shot until the battery was driven from the bluff."²⁰

¹⁷ MS. statement of Samuel Stone (51st Regiment).

¹⁸ MS. letter of F. M. Lindamood (51st Regiment) to B. A. Colonna, May 28, 1911.

¹⁹ MS. statement of W. E. Wampler (51st Regiment).

²⁰ MS. letter of D. H. Sayers (51st Regiment) to C. B. Tate, April 3, 1911.

In comment it may be said that an examination of all the evidence here presented leads to the conclusion that Edgar's case is far stronger than that of the 51st. His evidence is greater in volume, more logical and convincing, and possesses a larger contemporary value. In so far, then, as all of these statements may be considered accurate and made in good faith, and in so far as judgment is to be made from these statements, the judgment should be made in his favor, and in this work the judgment has been so made.

It is very probable, however, that most of these *ex parte* assertions are either consciously or unconsciously exaggerated. The men of the 51st seem to have exalted their steadiness, as Edgar's men have no doubt overrated the importance of their exploits. There is little doubt that the 51st did fall into confusion, and did waver. No stigma should result from this, since the 51st Regiment was sent forward in advance of the remainder of the Confederate left to lead a forlorn hope. It bore the brunt of terrific fighting while Edgar's men were safe behind. The loss of the 51st was more than a hundred; that of the 26th, twenty-four. There seems to be equally little doubt that when the crisis came the men of the 26th did press forward on the extreme left, and flank the Federal army on the river-bluff. But to assert that this battalion could have done such work alone or unaided is as idle as to declare that the Cadets by themselves could have stormed a battery and driven off a regiment. The 26th would have gone forward to destruction if the 51st and the adjoining commands had not pressed Sigel's men in front. As regards the captured artillery, there were reasons why conflicting claims could arise afterwards. To the left of the 51st the 26th captured three guns from Carlin's Battery, to the right the Cadets took one, or possibly two guns from

Von Kleiser. What part the men of the 51st took directly in these exploits cannot now be positively known, though it is the opinion of the author that they participated to some extent directly; but since they bore the brunt of the fight unaided at first, and since after their temporary confusion they rallied and fought well, there can be no doubt that indirectly they did contribute a great deal to the taking of the Federal cannon.


APPENDIX F.

ACCOUNT BY CADET N. B. NOLAND.

"I NOTICED just in front of my company an orchard and a dwelling house, and I think it was about here that the enemy's fire was most destructive to our Battalion. We went through the yard very close to the house, and it seems to me that a short distance beyond this house we were ordered to lie down behind the remnant of a worm-fence, about two rails high. Noticing Shriver, Cadet Captain of C Co., going further to the front, I followed him, and when about 30 yards in front of the line I saw him fall, or, as I supposed at the time, lie down for protection. At that I dropped as flat as I could in a furrow, and with my face close to the ground I could see a clear space next to the earth under the cloud of smoke, and right in front, covered by the smoke like a tarpauling, I could see emerging the felloes and 12 inches of the spokes of what I think may have been the wheel of a Yankee gun.

"As well as I can make it out, my position was right between the Cadets and the Yankee battery and line of battle. The distance between the fence-row occupied by the Cadets and the Yankee front could not have been more than 200 yards.

"The fire was furious at this time. It seemed to me I saw pieces of paper caught up and swept towards us by the currents of air set in motion by the projectiles, and the boughs of a large tree immediately in my front were all stretched out and swaying towards us. I believed I was bound to get killed, but I did not want to get killed out of ranks, so I made a



THE BUSHONG ORCHARD, THROUGH WHICH THE
CADETS ADVANCED, AND WHERE THEY SUFFERED
THEIR SEVEREST LOSSES.

spurt back to the line and scuttled in behind 2 rails alongside of some fellows.

"Whilst lying here with the air literally filled with Yankee missiles, each one of which seemed to miss me only by a scant sixteenth of an inch, I noticed the Color Sergeant of a body of troops on our left and rear, jump up, and along with the Color Guard run to the front and establish himself upon the prolongation of our line.

"In a second a number of his regiment were running to the front and grouping themselves around him. I saw them falling like jackstraws, on their backs, faces, sides and knees. Then the flag, which had been perfectly erect in the centre of the group, dipped almost to the ground, but some one had it up again in a moment. Then the regiment arose with a yell and rushed into line.

"Just then some fellow jumped up right near me, and by his voice I knew him to be Evans, our Color Sergeant. He sang out in a powerful, clear voice: 'Captain Wise, take command! Col. Shipp has fallen!' In the same second I saw Captain H. A. Wise spring to the front with drawn sword (as did Captains Preston and Robinson) and give the order to rise—then, *I think*, charge."¹

¹ Letter of N. B. Noland (C) to Charles Read, Esq., Oct. 18, 1895. MS. in possession of Henry A. Wise.

APPENDIX G.

THE ALUMNOS OF THE COLEGIO MILITAR.

THE conduct of the Cadets at New Market is to some extent paralleled by that of the Cadets of the Mexican Military Academy when the American troops stormed Chapultepec, September 13, 1847. Like the Southern lads seventeen years later these Mexican youths fought side by side with the older troops and made a desperate resistance to the enemy. "Una vez los asaltantes dentro del recinto, eran dueños de la mayor parte del Colegio Militar: los alumnos, reunidos con algunos soldados, ocuparon el jardín que queda sobre el mirador y allí hicieron una resistencia tenaz y vigorosa, que admiró el enemigo, aunque tuviesen al fin que sucumbir." "Murieron . . . varios alumnos."¹

"The castle was completely torn to pieces; nearly every part was riddled by our shot, while the pavements and fortifications were completely torn up by the shells. In it were crowds of prisoners of every rank and color; among whom were . . . about a hundred cadets of the Mexican military academy. The latter were pretty little fellows, from ten to sixteen years of age. Several of them were killed fighting like demons, and indeed they showed an example of courage worthy of imitation by some of their superiors in rank."²

¹ Manuel Balbontin, *La Invasión Americana, 1846 á 1848. Apuntes del Subteniente de Artillería*, Mexico, 1883, p. 131.

² Letter in *New York Courier and Enquirer*, quoted in E. D. Mansfield, *The Mexican War*, 298, 299. Cf. Don Jose María Roa Bárcena, *Recuerdos de la Invasión Norte-Americana, 1846-1848 por un Joven de En-*

tónces, Mexico, 1883, p. 483. According to the last author the "Asociación del Colegio Militar" celebrates the event every year, while a monument has been erected in commemoration. Cf. also *Apuntes para la Historia de la Guerra entre México y los Estados-Unidos*, Mexico, 1848, pp. 315, 316.

APPENDIX H.

THE CADETS AND THE CAPTURE OF THE CANNON.

THE question as to the part taken by the Cadets in the capture of the Federal cannon will probably never be answered to the satisfaction of all. The only thing known with certainty is that five guns were taken by the Confederates, and there is a possibility that six were captured.¹ Two pieces were captured on the Federal right during the battle, and one was afterwards found abandoned in a pond. One piece is said to have been abandoned on the Federal left, and another was discarded on the field during the last part of the retreat. This would make the five guns which Sigel declares he lost. But if these statements are correct, it would seem that six cannon must have been taken. The Cadets captured one gun beyond any doubt, and there has been a very persistent tradition that it was taken from Von Kleiser's Battery.² This battery was certainly never by the river-bluffs where the three cannon were taken, and while it was for a while undoubtedly on the Fed-

¹ I make this assertion with the weight of the testimony against me, basing it upon an analysis of the evidence. See above, p. 71.

² The following statement is one among many similar ones which have been made: "In executing this advance the right of the Cadets marched directly towards Kleiser's Battery, and from the beginning of the advance to the time we passed this battery there were no Confederate troops in front of us, and Kleiser's Battery did not cease firing and abandon their guns until we were within a few yards of them. In passing the battery I went between the guns." MS. letter of R. H. Cousins (C) to Henry A. Wise, May 12, 1909. Mr. Cousins says he talked with a number of men from Von Kleiser's Battery, and that they agreed in ascribing their defeat to the Cadets.

eral left, the Cadets were not there when they made their capture. Moreover, many have believed that the Cadets captured several guns or a battery. The problem, then, may be divided into two parts: first, how many cannon were taken by the Cadets; if only one, why have so many of them believed that they captured several? second, from what battery was the capture made?

The taking of a gun by the Cadets is established by very circumstantial testimony. Not only are there numerous statements by Cadets which declare that the guns of a battery were firing while they made their charge, but some assert that the guns were discharged up to the last moment, and that the gunners were driven off after hand to hand fighting.

"The veterans made better time than we did, so that by the time we reached the battery the line was fairly rectified, though the men were all somewhat scattered, the stronger ones being in advance. As I passed between two of the guns one of them was fired for the last time. The artillerymen fought well, none could have done better. There were smooth faced boy Cadets and hardy veterans of many battles in at the death, all shaking hands, all happy, all muddy, and all tired." ³

"When we reached the edge of the wheat-field through which we charged the Federal battery, the said battery and a regiment of infantry, the 34th Massachusetts, were there, and there was nothing between us but the wheat about knee high. They stayed there until we were nearly on them with the bayonet. The infantry broke and retired, and the gunners of the battery fought us with their sponge-staffs and hand-spikes, until compelled to give up the guns." ⁴ . . .

³ MS. letter of B. A. Colonna (C) to Henry A. Wise, April 14, 1909.

⁴ MS. letter of Hugh W. Fry (C) to Henry A. Wise, May 23, 1909.

"That they fought us gallantly is well known to me, for I saw their guns and fired at the gunners." "From this position the Corps arose, charged, captured the battery, and, pressing on, drove their infantry from the cedar thicket. . . . The troops on our left rendered splendid assistance in the capture of the battery after they had rallied to our support, but if any other command took these guns it must have been some time later, for when we passed they were too hot to handle."⁵

"The battery which we captured, was, as you and every one of the Corps knows, worked until we were almost on it."⁶

This assertion that the Cadets took a battery or several guns is substantiated by other participants.

"After lying a while the command was given to rise and charge, and it was in this charge, amidst a galling fire, that the four pieces of artillery were taken."⁷ . . .

"Shortly after Shipp stepped to the rear of the Battalion, and gave order to fire, he was struck by what I believe was a spent ball, and then he gave the order, 'Rally on the 62d!' (I think it was the 62d.) Unless I am very much at fault, at that time the Cadets were well in advance of any portion of the Confederate line, and to have rallied on any body of troops not in line with us would have meant to retreat, and this would have meant defeat. I was only a few files from Evans, who carried the flag, and I distinctly recall that he waved the flag about him and said words to this effect: 'Rally around this, boys!' You then, as Senior Captain, as I always thought, reformed the line, and the charge was resumed, and was not discontinued until the battery had been captured, and, indeed.

⁵ D. G. Mohler (C), MS. Recollections of the Battle of New Market.

⁶ MS. letter of J. J. A. Powell (C) to Henry A. Wise, May 17, 1909.

⁷ MS. letter of Lawrence Royster (C) to Henry A. Wise, June 12, 1895.

as I thought, until some little time after we passed the spot which the battery occupied.”⁸

“My recollection is very distinct, that the Cadets passed Wharton’s Brigade, and had to lie down along the worm of an old fence on the level ground, and that at this time the Federal ranks were unbroken. I remember while in this position that the rattle of the musketry and roar of cannon made such a noise that I could hear nothing else, so I raised up to see what was going on, and a perfect sheet of lead bullets were whistling over my head. One of our officers called out to lie down, or I would get my head shot off. After a while we were ordered to rise and advance. It was then that the Federal lines gave way, and we could see their blue backs in waving lines retreat before us. While we were lying down and after we began advancing, the battery which we soon captured was pouring grape and canister into us.”⁹ . . .

“After several unsuccessful attempts to dislodge that battery . . . the Cadets were called upon to make a final charge, *which they did without a break*, and drove the Federals from their guns and started them on a hurried retreat.”¹⁰

“We found ourselves just in front of a battery. . . . After a few moments we rose and charged, downing the battery”¹¹ . . .

“It may be that we did pass over some ground that the 62d had traversed in the first formation of the line, as you know we were held in reserve just behind that line, for a short while, but when General Breckinridge found it necessary to

⁸ MS letter of R. B. Tunstall (C) to Henry A. Wise, March 16, 1909.

⁹ MS. letter of E. M. Tutwiler (C) to Henry A. Wise, April 29, 1909.

¹⁰ MS. letter of C. M. Etheredge (C) to Henry A. Wise, April 30, 1909.

¹¹ MS. letter of George W. Gretter (C) to Henry A. Wise, May 3, 1909.

lengthen his line, . . . it took its place in the general engagement, and was certainly in front of the enemy receiving their fire; and we drove them from their guns." ¹²

"The Cadet Corps got up and charged, and captured some of the guns in their front. There were no troops at any time in front of the Cadets; except in the beginning of the fight." ¹³

"I do not remember to have seen any troops between us and the enemy, but we charged up and captured the battery." ¹⁴

In view of the abundance of this testimony it must be said that making all allowance for error in detail, unintentional exaggeration, and lapse of memory, it is evident that something occurred which made many of the Cadets believe that they had captured several guns.

It is very probable, that the only place where a group of guns was captured was near the river bluffs on the extreme Federal right. Edgar asserts specifically that his men captured these cannon as a result of their successful movement around the Federal right flank. His statements are so positive and so well supported that they have been accepted in this volume, though it is probable that shortly after Edgar's triumph the men of the 51st Regiment took part in the fighting nearby in such a manner as to make them believe that they had captured the guns themselves. Similarly it may be that the explanation of the assertions made by the Cadets that they captured a number of guns lies in the fact that they also along with the 51st Regiment had a part in driving the Federal troops away from Sigel's extreme right. In the confu-

¹² MS. letter of W. H. Spiller (C) to Henry A. Wise, May 10, 1909.

¹³ MS. letter of W. J. Harrison (C) to Henry A. Wise, May 26, 1909.

¹⁴ MS. letter of Robert E. Waller (C) to Henry A. Wise, May 26, 1909.

sion and the *melée* they may have come directly up to the guns which the 26th Battalion had forced Carlin to abandon, and so thought that they solely were responsible for the capture. This might well have taken place since their line of march brought them near to the place where Carlin and Snow had been stationed.

Such a theory was advanced in 1908 by Colonel George H. Smith of the 62d Virginia, who believed that the Cadets might have captured guns on the Federal right after the gunners had been driven away by other Confederate commands which had passed over the ground previously.

"The Cadet Corps and the right of the 51st Regiment were much cut up by the heavy fire to which they had been subjected. Neither of them formed on our left when we advanced with Echols' Brigade, but they both promptly followed the movement; and as the line of their march would pass over the position of the left of the enemy's artillery, it may be said they captured the guns left on the field by them. But this was after the enemy had been put to rout, and the 62d and 22d had passed beyond the position that had been occupied by them."¹⁵

This hypothesis, which is incorrect in part,¹⁶ immediately called forth indignant protests from the Cadets who had taken part in the capture of the guns from Von Kleiser, and who could remember hand to hand fighting with artillerymen and the seizure of a smoking cannon.

Nevertheless it is probable that this explanation is at least partly true. It is not true in the sense that the Cadets marched behind some other command, and so took no active part in the

¹⁵ *Confederate Veteran*, XVI, 571.

¹⁶ The Cadets certainly took part in the general forward movement of the Confederate line, of which they were a part, if they did not themselves begin the charge. See above, p. 84.

fighting. Their heavy losses would be sufficient to disprove this at once; and no doubt the statement was not so intended. It is probably true, however, in the sense that the guns of Carlin's Battery were abandoned before the Cadets got that far, because of the attack of Edgar and the 51st to their left, and of the 62d and 22d to their right. It seems, indeed, that these guns were not captured as a result of a charge upon them in action, or of a hand to hand conflict with the gunners, but because the position of the batteries had become untenable by reason of the advance of the whole Confederate line. In withdrawing, three of the guns had to be abandoned.¹⁷ The capture of these guns, then, while due most directly to the 26th Battalion, was made possible by the general advance of the Confederate line.

If recourse be had to contemporary accounts the difficulty increases, for there is no story of the Cadets capturing cannon. In a letter written almost immediately after the battle Captain Frank Preston says:

"The enemy's battery, at a distance of 150 yards, poured incessant volleys of canister and grape into us. We still fired, however, and soon the fire became too hot for the Yankee gunners and infantry. The battery limbered up and moved off, and the line of infantry began to retreat. Then, almost at the same time, Wise and myself (I am telling only what I saw), rose up and called to the Cadets to push on, and the color-bearer advanced to the front with the colors, almost the

¹⁷ "I therefore reluctantly gave orders to Captain Carlin . . . to withdraw his pieces . . . As some of the horses of two pieces had been killed, the guns were abandoned . . . During the retreat, and while the artillery were crossing a creek, another piece had to be abandoned, the horses being unable to bring it along." Sigel, "Sigel in the Shenandoah Valley," *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, IV, 489, 490.



THE WHEAT-FIELD BETWEEN THE BUSHONG ORCHARD AND THE SECOND OR PRINCIPAL LINE ON BUSHONG'S HILL. THE FEDERAL LINE EXTENDED FROM WEST TO EAST ACROSS THIS FIELD, THE RIGHT WING RESTING ON THE EDGE OF THE CLIFF LEADING DOWN TO THE SHENANDOAH RIVER. IN THE PICTURE THIS CLIFF IS MARKED BY THE TREES

IN THE BACKGROUND. THE BATTERIES OF CAR-LIN AND SNOW WERE POSTED NEAR THE THREE SMALL TREES STANDING APART. THE CONFEDERATE LINE EXTENDED FROM EAST TO WEST ALONG A FENCE RUNNING PARALLEL WITH, AND IMMEDIATELY IN REAR OF THE BOTTOM LINE OF THE PICTURE.

whole battalion rushing forward, and though the company organizations were gone, yet they rallied round the colors and formed some sort of a line, as we advanced. As we pursued the 34th Massachusetts, we saw the 12th Virginia (Yankees) in the cedars, on the right, pressing hard upon the 62d and Derrick's Battalion. I ran to the color-bearer and called his attention to it, and we started down on the right flank of this regiment, forming as we went. We had not gone far, nor fired much, before the regiment broke and ran. Then everything was forgotten but the excitement of pursuit. We ran after them in not much better order, but in far better spirits, firing as we ran. The Cadets captured from 60 to 100 prisoners. One of my company, Faulkner, took 23 to the rear. We pursued the enemy about half a mile"¹⁸ . . .

The official report made by Lieutenant-Colonel Scott Shipp, in command of the Corps, July 4, 1864, is equally silent as to this affair. "Our line took a position behind a line of fence. A brisk fusillade ensued; a shout, a rush, and the day was won. The enemy fled in confusion, leaving killed, wounded, artillery, and prisoners in our hands. Our men pursued in hot haste until it became necessary to halt, draw ammunition, and re-establish the lines for the purpose of driving them from their last position on Rude's Hill, which they held with cavalry and artillery to cover the passage of the river, about a mile in their rear. Our troops charged and took the position without loss. The enemy withdrew, crossed the river, and burnt the bridge."¹⁹

Recently some of the Cadets, after careful comparison of

¹⁸ Letter of Captain Frank Preston, May, 19, 1864, in *Lexington Gazette*, May 25, 1864.

¹⁹ *War Records*, ser. I, vol. XXXVII, part I, 91.

what they recollect, have come to the conclusion that they did not charge a battery firing into them.²⁰

Because of the silence of the contemporary accounts it is not possible to draw from the conflicting evidence and various statements conclusions which can be regarded as undoubtedly correct. Nevertheless it is probable that the explanation is approximately as follows:

1. The line of the Cadets extended some distance. Some took part in what others did not do and of which they did not at the time know. Hence the different accounts which have been written by Cadets.

2. As a direct result of their charge and as a result of hand to hand fighting some of the Cadets captured one cannon, from the battery of Von Kleiser. The capture of a cannon as a result of their charge is made certain by detailed statements made by some of the Cadets, and also by the account of Captain Town, a Federal officer who witnessed it. That the cannon was taken from Von Kleiser's Battery is established by the accounts of the Cadets, by the assertion of Captain Town, and by an almost uncontradicted tradition. It is substantiated by the fact that Von Kleiser lost a gun because of the general charge in which the Cadets took part. Finally, while Von Kleiser's Battery was stationed by Sigel at the left end of the infantry line when the afternoon combat began, yet it was forced to withdraw almost immediately when the first line of the Federal army was routed. What disposition Sigel then made he does not say, but Lieutenant-Colonel Lincoln of the 34th Massachusetts Regiment describing the organization of the second Federal line says that Von Kleiser's Battery was on an eminence in the center, a little advanced. The line of

²⁰ Statements to the author.

their march would have brought the Cadets directly to this position.

3. Most of Von Kleiser's guns were limbering up when the charge began, and so escaped. As the Cadets pursued some of them reached the place where Carlin's and Snow's Batteries had been posted, and from which they had been driven by the 26th Battalion. Here the Cadets came across the three guns which Carlin had been forced to leave behind.

4. In after times accounts of these several episodes were blended together into one story, and so took the impossible form that the Cadets had captured a battery or several guns from Von Kleiser's Battery.

A statement made by Lieutenant-Colonel Shipp is in some respects very near the truth. "The whole line advanced, defeating your column of attack, and the victory was won. You abandoned five guns. . . . I claim, and it is generally admitted, that the Cadets led in the charge which defeated your column of attack, and in this sense they may be said to have taken the battery, for the capture of the battery was the result of the defeat of the column."²¹

²¹ MS. letter to A. P. Young, April 28, 1873.

APPENDIX I.

FROM THE DIARY OF A FEDERAL SOLDIER.

"MAY 15, 1864. In camp. One mile north of Woodstock, Va. Get up before day, prepare to march. Start south at 6 A. M. March slowly till noon, then as heavy cannonading was heard at front, went faster. Arrived at Mount Jackson about 2 P. M. Start fires to make coffee, long roll sounds, fall in and start for the front. Arrive there and take part in the battle at 3 P. M. Engagement very hot. Stood our ground till all other regiments and batteries had left. Then as we were being outflanked, left in disorder. Made several stands on the way back to the Shenandoah bridge which we crossed over and burned about dark. Company D lost 3 killed and 10 wounded. Regiment lost 32 killed, 101 wounded, missing 41; total, 174. After dark start north. March all night and arrive at Woodstock a little after daylight on the 16th. Weather wet. Rain all day the 15th. Roads muddy. Everyone tired, wet, and hungry." ¹

¹ MS. Diary of George W. Gazeby (Second Lieutenant, Company D, 54th Pennsylvania Regiment). In possession of the writer, New Castle, Pennsylvania.

APPENDIX J.

ROSTER OF THE CADET BATTALION.

FOR a generation after the contest at New Market it was impossible to ascertain the names of all the Cadets who were present on the battle-field, owing to the destruction of the official records upon which a list should have been based. Accordingly the various rosters which were printed from time to time were confessedly inaccurate and incomplete.

About 1903, when plans were being made to erect at Lexington a monument to the "New Market Corps of Cadets," the question arose as to what names should be inscribed upon the pedestal. Searching investigations were then undertaken by a committee of the alumni of the Virginia Military Institute acting jointly with the superintendent. After some consideration it was decided that the list to be drawn up should contain the names of all the Cadets who were on roll at the Institute on May 11, the day upon which the march to New Market began. This would, to be sure, include the names of a few who were left behind on guard duty at the Institute, but it was felt that they had been subjected to an unavoidable hardship by the orders of their superiors, and that under the circumstances standing guard at Lexington entitled them to share the honors which had been won by their comrades on the battlefield. After arduous and difficult toil the list was completed, and may now be regarded as the final and official roster of the New Market Battalion of Cadets.

The total number thus ascertained is 295, including field and staff and artillery detachment and musicians. Deducting

the three musicians, two of the staff on guard duty in the rear, nine Cadets at the Institute, one away on furlough, and one absent on surgeon's certificate, there remain 279, which number may be taken as approximately the fighting strength of the Battalion.¹ Of these, thirty, with the artillery, were separated from the main body, so that 249, at the highest, was probably the force which fought under Lieutenant-Colonel Shipp.²

ROSTER OF THE CADET BATTALION, MAY 11, 1864.

FIELD AND STAFF.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SCOTT SHIPP, *Commanding*.
COLONEL R. L. MADISON, *Surgeon*.
CAPTAIN GEORGE ROSS, *Assistant-Surgeon*.
CAPTAIN J. C. WHITWELL, *Commissary and Quarter-Master*.
CADET LIEUTENANT CARY WESTON, *Adjutant*.
CADET LIEUTENANT J. W. WYATT, *Quarter-Master*.

NON-COMMISSIONED STAFF.

CADET SERGEANT J. E. WOODBRIDGE, *Sergeant-Major*.
CADET SERGEANT O. P. EVANS, *Color-Bearer*.
CADET SERGEANT G. A. DAVENPORT, *Quarter-Master Sergeant*.

MUSICIANS.

J. H. CROCKEN, *Fife*.
RICHARD STAPLES, *Kettle Drum*.
JACOB MARKS, *Bass Drum*.

¹ For this information, as well as for the following lists, I am indebted to Mr. Joseph R. Anderson, Historiographer of the Virginia Military Institute.

² It has usually been said that the total number of Cadets at New Market was about 250. Some writers have put it as low as 220.



THE RUINED BARRACKS OF THE VIRGINIA MILITARY INSTITUTE, BURNED BY MAJOR-GENERAL DAVID HUNTER, JUNE 12, 1864.

COMPANY A.

Henry A. Wise, *Senior Tactical Officer and Captain Commanding.*
C. H. Minge, *Cadet Captain.*
W. C. Hardy, *Cadet First Lieutenant.*
W. A. Morson, *Cadet Second Lieutenant.*
E. M. Ross, *Cadet First Sergeant.*
W. B. Shaw, *Cadet Second Sergeant.*
W. T. Duncan, *Cadet Third Sergeant.*
J. T. Douglas, *Cadet Fourth Sergeant.*
Hunter Wood, *Cadet Fifth Sergeant.*
Lawrence Royster, *Cadet First Corporal.*
G. K. Macon, *Cadet Second Corporal.*
R. L. Brockenbrough, *Cadet Third Corporal.*
S. F. Atwill, *Cadet Fourth Corporal.*

PRIVATES.

Adams, R. A.,	Mallory, E. S.,
Allen, Donald,	Mead, H. J.,
Anderson, C. J.,	Mohler, D. G.,
Ashley, C. G.,	Morgan, P. H.,
Bagnall, J. S.,	Page, F. W.,
Binford, R. J.,	Payne, A. S.,
Bowen, H. C.,	Pendleton, R. A.,
Buster, W. D.,	Raum, G. E.,
Butler, W. H.,	Seaborn, G. A.,
Carmichael, John,	Skaggs, S. B.,
Cocke, P. St. G.,	Smith, E. H.,
Corling, C. T.,	Smith, Jr., F. L.,
Cousins, R. H.,	Spiller, George,
Davis, J. A.,	Spiller, W. H.,
Garrett, H. W.,	Temple, P. C.,
Goodykoontz, A. E.,	Thomson, A. P.,
Harrison, C. H.,	Watson, W. P.,
Hayes, W. C.,	White, T. W.,
Hidden, P. B.,	White, W. H.,
Hill, J. M.,	Wimbish, L. W.,
Howard, J. C.,	Wingfield, S. G.,
Hubard, W. J.,	Wood, H. T.,
James, F. W.,	Wood, P. S.,
Larrick, J. S.,	Wood, W. M.,
Lewis, W. L.,	Woodruff, Z. T.,
McVeigh, Newton,	Yarbrough, W. T.

COMPANY B.

Frank Preston, *Tactical Officer and Captain Commanding.*

Carlton Shafer, *Cadet Captain.*

G. W. Gretter, *Cadet First Lieutenant.*

Levi Welch, *Cadet Second Lieutenant.*

A. Pizzini, Jr., *Cadet First Sergeant.*

H. W. Garrow, *Cadet Third * Sergeant.*

W. M. Patton, *Cadet Fourth Sergeant.*

T. G. Hayes, *Cadet First Corporal.*

J. B. Jarratt, *Cadet Second Corporal.*

Patrick Henry, *Cadet Third Corporal.*

B. W. Barton, *Cadet Fourth Corporal.*

PRIVATES.

Bayard, N. J.,

Bennett, W. G.,

Bowen, W. B.,

Bransford, J. F.,

Cabell, R. G.,

Carmichael, W. S.,

Christian, E. D.,

Clarkson, J. H.,

Cocke, J. L.,

Cocke, W. R. C.,

Crank, J. T.,

Cullen, Simon,

Darden, J. D.,

Dillard, J. L.,

Faulkner, C. J.,

Garrett, V. F.,

Gibson, F. G.,

Grasty, W. C.,

Hankins, M. O.,

Happer, R. W. B.,

Harris, W. O.,

Hartsfield, A. C.,

Hawks, A. W.,

Haynes, L. C.,

Hundley, C. B.,

Hupp, R. C.,

Jefferson, T. G.,

Johnson, Porter,

Jones, T. W.,

Kemp, Wyndham,

Lee, G. T.,

Leftwich, A. H.,

Lewis, N. C.,

McCorkle, J. W.,

McDowell, W. H.,

Mason, S. B.,

Patton, J. R.,

Penn, J. G.,

Perry, W. E. S.,

Phillips, S. T.,

Powell, J. J. A.,

Preston, J. B.,

Preston, T. W.,

Redwood, W. F.,

Richeson, J. D.,

Roane, John,

* The Second Sergeant of this company was O. P. Evans, who was the Color-Bearer at New Market in place of Color-Sergeant W. B. Shaw, absent on surgeon's certificate.

Stacker, Clay,	Veitch, Wilberforce,
Stanard, J. B.,	Walker, C. P.,
Tabb, John,	Washington, Lloyd,
Tackett, J. F.,	Wesson, C. M.,
Tardy, A. H.,	Wharton, J. E.,
Taylor, J. E.,	White, J. S.,
Tunstall, R. B.,	Whitehead, H. C.,
Turner, E. L.,	Wilson, R. G.,
Woodlief, P. W.	

COMPANY C.

A. Govan Hill, <i>Tactical Officer and Captain Commanding.</i>
S. S. Shriver, <i>Cadet Captain.</i>
T. D. Davis, <i>Cadet First Lieutenant.</i>
A. Boggess, <i>Cadet Second Lieutenant.</i>
J. A. Stuart, <i>Cadet First Sergeant.</i>
L. C. Wise, <i>Cadet Second Sergeant.</i>
A. F. Redd, <i>Cadet Third Sergeant.</i>
W. B. Martin, <i>Cadet Fourth Sergeant.</i>
H. H. Dinwiddie, <i>Cadet First Corporal.</i>
J. E. Wood, <i>Cadet Second Corporal.</i>
J. G. James, <i>Cadet Third Corporal.</i>
R. Ridley, <i>Cadet Fourth Corporal.</i>

PRIVATES.

Adams, S. B.,	Goodwin, J. H.,
Blankman, J. S.,	Harrison, W. L.,
Blundon, R. M.,	Jones, W. S.,
Booth, S. W.,	Lamb, W. K.,
Buffington, E. S.,	Langhorne, M. D.,
Chalmers, W. M.,	Lee, R. F.,
Crawford, W. B.,	McGavock, J. W.,
Crichton, J. A.,	Martin, T. S.,
Davis, A. J.,	Maury, Reuben,
Davis, L. S.,	Merritt, J. L.,
Dunn, J. R.,	Minor, J. H.,
Early J. C.,	Mitchell, S. T.,
Ezekiel, M. J.,	Morson, A. A.,
Fry, H. W.,	Morson, J. B.,
Fulton, C. M.,	Noland, N. B.,
Goode, H. L.,	Overton, A. W.,

Page, P. N.,	Tate, C. B.,
Pendleton, W. W.,	Taylor, B. D.,
Price, F. B.,	Taylor, Carrington,
Randolph, C. C.,	Taylor, W. C.,
Read, C. H.,	Thompson, K.,
Ricketts, L. C.,	Tomes, F. J.,
Roller, P. W.,	Toms, A. C.,
Rose, G. M.,	Turner, C. W.,
Rutherford, T. M.,	Upshur, J. N.,
Shields, J. H.,	Walker, C. D.,
Shriver, T. H.,	Waller, R. E.,
Slaughter, W. L.,	Walton, N. T.,
Smith, C. H.,	Wheelwright, J. C.,
Smith, W. T.,	Wilson, D. C. B.

COMPANY D.

Thomas B. Robinson, *Tactical Officer and Captain Commanding.*
 B. A. Colonna, *Cadet Captain.*
 J. F. Hanna, *Cadet First Lieutenant.*
 F. W. Claybrook, *Cadet Second Lieutenant.*
 W. H. Cabell, *Cadet First Sergeant.*
 William Nelson, *Cadet Second Sergeant.*
 J. R. Echols, *Cadet Third Sergeant.*
 C. M. Etheredge, *Cadet Fourth Sergeant.*
 O. A. Glazebrook, *Cadet First Corporal.*
 Alfred Marshall, *Cadet Second Corporal.*
 John S. Wise, *Cadet Third Corporal.*
 J. R. Triplett, *Cadet Fourth Corporal.*

PRIVATES.

Akers, R. C.,	Coleman, J. J.,
Alexander, W. K.,	Corbin, J. P.,
Arbuckle, A. A.,	Crenshaw, S. D.,
Barney, W. H.,	Crews, B. S.,
Baylor, J. B.,	Crockett, C. G.,
Beattie, W. F.,	Crockett, H. S.,
Berkeley, Edmund,	Dickinson, J. I.,
Brown, J. A.,	Dillard, William,
Clark, G. B.,	Eubank, W. M.,
Clendinen, T. R.,	Garnett, G. T.,
Cocke, Preston,	Gray, J. B.,

Hamlin, E. L.,	Marshall, Martin,
Hannah, J. S.,	Moorman, E. S.,
Harvie, J. B.,	Nalle, G. B. W.,
Harvie, J. S.,	Phelps, T. K.,
Horsley, John,	Peirce, D. S.,
Imboden, J. P.,	Radford, W. N.,
Johnson, F. S.,	Reid, J. J.,
Jones, H. J.,	Reveley, G. F.,
Kennedy, W. H.,	Sowers, J. F.,
King, D. P.,	Stuart, Jr., A. H. H.,
Kirk, W. M.,	Tunstall, J. L.,
Knight, E. C.,	Tutwiler, E. M.,
Lee, F. T.,	Venable, W. L.,
Letcher, S. H.,	Ward, G. W.,
Locke, R. N.,	Webb, J. S.,
Lowry, T. S.,	Wellford, C. E.,
Lumsden, W. J.,	White, R. J.,
McClung, T. W.,	Witt, J. E.,
Marks, C. H.,	Wood, M. B.

CASUALTIES.

KILLED.

Cadet W. H. Cabell, Va., 2d Class, 1st Sergeant, D Company.
 Cadet S. F. Atwill, Va., 3d Class, Corporal, A Company.
 Cadet C. G. Crockett, Va., 4th Class, Private, D Company.
 Cadet T. G. Jefferson, Va., 4th Class, Private, B Company.
 Cadet H. J. Jones, Va., 4th Class, Private, D Company.
 Cadet W. H. McDowell, N. C., 4th Class, Private, B Company.
 Cadet J. B. Stanard, Va., 4th Class, Private, B Company.
 Cadet J. C. Wheelwright, Va., 4th Class, Private, C Company.

MORTALLY WOUNDED.

* Cadet L. C. Haynes, Va., 4th Class, Private, B Company.

WOUNDED.

Lieutenant-Colonel Scott Shipp, Commanding Battalion of Cadets.
 Captain A. G. Hill, Tactical Officer, Commanding C Company.

* Died of wounds one month after the battle.

- Cadet S. S. Shriver, Va., 1st Class, Cadet Captain, C Company.
Cadet Andrew Pizzini, Jr., Va., 2d Class, 1st Sergeant, B Company.
Cadet J. A. Stuart, Va., 2d Class, 1st Sergeant, C Company.
Cadet L. C. Wise, Va., 2d Class, Sergeant, C Company.
Cadet H. W. Garrow, Ala., 2d Class, Sergeant, B Company.
Cadet G. K. Macon, Va., 3d Class, Corporal, A Company.
Cadet J. R. Triplett, Va., 3d Class, Corporal, D Company.
Cadet J. S. Wise, Va., 3d Class, Corporal, D Company.
Cadet Edmund Berkeley, Va., 4th Class, Private, D Company.
Cadet J. F. Bransford, Va., 4th Class, Private, B Company.
Cadet W. D. Buster, Va., 3d Class, Private, A Company.
Cadet E. D. Christian, Va., 4th Class, Private, B Company.
Cadet Preston Cocke, Va., 4th Class, Private, D Company.
Cadet C. T. Corling, Va., 4th Class, Private, A Company.
Cadet J. D. Darden, Va., 4th Class, Private, B Company.
Cadet J. I. Dickinson, Va., 4th Class, Private, D Company.
Cadet William Dillard, Va., 4th Class, Private, D Company.
Cadet G. T. Garnett, Va., 4th Class, Private, D Company.
Cadet F. G. Gibson, W. Va., 4th Class, Private, B Company.
Cadet J. H. Goodwin, Va., 4th Class, Private, C Company.
Cadet W. O. Harris, Va., 4th Class, Private, B Company.
Cadet C. H. Harrison, Va., 4th Class, Private, A Company.
Cadet A. C. Hartsfield, N. C., 3d Class, Private, B Company.
Cadet J. C. Howard, Va., 4th Class, Private, A Company.
Cadet J. P. Imboden, Va., 4th Class, Private, D Company.
Cadet Porter Johnson, W. Va., 4th Class, Private, B Company.
Cadet W. S. Jones, Va., 4th Class, Private, C Company.
Cadet Martin Marshall, Miss., 4th Class, Private, D Company.
Cadet H. J. Mead, Va., 3d Class, Private, A Company.
Cadet J. L. Merritt, Va., 4th Class, Private, C Company.
Cadet E. S. Moorman, Va., 4th Class, Private, D Company.
Cadet R. A. Pendleton, Va., 4th Class, Private, A Company.
Cadet S. T. Phillips, Va., 4th Class, Private, B Company.
Cadet D. S. Peirce, Va., 3d Class, Private, D Company.
Cadet C. C. Randolph, Va., 4th Class, Private, C Company.
Cadet C. H. Read, Jr., Va., 4th Class, Private, C Company.
Cadet C. H. Smith, Va., 4th Class, Private, C Company.
Cadet E. H. Smith, Va., 4th Class, Private, A Company.
Cadet F. L. Smith, Jr., Va., 4th Class, Private, A Company.
Cadet George Spiller, Va., 3d Class, Private, A Company.
Cadet J. N. Upshur, Va., 4th Class, Private, C Company.

Cadet C. D. Walker, Va., 4th Class, Private, C Company.
 Cadet W. P. Watson, N. C., 4th Class, Private, A Company.
 Cadet T. W. White, Va., 4th Class, Private, D Company.
 Cadet H. C. Whitehead, Va., 3d Class, Private, B Company.
 Cadet P. W. Woodlief, Jr., La., 4th Class, Private, B Company.

RECAPITULATION.

Killed,	8
Mortally wounded,	1
Wounded,	48
	57
Estimated strength of Battalion at New Market,....	279
Loss in battle,	57
Percentage of loss,	20%

ABBREVIATIONS.

- A.—Author (Edward Raymond Turner).
C.—Cadet of the Virginia Military Institute.
Ca.—Colonna, Benjamin A.
E.—Edgar, Lieutenant-Colonel George M.
W.—Wise, Henry A.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

I.

CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTS.

The following accounts are more authoritative than any others used in the composition of this work, since they follow most closely after the events which they describe. Moreover the official reports were written in most cases by those most qualified to speak. The principal defect is absence of information about details, and, indeed, complete silence on many points essential to an understanding of the battle. Furthermore the official reports represent almost entirely one side, the Federal, and are defective because written too soon. The newspaper accounts must have been based partly upon hearsay and rumor, and so are no better than newspaper descriptions usually are. Accordingly it has been constantly necessary to supplement this contemporary information by later writings, farther removed from the facts related, but more carefully recollected and thought out.

The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Published under the Direction of the Hon. Redfield Proctor, Secretary of War, by Major George B. Davis, U. S. A., Mr. Leslie J. Perry, Mr. Joseph W. Kirkley, Board of Publication. 70 vols. in 128 (found also in House Miscellaneous Documents, 52-56 Congress), Washington, 1880-1891. (Abbreviated: War Records.)

Series I, vol. XXXIII, contains dispatches relative to preparations which culminated in the battle of New Market.

Series I, vol. XXXVII, part I, contains the matter relating to the battle of New Market, and particularly the official reports:

Report of Colonel Jacob M. Campbell, 54th Pennsylvania Infantry, May 18, 1864, pp. 86-87.

Report of Colonel Augustus Moor, 28th Ohio Infantry, May 21, 1864, pp. 79-81.

Report of Major Henry Peale, 18th Connecticut Infantry, May 21, 1864, pp. 81-83.

Report of Colonel George D. Wells, 34th Massachusetts Infantry, May 21, 1864, pp. 82-86.

Unfortunately this collection contains but one report from the Confederate side:

Report of Lieutenant-Colonel Scott Shipp, Cadet Corps, July 4, 1864, pp. 89-91.

There are brief communications from Sigel, p. 76, and from Breckinridge, p. 87, but no extended reports.

A number of accounts written shortly after the battle have been preserved in private collections.

MS. Draft of a Report of the Battle of New Market written by Colonel J. Stoddard Johnston for General Breckinridge, "shortly after the battle." (The only comprehensive report relating to the battle. Colonel Johnston was General Breckinridge's Chief of Staff.)—In possession of Henry A. Wise, Baltimore, Maryland.

MS. Report of Lieutenant-Colonel George M. Edgar, 26th Virginia Battalion, August 8, 1864. (One of the two official reports submitted by Confederate commanders in this battle.)—In possession of Lieutenant-Colonel Edgar, Paris, Kentucky.

MS. letter of Brigadier-General John Echols to Lieutenant-Colonel Scott Shipp, Rude's Hill, May 16, 1864. (Compliments Cadets.)—Copy.—W.

MS. letter of G. A. De Russy, A. A. G., to Lieutenant-Colonel Edgar, May 17, 1864. (Brigadier-General Wharton's thanks to Edgar.)—Edgar.

MS. letter of Micajah Woods (First Lieutenant, Jackson's Battery), to his father, Mount Jackson, May 16, 1864.—J. R. Anderson, Lee, Va.

A number of the Virginia newspapers give accounts of the battle.

Daily Richmond Enquirer, May 17, 18, 19, 1864.

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(Richmond) *Daily Dispatch*, May 17, 19, 20, 21, 1864. ("The Lexington Cadets bore an important part in the contest." May 17, 1864.)

(Richmond) *Sentinel*, May 16, 20 (important detailed account which does not mention part played by Cadets), 21 (compliments Cadets), 25 (says 62d Virginia Regiment captured battery), 1864.

Staunton Spectator, May 17, 1864 (quoted in (Richmond) *Daily Dispatch*, May 20, 1864.)

Richmond Whig, May 17, 18, 20, 23, 1864. (Comments on splendid and efficient conduct of Cadets.)

Lexington Gazette, May 25, 1864. (Contains letter by Captain Frank Preston, Company B, V. M. I. Corps, from New Market, May 19, 1864, to a member of his family in Lexington, Va. One of the most important narratives of the part taken by the Cadets.)—Copy.—W.

(Richmond) *Dispatch*, May 24, 1864. (Report of the proceedings of the Confederate House of Representatives, May 23, 1864.)

(Richmond) *Dispatch*, May 28, 1864, "The Lexington Cadets. Presentation of a Flag."

Journal of the Confederate House of Representatives, first session, second Congress, May 23, 1864.—War Department, Washington.

II.

ACCOUNTS NOT CONTEMPORARY WRITTEN BY OFFICERS COMMANDING AND OTHERS.

The following accounts, which were written some years after the battle, are less valuable in proportion to the lapse of time. For the most part, however, they were composed by eye-witnesses, and in some cases by commanders, who took a leading part in the struggle, and were thus best qualified to

speak. They are inferior to the sources given in Section I, because of the blurring and effacement of things to be remembered, but are superior in wealth of detail and carefulness of construction. They represent the first serious efforts to write comprehensive descriptions of the battle.

Echols, John, Brigadier-General, *Address on the Life and Character of General John C. Breckinridge*, May 15, 1877, New Market, Va. (Eulogistic.)—W.

Edgar, George M., Lieutenant-Colonel, MS. Notes of Comment on the Battle of New Market, Montgomery, Ala., 1911, Paris, Ky., 1911, 1912.—In possession of author.

Edgar, MS. Critical Notes of Comment on the Battle of New Market, Montgomery, Ala., 1911.—Author.

(Colonel Edgar's Notes were written in criticism of an earlier draft of this book. They were always very stimulating and usually very helpful. I have not been able to adopt all of the writer's contentions, and am under the impression that he tends, although not consciously, to overrate the importance of the part taken in the battle by the 26th Battalion. The Critical Notes were accompanied by statements written by officers and men of the command:

Major Richard Woodrum,
Captain E. S. Read, Company B,
Lieutenant G. W. Hines, Company B,
Private W. W. Jones, Company B,
Captain James H. Peck, Company C,
Captain F. C. Burdette, Company D,
Lieutenant J. W. McDowell, Company D,
Lieutenant Thomas H. Kirkpatrick, Company E,
Captain T. C. Morton, Company F,
Lieutenant W. W. George, Company F,
Captain John O. Carr, Company I.)

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Imboden, John D., MS. letter to W., Damascus, Va., June 6, 1895.—W.

Johnston, J. Stoddard, Colonel, MS. The Battle of New Market. (Written by one who was well informed.)—W.

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Walker, William C., *History of the Eighteenth Regiment Connecticut Volunteers in the War for the Union*. By Chaplain Wm. C. Walker. Norwich, Conn., 1885. (At New Market.)

III.

RELATIONS CONCERNING PARTS OF THE BATTLE, FOR THE MOST PART BY OFFICERS AND MEN PARTICIPATING.

The sources cited in this section are marred by the defects characteristic of those just mentioned. Some of the accounts are contemporary, but most of them were written long after the battle, some quite recently. With these limitations, how-

ever, they are excellent, since, being detailed descriptions of parts of the battle, they afford information otherwise not obtainable.

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Bralley, Guy S. (Company B, 51st Virginia Regiment), MS. letter to C. B. Tate, Glade Springs, Va., Jan. 28, 1911.—Ca.

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Edgar, George M., MS. letter to A., Paris, Ky., Dec. 26, 1911.—A.

(The correspondence of Colonel Edgar relates largely to the work of the 26th Battalion, which he commanded. His statements are so well fortified, and so intrinsically probable, that I have accepted them as the chief source in describing this part of the battle. I have not been able to accept entirely his statements about what went on in other parts of the field. His assistance has been of the first importance, however, and this book is materially better because of his co-operation.)

Forsberg, Colonel (51st Virginia Regiment), MS. Memoranda. (On day of battle, ill in hospital in Lynchburg. Wrote shortly after. Knew common rumor, no doubt.)—In possession of Miss Hilda L. Forsberg, Lynchburg, Va.

Gazeby, George W., Lieutenant (Company D, 54th Pennsylvania Regiment), MS. letter to Ca., New Castle, Pa., May 27, 1911. (Graphic description of retreat and pursuit.)—Ca.

Gilbert, A. J. (Company B, 123d Ohio Regiment), MS. letter to Ca., Mansfield, Ohio, Dec. 12, 1910.—Ca.

Gilbert, A. J., to Ca., Dec. 21, 1910.—Ca.

Holt, Charles A., MS. letter to Captain T. C. Morton, Staunton, Va., Feb. 10, 1896.—W.

Humphreys, C. W., "Battle of New Market. Its History and Its Vast Importance . . . Errors of History Writers Corrected." (Richmond) *Times-Dispatch*, Oct., 8, 15, 1905. (One of the ablest accounts yet written, though it is chiefly valuable in connection with the part of the 26th Battalion, in which the author served, and the achievements of which he probably overrates. In other respects the story is marred by a tendency to base conclusions upon opinion and insufficient evidence.)

Humphreys, C. W., "Rev. Dr. Humphreys Replies to Criticism. Rejoinder to Capt. D. H. Bruce on the Battle of New Market." *Confederate Veteran*, XVI, 572-573 (November, 1908.)

Humphreys, C. W., MS. letter to W., Milton, Fla., Feb. 20, 1911.—W.

Humphreys, C. W., MS. letter to A., Milton, Fla., March 6, 1911.—A.

(I have been unable to accept all of the conclusions of Dr. Humphreys, some of which I do not consider to be based upon sufficient evidence. I have been fortunate, however, in having the writer's criticism and co-operation, which have always been suggestive and helpful.)

Imboden, John D., Brigadier-General, MS. letter to Colonel A. Fulkenen, Abingdon, Va., June 21, 1889.—W.

Johnston, J. Stoddard, Adjutant-General, MS. letter to W., Louisville, Ky., April 21, 1895.—W.

Jones, James L., (Snow's Battery), MS. letter to Ca., Rowland Mills, Md., Dec. 4, 1910.—Ca.

Klingaman, J. F., MS. Diary. (Relates incidents just before the battle.)—In possession of J. F. Klingaman, Waterloo, Iowa.

Lang, Theodore F., Major, MS. Personal Recollections of the Battle of New Market, . . . by a member of General Sigel's Staff. No date.—W.

Lincoln, William S., (34th Mass. Regiment), "A Letter from General Lincoln on the Battle of New Market." (Richmond) *State*, April 4, 1888. (Describes the charge of the Cadets.)—Clipping in possession of W.

Lindamood, F. M. (Color Sergeant, 51st Virginia Regiment), MS. letter to Ca., Wytheville, Va., May 28, 1911.—Ca.

McLaughlin, William, Major, MS. letter to W., Lexington, Va., Jan. 27, 1897.—W.

Morton, Howard, "War's Wicked Work." *Pittsburg Dispatch*, Nov. 10, 1895.

Morton, T. C., MS. letter to W., Staunton, Va., Feb. 12, 1896.—W.

Otey, Peter J., Major, MS. letter to Lieut.-Col. Scott Shipp, Lynchburg, Va., April 14, 1873.—W.

Park, Abraham (Company H, 123d Ohio Regiment), MS. letter to Ca., Feb. 16, 1911.—Ca.

Parsons J. W., Captain (Company A, 18th Virginia Cavalry), "Capture of Battery at New Market." *Confederate Veteran*, XVII, 119 (March, 1909.)

Porter, John A., (Company B, 51st Virginia Regiment), MS. letter to C. B. Tate, March 3, 1911.—Ca.

Pratt, G. Julian, Lieutenant (Company H, 18th Virginia Cavalry), MS., letter to Ca., Waynesboro, Va., Nov. 19, 1910.—Ca.

Rand, Noyes, Adjutant (22 Virginia Regiment), MS. letter to Ca., Jan. 5, 1911.—Ca.

Richmond, C. H. (Company B, 18th Connecticut Regiment), MS. letter to Ca., Providence, R. I., Dec. 13, 1910.—Ca.

Sayers, D. H. (Company B, 51st Virginia Regiment), MS. letter to C. B. Tate, Delton, Va., April 3, 1911.—Ca.

Smith, Francis L., Brevet-General, MS. letter to W., Alexandria, Va., March 27, 1909.—W.

Smith, George H., Colonel (62d Virginia Regiment), MS. letter to W., Los Angeles, Cal., March 7, 1896.—W.

Smith, George H., "More of the Battle of New Market." *Confederate Veteran*, XVI, 569-572 (November, 1908).

Smith, George H., MS. letter to W., Los Angeles, Cal., July 6, 1910.—W.

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Taylor, Blair D., Colonel, MS. letter to W., Atlanta, Ga., May 25, 1909.—W.

Thom, William A., Jr., "Battle of New Market. A Fight Unique in the History of War." *Norfolk Virginian*, Sept. 9, 1894.

Town, Franklin E., Captain, "An Eye Witness from the Other Side." *New Market Day*. June 23, 1903. (Letter to an old Cadet of the Virginia Military Institute.)

Waddell, J. N. (Company D, 12th West Virginia Regiment), MS. letter to Ca., Taylorsville, Ill., Nov. 28, 1910.—Ca.

Wharton, Gabriel C., Brigadier-General, MS. letter to Colonel Forsberg, Radford, Va., Nov. 1, 1905. (Disputes Humphrey's contentions, and declares that 51st Virginia Regiment captured guns on Federal right).—Ca.

Wharton, Gabriel C., MS. letter to G. W. Dunford, Radford, Va., March 26, 1906.—Ca.

Wolfe, Robert E. (Wharton's Staff), MS. letter to C. B. Tate, Blountville, Tenn., June 7, 1911.—Ca.

Wolfe, Robert E., MS. letter to Ca., Blountville, Tenn., June 23, 1911.—Ca.

Yutzy, J. C. (Company C, 54th Pennsylvania Regiment), MS. letter to Ca., Falls City, Neb., Feb. 18, 1911.—Ca.

Young, Adolphus Pennington, MS. extract from letter to General Scott Shipp, Newark, N. J., no date.—W.

IV.

ACCOUNTS WRITTEN BY CADETS OF THE VIRGINIA MILITARY INSTITUTE.

These accounts were written for Captain Henry A. Wise when he was completing his collection of material to be used in the composition of this book. Practically every Cadet who could be reached has written all that he could remember about the part taken by his Battalion in the battle. The result is an extraordinary collection, interesting, vivid, detailed, and minute. Extensive use has been made of these accounts, but they have constantly been viewed as subject to the following limitations:

1. Inevitably the Cadets are interested witnesses.
2. Unconsciously they tend to magnify the exploits of their Battalion.
3. The accounts contain many inaccuracies and contradictions caused by the forty or more years intervening between the event described and the writing.

Accordingly no statement contained in these descriptions has been accepted unless supported by some other statement made independently, and has then been subjected to sharp scrutiny.

Anderson, Charles J., MS. letter to W., Richmond, Va., March 28, 1909.—W.

Bagnall, J. S., MS. letter to W., Norfolk, Va., March 22, 1900.—W.

Baylor, J. B., MS. letter to W., Van Buren, Va., June 6, 1909.—W.

Bennett, W. G., MS. letter to W., Weston, W. Va., May 12, 1909.—W.

Berkeley, Edmund, MS. letter to Preston Cocke, Atlanta, Ga., June 1, 1903.—W.

Bowen, H. C., MS. letter to W., Remington, Va., May 5, 1909.—W.

Bransford, J. F., MS. letter to W., Bon Air, Va., June 26, 1895.—W.

Bransford, J. F., MS. letter to W., May 5, 1909.—W.

Clarkson, J. H., MS. letter to W., Chicago, May 15, 1909.—W.

Claybrook, F. W., MS. letter to W., Kilmarnock, Va., April 8, 1909.—W.

Cocke, Preston, MS. letter to Edmund Berkeley, May 26, 1903.—W.

Cocke, Preston, MS. letter to W., Richmond, Va., July 25, 1895.—W.

Cocke, Preston, MS. letter to W., Jan. 6, 1909.—W.

Cocke, Preston, MS. statement as to the movements of the Cadets. Oct. 27, 1910.—W.

Cocke, P. St. G., MS. letter to W., Charlottesville, Va., June 12, 1909.—W.

Colonna, Benjamin A., MS. letter to W., Washington, April 14, 1909.—W.

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Cousins, R. H., MS. letter to W., Austin, Texas, May 12, 1909.—W.

Crockett, C. C., MS. letter to W., Americus, Ga., May 29, 1909.—W.

Davenport, Gideon A., MS. Description of the Battle of New Market, in letter to Preston Cocke, Richmond, Va., Jan. 28, 1895.—W.

Early, J. Cabell, MS. letter to W., Lynchburg, Va., May 30, 1909.—W.

Etheredge, C. M., MS. letter to W., Charlotte, N. C., April 30, 1909.—W.

Faulkner, Charles J., MS. letter to W., Washington, March 30, 1909.—W.

Fry, Hugh W., MS. letter to W., Bonsack, Va., May 23, 1909.—W.

Garrett, V. F., MS. letter to W., Williamsburg, Va., April 26, 1909.—W.

- Gretter, George W., MS. letter to W., Watsonville, Cal., May 3, 1909.—W.
- Harris, W. O., MS. letter to W., Louisville, Ky., April 19, 1909.—W.
- Harrison, Carter H., MS. letter to W., Staunton, Va., May 5, 1909.—W.
- Harrison, W. J., MS. letter to W., Westover, Va., May 26, 1909.—W.
- Harvie, James B., MS. letter to W., Richmond, Va., June 4, 1909.—W.
- Hidden, P. B., MS. letter to W., Washington, May 6, 1909.—W.
- Horseley, John, MS. letter to W., Lexington, Va., April 28, 1909.—W.
- Howard, J. C., MS. letter to W., Ashland, Va., May 10, 1909.—W.
- Hupp, R. C., MS. letter to W., Detroit, Mich., May 30, 1909.—W.
- James, F. W., MS. letter to W., Abilene, Texas, March 29, 1909.—W.
- Johnson, Porter, MS. letter to W., Wheeling, W. Va., June 8, 1909.—W.
- Jones, W. S., MS. letter to W., Abingdon, Va., May 23, 1909.—W.
- Kemp, W., MS. letter to General James A. Goggin, El Paso, Texas, March 25, 1888. (Copy.)—W.
- Kemp, W., MS. letter to W., March 12, 1895.—W.
- Kirk, W. M., MS. letter to W., White Stone, Va., April 27, 1909.—W.
- Lee, George Taylor, MS. letter to W., Johnson City, Tenn., May 15, 1909.—W.
- Letcher, S. H., MS. letter to W., Lexington, Va., May 2, 1909.—W.
- McGavock, J. W., MS. letter to W., Pulaski, Va., May 20, 1909.—W.
- Martin, William Bruce, MS. letter to W., Norfolk, Va., Jan. 5, 1909.—W.
- Mason, S. B., MS. letter to W., New York, May 13, 1909.—W.
- Minge, C. H., MS. letter to W., Mississippi City, April 24, 1909.—W.
- Mohler, D. G., MS. Recollections of the Battle of New Market, 1909.—W.
- Morgan, P. H., MS. letter to W., Shawboro, N. C., May 5, 1909.—W.
- Nalle, G. B. W., MS. letter to W., Culpeper, Va., June 15, 1909.—W.
- Noland, N. B., MS. letter to Charles Read, Offley, Va., Oct. 18, 1895.—W.
- Noland, N. B., MS. letter to W., Beaver Dam, Va., May 24, 1909.—W.
- Noland, N. B., MS. letter to W., May 31, 1909.—W.
- Overton, A. W., MS. letter to W., Frankfort, Ky., April 26, 1909.—W.
- Patton, W. M., MS. letter to W., Chicago, June 10, 1895.—W.
- Payne, A. S., MS. letter to W., Lynchburg, Va., May 17, 1909.—W.
- Pizzini, Andrew, Jr., MS. letter to W., Richmond, Va., March 30, 1909.—W.
- Powell, John A., MS. letter to W., Wytheville, Va., May 17, 1909.—W.

- Preston, T. W., MS. letter to W., Vicksburg, Miss., May 11, 1909.—W.
- Ridley, R., MS. letter to W., Portsmouth, Va., May 10, 1909.—W.
- Ross, Erskine M., MS. letter to W., Los Angeles, Cal., March 23, 1896.—W.
- Ross, Erskine M., MS. letter to W., March 29, 1909.—W.
- Ross, George (Ex-Assistant Surgeon in charge of Cadet Battalion), MS. letter to Preston Cocke, Richmond, Va., Dec. 28, 1894.—W.
- Royster, Lawrence, MS. letter to W., Norfolk, Va., June 12, 1895.—W.
- Rutherfordord, Thomas M., MS. letter to W., Richmond, Va., May 24, 1909.—W.
- Shipp, Scott, General, MS. letter to W., Lexington, Va., Feb. 15, 1897.—W.
- Shipp, Scott, MS. letter to W., April 2, 1909.—W.
- Shipp, Scott, MS. letter to W., June 2, 1909.—W.
- Shipp, Scott, MS. letter to A. P. Young, April 28, 1873. (Copy.)—W.
- Spiller, George, MS. letter to W., Jacksboro, Texas, March 6, 1909.—W.
- Spiller, W. H., MS. letter to W., Wytheville, Va., May 10, 1909.—W.
- Tabb, John, MS. letter to W., Gloucester, Va., May 21, 1909.—W.
- Temple, P. C., MS. letter to W., Richmond, Va., May 5, 1909.—W.
- Thomson, A. Pembroke, MS. letter to W., Summit Point, April 1, 1909.—W.
- Tunstall, Richard B., MS., letter to Preston Cocke, Norfolk, Va., Dec. 27, 1894.—W.
- Tunstall, Richard B., MS. letter to W., March 16, 1909.—W.
- Tunstall, Richard B., MS. letter to W., March 30, 1909.—W.
- Tunstall, Richard B., MS. letter to W., June 4, 1909.—W.
- Tutwiler, E. M., MS. letter to W., Birmingham, Ala., April 29, 1909.—W.
- Upshur, J. N., MS. letter to W., Richmond, Va., March 21, 1909.—W.
- Upshur, J. N., "The Battle of New Market. An Address Delivered on the Occasion of the Unveiling of the Memorial Monument at the Virginia Military Institute, June Twenty-Third, Nineteen-Three," etc., *New Market Day*. (A good account of the part of the Cadets, though marred by the excessive laudation which has characterized most of the writing upon this subject.)
- Venable, W. L., MS. letter to W., Petersburg, Va., April 26, 1909.—W.
- Waller, Robert E., MS. letter to W., Gatewood, Va., May 26, 1909.—W.
- Washington, L., MS. letter to W., Chicago, May 25, 1909.—W.
- White, William H., MS. letter to W., Richmond, Va., March 29, 1909.

Whitehead, H. C., MS. letter to W., Norfolk, Va., March 24, 1909.—W.

Wimbish, L. W., MS. letter to W., Phillis, Va., May 3, 1909.—W.

Wise, John S., "The West Point of the Confederacy," *Century*, XXXVII, 461-471 (January, 1889).

Wise, John S., *Memorial Address of Hon. John S. Wise Delivered at the Unveiling of a Monument to the Memory of the Southern Soldiers and V. M. I. Cadets Who Fell in the Battle of New Market, May 15, 1864*. 1898.

Wise, John S., "Address" before the Alumni of the Virginia Military Institute. *New Market Day*. 1903.—W.

(These papers are beautifully written, but are inaccurate and colored by imagination.)

Wise, John S., MS. letter to W., New York, March 18, 1909.—W.

Wise, Henry A., numerous MS. letters to the author, bearing most upon the part taken by the Cadets.—A.

Wise, Louis C., MS. Reminiscences of the Battle of New Market. 1909.—W.

Wood, J. E., MS. letter to W., Elizabeth City, N. C., May 1, 1909.—W.

Woodbridge, J. E., MS. letter to W., May 27, 1909.—W.

V.

MAPS AND DIAGRAMS, FOR THE MOST PART BY PARTICIPANTS IN THE BATTLE.

Many of these are contradictory, and possess but little value.

Atlas to Accompany the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Published under the Direction of the Hons. Redfield Proctor, Stephen B. Elkins, and Daniel S. Lamont, Secretaries of War, by Major George B. Davis, U. S. Army, Mr. Leslie J. Perry, Civilian Expert, Mr. Joseph W. Kirkley, Civilian Expert, . . . Compiled by Capt. Calvin D. Cowles, 23d U. S. Infantry. Washington, 1891-1895. (Maps excellent and minute.)

Bagnall, J. S. (C), Plan of Positions of Cadets at the Battle of New Market. 1909.—W.

Bransford, J. F. (C), Diagram of the Battle of New Market. 1895.—W.

Colonna, B. A. (C), Plan of the Battle of New Market. 1909. (Excellent).—W.

(Imboden, John D., Brigadier-General), "The Battle of New Market," *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, IV, 480-486, map inserted in, (p. 482), inaccurate and misleading.

Lang, Theodore F., Major, Diagram of the Battle of New Market. No date. (Apparently not an independent drawing, and of little importance).—W.

McLaughlin, William, Major, Diagram of the Battle of New Market. 1897.—W.

Wharton, Gabriel C., Brigadier-General, Diagram of the Battle of New Market. (The authorship should make this work valuable, but it is difficult to estimate the value, since I have been unable to ascertain upon what data it was based. Apparently it was executed too long after the battle to be accurate.)—In possession of Elon O. Henkel, New Market, Va.

Wise, Henry A., A series of maps and sketches drawn or copied by.—W.

Young, Adolphus Pennington, Diagram of the Battle of New Market. 1875. (Copy).—W.

VI.

AUTHORITIES, SECONDARY ACCOUNTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS.

Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. Being for the Most Part Contributions by Union and Confederate Officers. Based upon "The Century War Series." Edited by Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence Clough Buel, of the Editorial Staff of "The Century Magazine." New York, 1887-1888.

Cameron, William E., "The Cadet Warriors of Old Virginia." (Baltimore) *Herald*, Oct. 28, 1894.

Conrad, Holmes, "Address", *New Market Day*. 1903.

Crim, Mrs. E. C., "When Boys Fought Like Veterans," (Richmond) *Times-Dispatch*, Nov. 14, 1909.

Crim, Mrs. E. C., MS. letter to Ca., New Market, Dec. 13, 1910. ("Mother Crim," who still lives in New Market, witnessed the charge of the Cadets, and nursed those who fell in the battle.)—Ca.

Early, Jubal A., Lieutenant-General, *A Memoir of the Last Year of the War for Independence, in the Confederate States of America*, etc., New Orleans, 1867.

Goolrick, John T., Jr., "Brave Boys of Lexington. How the Virginia Cadets Carried Themselves in Battle." *Mobile Daily Register*, June 29, 1895.

Gordon, Armistead C., "New Market. A Threnody." *New Market Day*.

Long, A. L., *Memoirs of Robert E. Lee, His Military and Personal History*, etc., New York, 1887.

Pond, George E., *The Shenandoah Valley in 1864*, New York, 1883. (Reviewed by Colonel William Allan in *Southern Historical Society Papers*, XI, 270-282.)

(Richmond) *State*, Feb. 9, 15, 21, March 8, 13, April 4, 1888. (Controversy between James Henderson Smith and General Early as to alleged assertions about the superior drill and effectiveness of the Cadets.)

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The re-emergence of this extraordinary volume after more than 75 years in publishing limbo represents a milestone in the chronicling of one of the most ballyhooed Events of the American Civil War.

Originally published in 1912, Edward Raymond Turner's "The New Market Campaign" drew on the first-hand recollections of participants in the 1864 battle; incorporated information gleaned from thousands of letters, books, documents and personal statements; and painted an unbiased portrait of the last Confederate victory in the Shenandoah Valley.

Turner's attention to detail and conscientious sifting of historical data makes "The New Market Campaign" important for three critical reasons.

First, it presents a uniqueness of viewpoint and timeliness of narrative that modern historians are unable to duplicate.

Second, it dispels one of the greatest myths of the Civil War—that Virginia Military Institute cadets turned the tide of battle for a desperate Confederate army.

"The Confederate triumph was owing to superb and brilliant movements of Imboden and Breckinridge, who showed themselves no unworthy successors of Stonewall Jackson, and to the resolute bravery of the veteran Confederate troops," wrote Turner.

"Any assertion[s] that the Cadets won the battle of New Market, or stemmed a Confederate rout, are popular exaggerations which have tended to discredit what they actually did."

And third, "The New Market Campaign" is simply a good read.

In a fluid yet authoritative style, Turner takes the reader on an exciting journey that begins in 1864 with the North's master plan to conquer the Confederacy. Crucial to this plan was the crushing of Southern resistance in the lush, fertile Shenandoah Valley.

Just as Stonewall Jackson had hamstrung large numbers of Federal troops in the Valley during his immortal 1862 campaign, the North in 1864 sought to lure Confederate troops there to divert them from the major death struggle between Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee. But the man Grant chose for the job—Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel—was no Stonewall Jackson.

Turner's narrative moves swiftly, placing the players on the stage with both the speed of a novel and the detail of a serious history. It shows how Sigel, with 8,900 men, entered the Valley and crept toward the Rebel stronghold of Staunton while Confederate Generals John C. Breckinridge, John Imboden and Gabriel C. Wharton scrambled to throw together the semblance of an army.

Finally, with 4,500 hastily-assembled soldiers—including 295 cadets from VMI in Lexington—Breckinridge faced Sigel in the peaceful hamlet of New Market on May 15.

Turner shows how the principal commanders differed in nearly every aspect of battlefield acumen. Sigel, he shows, failed at every turn to fully utilize his men, resources and strategic advantages. Breckinridge, Imboden and Wharton on the other hand, performed with the cunning, audacity and fierceness that early in the war marked the Confederate army as an invincible gray tide. As a result, Sigel and his men were thrashed, driven from the field and chased from the Valley.

While Turner admitted that the New Market conflict was not one of the great battles of the Civil War, he pointed out that it achieved legendary status primarily because popular sentiment and biased recollections incorrectly elevated the role of the VMI cadets.

Turner went to scholarly lengths to detail the precise movements of the cadets and the extent to which they contributed to the Confederate victory. He paid tribute to their pluck, but shattered many romantic, commonly held beliefs.

For that reason, many VMI/New Market devotees will have their eyes opened to the truth for the first time, and newcomers to the battle can begin their historical sojourn without having to contend with the stumbling blocks of misinformation.

For both, however, "The New Market Campaign" will provide an exciting and informative look at a day in May when the rapidly falling star of the Confederacy shone bright one last time.